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1 Introduction to the Research Context 
“Corporate reporting regulation has seen substantial changes in recent years” (Leuz 2010, 
p. 229) and enforcement of financial information is but one of them.* That is, enforcement has 
become one of the most important regulatory actions (Brown and Tarca 2005), although en-
forcement systems differ across different institutional settings. Financial information regula-
tion is beneficial when avoiding externalities, producing cost savings through standardization, 
increasing the level of transparency, and decomposing agency conflicts. However, one has to 
bear in mind that regulation also comes with costs. In consequence, benefits from regulation 
need to exceed corresponding costs in order to improve financial information quality and, 
finally, capital market efficiency (cf. Leuz 2010 for a detailed comparison of different ap-
proaches to reporting regulation).  
There are different institutions that ensure financial information quality through different 
mechanisms, including internal and external corporate governance institutions. Vice versa, 
reliable financial information is a pivotal part of corporate governance since it provides rele-
vant information to internal and external shareholders who use financial reporting in order to 
derive both their control and investment decisions (Armstrong et al. 2010). However, princi-
ples-based accounting standards frequently require managerial discretion (Schipper 2005) 
which cannot be observed by other stakeholders and, thus, might impair financial information 
reliability. Both internal and external governance mechanisms should therefore ensure that 
management uses discretion in a comprehensible manner.  
                                               
*  For the purpose of this dissertation, the term ‘financial information’ refers to regulated information as out-
lined by the Transparency Directive, and all other synonyms that relate to information, which are presented 
in regulated financial statements.  
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However, in the early 2000’s, worldwide accounting scandals exposed that (supervisory) 
boards as well as auditors were not able to prevent the preparation of erroneous or even 
fraudulent financial statements (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Flowtex or Comroad). In 
reaction to those accounting scandals, which led to large stock price declines and even bank-
ruptcy (i.e. Enron or Worldcom), legislators responded by initiating tougher corporate govern-
ance rules and enforcement mechanisms for firms geared towards capital markets. Those reac-
tions include amongst others the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act in the US (Leuz 2007, Zhang 2007) and 
different European regulations that have been adopted on the national level accordingly. 
In response to the aforementioned scandals, European regulation superseded national regula-
tion in order to protect the integrated European capital market (Wagenhofer and Ewert 2015). 
Regulation of financial information on European level is mostly governed by the so-called 
IAS Regulation (EC/1606/2002) and the so-called Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC). 
Being a key precondition for an integrated European capital market, the IAS Regulation re-
quires listed firms to prepare their consolidated financial statements according to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, solely using a single set of accounting 
standards does not ensure faithful and consistent application of the relevant accounting stand-
ards.† Thus, Transparency Directive’s recital 16 additionally requires EU member states to 
implement and maintain an effective enforcement mechanism that ensures faithful and con-
sistent application of IFRS. In this context, enforcement of financial information requires “ex-
amining the compliance of financial information with the relevant financial reporting frame-
                                               
†  The term ‘relevant accounting standards’ includes all sets of accounting standards that firms use when pre-
paring their (consolidated) financial statements. That is in line with paragraph 24 of the ESMA guidelines 
on enforcement (ESMA 2014) that extends the scope of enforcement to accounting requirements under na-
tional law. For firms that are listed on a German stock market, relevant accounting standards therefore in-
clude IFRS and all corresponding interpretations, German GAAP (Handelsgesetzbuch - HGB), and GAS 
(Deutsche Rechnungslegungsstandards). Unlike consolidated financial statements which are regularly pre-
pared in accordance with IFRS, legal entity accounts are prepared under German GAAP. With regard to 
GAS, for example, GAS 20 provides detailed guidance for the management report (Zülch & Höltken 2013), 
which is one of FREP’s regular yearly enforcement priorities. 
 
5 
work, taking appropriate measures where infringements are discovered during the enforce-
ment process, in accordance with the rules applicable under the Transparency Directive and 
taking other measures relevant for the purpose of enforcement” (ESMA 2014, p. 5). That is, 
enforcement contributes to the transparency of financial information and, thus, to the protec-
tion of investors as well as the promotion of market confidence and market efficiency.  
There are three different types of enforcement systems, including authoritative enforcement 
systems, private enforcement systems, and hybrid enforcement systems.‡ Regarding the au-
thoritative enforcement model, US enforcement by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission) regularly serves as a role model.  The main characteristics are extensive enforcement 
and direct sanctioning powers (e.g. fines or injunctions) at the level of the federal authority. 
Restatements as well as auditing and accounting error releases (AAERs) are publicly dissemi-
nated in order to enable the adverse disclosure mechanism (Karpoff et al. 2008). Considering 
the SEC’s broad powers, most of the EU member states similarly delegated enforcement re-
sponsibilities to federal authorities (ESMA 2015). Vice versa, UK enforcement by the FRRP 
(Financial Reporting Review Panel) is regularly used when characterizing private enforce-
ment models. The main characteristics are investigations on a voluntarily basis and no en-
forcement or direct sanctioning functions on the level of the private enforcement panel. Un-
like US-listed firms, UK-listed firms are solely sanctioned through adverse disclosure of ex-
posed financial information errors.  
Third, hybrid systems combine features of both systems (Schmidt-Versteyhl 2008, Bockmann 
2012). Those systems are typically characterized by regulated self-regulation and governmen-
tal subsidiarity. Regulated self-regulation describes organizational forms that delegate federal 
                                               
‡  The terms ‘hybrid enforcement system’ and ‘two-tiered enforcement system’ have the similar meaning, 
referring to enforcement systems that combine both authoritative and private enforcement institutions (cf. 
Hoffmann and Höltken 2015 for a detailed comparison of existing hybrid enforcement systems).  
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assignments to a private body. In addition, governmental subsidiarity means that the federal 
authority acts strictly subsidiary to the private body. More specifically, the responsible federal 
authority primarily delegates the duty enforcement investigation to a private enforcement 
panel. This private enforcement panel operates similar to the FRRP. In this context, the federal 
authority retains the ultimate responsibility for the enforcement process and, thus, has the 
necessary powers to mandate firms to take part in the enforcement process, provide the neces-
sary financial information to the enforcement bodies, and instruct firms to issue error an-
nouncements. Hence, the federal authority acts similarly to the SEC. However, the federal 
authority does not impose any direct sanctions related to erroneous financial information. In 
consequence, the single sanctioning function of the hybrid enforcement system is the adverse 
disclosure mechanism. The first country to introduce such a hybrid enforcement system was 
Germany back in 2005. In 2014, Austria was the second country to implement a similar en-
forcement system.§  
The enforcement of financial information in Germany is but one reaction to accounting scan-
dals which took place in the early 2000’s. Financial misreporting by German firms like Flow-
tex or Comroad impaired investor confidence in financial statement reliability and, thus, nega-
tively affected capital market effectiveness. In consequence, Germany enacted three legisla-
tions in order to enhance the degree of financial information enforcement, including new in-
dependency rules for auditors, restructuring auditor oversight and, finally, a hybrid enforce-
ment mechanism (cf. Ernstberger et al. 2012 for a detailed overview on the aforementioned 
legislative reforms). This said, the hybrid enforcement mechanism complements prior finan-
cial reporting enforcement mechanisms, which include the two-tiered board structure, statuto-
                                               
§  We compiled a detailed guidance for the Austrian enforcement system based upon several years of relevant 
experience in German enforcement investigations. In this context, we provide best-practices on, amongst 
others, how to react to the initiation of the investigation and how to cooperate with enforcement institutions 
in Austria (Zülch et al. 2014c).  
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ry audits and court decisions.** The Accounting Enforcement Act (Bilanzkontrollgesetz) en-
acted the national implementation of new enforcement requirements and created the legal 
basis for mandating enforcement responsibilities to a private panel and a federal authority. 
Although the 2014 published ESMA guidelines on enforcement affirm the European require-
ment set out in the Transparency Directive that enforcement responsibilities are primarily sit-
uated with federal authorities (ESMA 2014), the German hybrid model is in accordance with 
European requirements (Hommelhoff and Gundel 2015). That is, by delegating the responsi-
bility for enforcement investigations to a private enforcement panel, the federal authority in 
Germany retains overall responsibility for all enforcement matters.  
This said, §§ 342b – 342e of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) constitute 
the legal foundation for recognizing a private enforcement panel, which is named German 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP; Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung). 
Since 2005, FREP has conducted investigations with regard to firm-specific issues of relevant 
accounting standards. Thus, FREP constitutes the first tier to the hybrid enforcement mecha-
nism. The hybrid setting is completed by the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin; 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) which is primarily responsible for the en-
forcement of financial information in Germany. In the course of the Accounting Enforcement 
Act, the Securities Trading Act (WpHG; Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) has been amended by the 
§§ 37n – 37u creating the legal basis to control the legitimacy of financial statements of listed 
firms in Germany. BaFin acts strictly subsidiary to FREP (§ 37p WpHG). However, BaFin 
conducts its own investigations under certain circumstances, namely when (1) firms refuse to 
cooperate with FREP, (2) firms disagree with FREP’s findings, or (3) BaFin has reasonable 
                                               
**  The hybrid enforcement system particularly complements enforcement by statutory audits. However, both 
governance mechanisms differ substantially in focus, staffing provisions, and purpose (Zülch et al. 2014a, 
Zülch et al. 2014b). In consequence, firms under investigation regularly report that enforcement investiga-
tions create the impression to examine accounting treatments on a case-by-case basis.  
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doubts about FREP’s findings. Nevertheless, only BaFin has the necessary authoritative pow-
er to order firms to publish accounting errors that have been established throughout the en-
forcement process (§ 37q WpHG).  
Since 2005, FREP has conducted investigations on firms that are listed on a German capital 
stock market.†† Firms listed in one of the four major indices (DAX, MDAX, TecDAX, 
SDAX) are subject to investigation every four to six years, whereas FREP investigates all 
other firms every eight to ten years. There are three different investigation types, including 
random sample examinations, examinations with cause, and examinations requested by BaFin 
(table 1 provides an overview on the frequency of each investigation type pursued and the 
number of errors established). Considering all error announcements published from 2006-
2015, the error rate reveals that still one out of five financial statements under investigations 
is found to be erroneous. Although the error rate has significantly declined during the last four 
years, FREP states that particularly complex transactions and decisions which require profes-
sional judgment regularly give reason to errors established throughout the enforcement pro-
cess (FREP 2016). 
                                               
††  This procedure is changed for investigations beginning after January 1, 2016. From then on, German en-




Table 1: Enforcement investigations and errors exposed from 2005-2015 
Research on the German enforcement system has grown in the past years. Nevertheless, there 
is only little evidence on the hybrid enforcement system’s deterring function through adverse 
disclosure. The public dissemination of financial misreporting which has been detected by 
either FREP or BaFin is the main characteristic of the German enforcement system and, thus, 
facilitates the adverse disclosure mechanism which is often also labeled as “name and shame” 
mechanism. This mechanism is both preventive and reactive in nature (Berger 2010). That is, 
the public dissemination of financial misreporting primarily increases firms’ and executives’ 
awareness of certain accounting treatments. In addition, by publicly naming the firms that 
prepare erroneous financial statements, the adverse disclosure is reactive in nature and, thus, 
triggers the enforcement’s sanctioning function. Overall, the foundation of adverse disclosure 
as well as the interaction of adverse disclosure with and its perception by other stakeholders is 
of particular interest. This key mechanism in hybrid enforcement is therefore covered by this 
dissertation titled “Enforcement of Financial Reporting: Foundations and Consequences of 
Adverse Disclosure”.   
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Proportion
Total 7 109 135 138 118 118 110 113 110 104 81 1,143 100%
Sampling-based 4 98 118 118 103 106 90 110 98 99 71 1,015 89%
Indication-based 3 10 15 19 14 8 6 2 6 3 6 92 8%
Mandatory 
request by BaFin
0 1 2 1 1 4 14 1 6 2 4 36 3%
Total 2 19 35 37 23 31 27 18 15 13 12 232 20%
Proportion 29% 17% 26% 27% 19% 26% 25% 16% 14% 13% 15%
Total 0 5 32 32 39 25 30 23 14 10 12 222 96%
Proportion to 
FREP/BaFin
0% 26% 91% 86% 170% 81% 111% 128% 93% 77% 100%
Examinations by FREP
Error Findings Reported 
by FREP/BaFin
Errors Stated in Federal 
Gazette by Companies
Note: Number of examinations and error announcements are taken from the annual activity reports of the FREP (2005-2015). Error findings are





Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation comprises five separate manuscripts, including a literature review, an eco-
nomic analysis of legal foundations, two empirical studies, and a teaching case. The first 
manuscript compiles the status quo of preceding research on the world-wide enforcement of 
financial information and identifies avenues for further research. The second paper narrows 
the scope of the dissertation by comparing the hybrid enforcement systems in Germany and 
Austria. The third and fourth papers investigate firm-level and executive-level consequences 
to adverse disclosure. Finally, the fifth paper is a teaching case that elaborates on FREP’s de-
cision making process during the enforcement investigation. Figure 1 provides a structured 
overview on all five parts of this dissertation. Overall, this dissertation aims at contributing to 
Enforcement in Germany: 
Foundations and Consequences of Adverse Disclosure
I.
Enforcement of Financial Reporting:
A Corporate Governance Perspective
Germany and Austria as Examples of 
Hybrid Enforcement Systems in Europe
II.
III.
Institutional Embedding of Hybrid Enforcement Systems 
Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error
Announcements: Extended Evidence from Germany
The Association Between Executive Turnover and
Financial Misreporting: Evidence from Germany
Enforcement of Financial Reporting in




Determinants and Consequences of Adverse Disclosure
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the understanding of the adverse disclosure mechanism that servers as a deterrent for the hy-
brid enforcement system in Germany. 
The enforcement of financial information ensures faithful and consistent application of rele-
vant accounting standards. This is mandatory for providing reliable financial information 
which is, in turn, necessary for effective corporate governance. Hence, enforcement augments 
financial information governance by (supervisory) boards and statutory audits to become the 
third governance tier. That is, manuscript A “Enforcement of Financial Reporting: A Cor-
porate Governance Perspective” provides a comprehensive overview on preceding en-
forcement research. By doing so, we analyze interactions between enforcement and other 
governance mechanisms. In consequence, this literature review forms the basis of this disser-
tation by displaying results from preceding research and deducting possible avenues for fur-
ther research.  
At first, we provide a structured approach to categorizing prior enforcement research, includ-
ing institutional and operational differences between the aforementioned three types of en-
forcement systems. Moreover, by categorizing interrelations with both internal and external 
governance mechanisms, we critically discuss the role of enforcement on enhancing other 
internal and external governance mechanisms. As a result, we emphasize the necessity to fur-
ther assess enforcement systems’ efficiency and efficacy in order to gain insights on the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each enforcement system, which are in direct competition 
(guest commentary by Hommelhoff in FREP 2015). Finally, we also highlight the scarcity of 
evidence for both the prevention and sanctioning function with regard to non-capital market 
measures in the European context. We also note that future research needs to further investi-
gate on the association between accounting issues and enforcement outcomes. Overall, this 
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manuscript therefore contributes to the understanding of enforcement in a corporate govern-
ance context.  
As previously mentioned, there are three different types of enforcement systems, including 
authoritative, private, and hybrid enforcement systems. Germany was the first country to im-
plement a hybrid enforcement system that combines both authoritative and private elements. 
In 2014, Austria was the second country to implement a similar enforcement system. Hence, 
manuscript B “Germany and Austria as Examples of Hybrid Enforcement Systems in 
Europe” elaborates on the differences between both legal frameworks from an economic per-
spective. That is, after defining regulated self-regulation and governmental subsidiarity as the 
two main characteristics of a hybrid enforcement system and applying those principles to dif-
ferent procedural enforcement issues, we deduct a consequent distinction of hybrid enforce-
ment systems. In consequence, we define Germany as a typical hybrid enforcement system 
which is fully compliant with the two aforementioned principles. By contrast, the Austrian 
enforcement system represents an atypical hybrid enforcement system which is characterized 
by a less pronounced governmental subsidiarity. Overall, this manuscript contributes to the 
understanding of the legal environment of hybrid enforcement systems and, therefore, of the 
foundations of adverse disclosure.  
Based upon the general conditions of enforcement as outlined in manuscripts A and B, manu-
script C “Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements: Extended Evi-
dence from Germany” investigates shareholder reactions to error announcements in a single-
country setting. That is of particular interest as shareholders are the main addressees of en-
forcement of financial reporting. Also, adverse disclosure intends to facilitate investor reac-
tions to error announcements in order to enable enforcement’s sanctioning function. Previous-
ly, the study by Hitz et al. (2012) has been the only research conducted on shareholder reac-
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tions to error announcements. But their relatively short investigation period is subject to in-
herent methodological shortcomings due to sample size and the confounding mandatory ap-
plication of IFRS (cf. Barth and Israeli 2013 discussing Christensen et al. 2013). In conse-
quence, our manuscript augments prior evidence by using a longer investigation period in 
order to increase statistical power, and additional qualitative explanatory variables. That is, 
the adjusted design of our study fulfils the demand for further investigations on accounting 
issues as demanded in manuscript A.  
Shareholder reactions are but one channel that enables the deterring function. But executive 
turnover in response to financial misreporting also serves as a deterrent. That is, manuscript D 
“The Association between Executive Turnover and Financial Misreporting: Evidence 
from Germany” augments preceding research on the German enforcement system by analyz-
ing consequences at the executive level in the context of an error announcement. Being the 
first to investigate this association, we contribute to two streams of literature. First, we pro-
vide current insights on the association between financial misreporting and executive turnover 
in Germany. Second, prior research on the German enforcement system to date is focused on 
capital-market properties. By analyzing executive consequences, this manuscript provides an 
additional perspective on the adverse disclosure mechanism. Overall, this study responds to 
the demand for further research to investigate different channels of adverse disclosure as out-
lined in manuscript A. 
Considering the enforcement investigation’s confidentiality, there is not much information on 
how the enforcement bodies decide on whether an accounting treatment is erroneous. Howev-
er, it is necessary to understand that enforcement is not always a binary decision but regularly 
requires enforcement bodies to also apply professional judgment when evaluating different 
accounting treatments. In consequence, manuscript E “Enforcement of Financial Reporting 
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in a Professional Football Firm: An Integrative Case” uses a teaching case setting to pro-
vide students with the opportunity to independently decide on different accounting treatments. 
Based upon a real-world scenario, we use a typical investigation procedure including FREP 
questionnaires and a listed football firm’s response letters for in-class discussion. The case 
covers three different accounting treatments which require professional judgment by both 
preparers and examiners-in-charge, including professional football players as intangible assets 
(IAS 38), deferred tax assets from loss carryforwards (IAS 12), and revenue recognition from 
sponsoring (IAS 18). To sum this up, manuscript E contributes to the understanding of the 
cooperative investigation approach of the hybrid enforcement system by providing insights in 




2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts 
Manuscript A “Enforcement of Financial Reporting: A Corporate Governance Perspec-
tive” is a literature review on preceding enforcement research that aims at providing a theoret-
ical embedding of enforcement as a separate corporate governance mechanism and a struc-
tured approach to prior research on enforcement of financial reporting. Taking into account 
the results and mentioned methodological shortcomings of prior research, we contribute to the 
world-wide stream of literature that investigates the impact of enforcement of financial report-
ing on accounting quality by identifying four subordinate avenues for further research. Fur-
thermore, we contribute to the growing stream of literature on the unique hybrid German en-
forcement system by additionally addressing research gaps particularly associated with hybrid 
enforcement systems..  
First, we deliver a definition of enforcement of financial reporting. Considering the definition 
of objectives by different regulatory institutions, we further provide a thorough embedding of 
enforcement as an external governance mechanism. Based on the notion that corporate gov-
ernance requires reliable financial information, we also show the interaction of enforcement 
and other both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.  
Second, there is a large body of literature on enforcement. We therefore develop a structured 
approach in order to initially identify all relevant research on the enforcement of financial 
reporting in different institutional settings. That is, we identify 164 relevant studies which 
employ a range of different methodological assessments. Additionally, we group preceding 
research along four dimensions of enforcement, comprising different enforcement characteris-
tics and different enforcement consequences. With regard to characteristics, we distinguish 
between research on enforcement reforms and research on enforcement strength. Hence, these 
streams of research provide evidence for institutional differences in enforcement systems. 
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Prior research offers almost unambiguous evidence that stricter enforcement benefits capital 
market properties, financial reporting perception, and accounting quality. Vis-à-vis these two 
research streams, research on either restatements or enforcement actions focuses on enforce-
ment outcomes and, thus, sheds further light on the operational level of enforcement. Relevant 
research points to a strong deterring mechanism of enforcement by providing evidence for 
particularly strong sanctioning mechanisms on both firm and personal levels. However, re-
search also provides deviating results for different institutional settings indicating that “the 
US appears to be a major outlier when it comes to enforcement and quite different [even] 
from fellow Anglo-American countries” (Leuz 2010, p. 247). 
By highlighting different interactions between enforcement characteristics and enforcement 
consequences as well as the mentioned methodological shortcomings, we come up with a crit-
ical assessment of preceding research that provides us with four main avenues for further re-
search. The first pair of research opportunities concerns the enforcement systems’ efficiency 
and efficacy. To begin with, there is no evidence for efficiency yet. Research in this context 
might contribute by providing evidence for advantages and disadvantages of different en-
forcement systems which differ systematically in terms of available resources. Hence, evi-
dence on different enforcement institutions making efficient use of their resources would shed 
further light on the ongoing discussion on enforcement best practices.  
Moreover, efficacy evaluates the degree of target achievement. Considering the enforcement 
setting, efficacy denotes the relation between enforcement outcomes to the target of enforce-
ment. With regard to research on the enforcement’s impact on capital market properties, re-
search attributes enforcement a beneficial role. Still, it seems unclear whether the design of 
recent research is able to distinguish between the effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement 
implementation (cf. discussion between Christensen et al. 2013 vs. Barth and Israeli 2013). In 
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addition, enforcement aims at ensuring faithful and consistent financial reporting which might 
be equated with accounting quality. However, there is not a single view on how to measure 
accounting quality. Vice versa, there is evidence on the preventive and sanctioning function of 
enforcement. Unlike its US predecessors, first evidence on European enforcement does not 
support the strong relation between enforcement consequences and the firm or personal level 
deterring function of adverse disclosure. However, it has to be noted that most of these asso-
ciations have to date not been investigated for the European setting. 
The second pair of research opportunities focuses on the operational level of enforcement and, 
therefore, directly augments the two avenues on the institutional level. That is, we encourage 
scholars to take into account the deviating role of capital markets for European countries and 
to further investigate other channels of the adverse disclosure’s deterring function. Further-
more, we point to the fact that prior research regularly omits to investigate the association 
between different accounting issues and enforcement outcomes and instead solely uses the 
shareholder perspective by employing ratios from financial statement analysis. That is, prior 
research only assesses quantitative but no qualitative characteristics of this association. 
After having received a “revise and resubmit”-decision, the manuscript was recently resub-
mitted to Management Review Quarterly (ISSN: 2198-1620; VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”) and is 
currently under review. Two earlier versions of this paper were published as HHL Working 
Papers No. 142 and No. 150 (revised version of No. 142). Working Paper 150 was also pub-
lished on the Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com). The paper is co-authored by 
Germar Ebner. Both authors contributed equally to the development of the research question, 
the conceptualization of the structured approach, the literature analysis, and the draft of the 
manuscript. The author of this dissertation predominantly conducted the parts on the institu-
tional background of enforcement and enforcement as a corporate governance mechanism. 
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This also holds for the description of relevant literature concerning restatements and enforce-
ment actions as well as the critical discussion of the effects of enforcement on internal corpo-
rate governance mechanisms and capital markets. The avenues for further research were de-
rived equally by Germar Ebner and the author of this dissertation. The remainder of the man-
uscript has been predominantly conducted by Germar Ebner. Furthermore, we summarized 
exclusive findings for the hybrid German enforcement system in the article “10 Jahre DPR – 
Ist das deutsche Enforcement-System effektiv?“ that was published in Die Wirtschaftsprüfung 
(ISSN: 0340-9031; VHB-Jourqual 3: “C“; Vol. 68(13), pp. 656-666) in 2015. 
Manuscript B “Germany and Austria as Examples of Hybrid Enforcement Systems in 
Europe” is an economic analysis of legal foundations for enforcement systems implemented 
in Germany and Austria. Germany and Austria are the only two countries in the world that 
have implemented a hybrid enforcement system (ESMA 2015). Considering this, it is im-
portant to note that the Austrian enforcement system is derived from the German system. 
Germany was the first country to combine both private and authoritative enforcement ele-
ments in order to benefit from each type’s advantages. Hence, we were interested whether 
these two systems differ in certain aspects that are typical for the procedure of hybrid en-
forcement systems.  
We use two different signature characteristics in order to identify potential differences be-
tween both systems, including self-regulated regulation and governmental subsidiarity. Self-
regulated regulation requires a private institution to take over authoritative responsibility and, 
thus, facilitate financial information regulation on a level playing field for firms. Additionally, 
governmental subsidiarity augments self-regulated regulation. That is, the federal authority 
that delegates its powers to the private institution is legally required to strictly act on a lagged 
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basis. By analyzing and comparing six different areas of legal requirements,‡‡ we find notable 
differences for the procedural responsibilities of both federal authority and private panel be-
tween both countries. Based upon these findings, we characterize the German enforcement 
system as typically hybrid because it meets all requirements of both principles. By contrast, 
the Austrian enforcement system is characterized as atypically hybrid because we find a less 
pronounced governmental subsidiarity.     
The manuscript has been published in Die Wirtschaftsprüfung (ISSN: 0340-9031; VHB-
Jourqual 3: “C”; 2014, Vol. 67(14), pp. 730-736). The manuscript is co-authored by Sebastian 
Hoffmann. Both authors have equally contributed to both the development and conceptualiza-
tion of the research idea, the analysis of the legal foundations, and the draft of the manuscript.  
Manuscript C “Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements: Extended 
Evidence from Germany” is an empirical analysis of investor reactions to error announce-
ments in a short-window event study design. Besides investigating the adverse disclosure 
mechanism’s existence, we employ a multivariate determinants model in order to identify 
certain error characteristics driving investor reactions.  
Since 2005, FREP has conducted enforcement investigations aiming at ensuring compliance 
with all relevant accounting standards for firms listed in Germany. Considering this rather 
young mechanism, the hybrid enforcement mechanism was a substantial change to financial 
information regulation in the context of the simultaneous IFRS adoption (Ernstberger et al. 
2012). Hence, there are differing opinions whether the positive impact on capital market 
properties is caused by IFRS adoption or enforcement changes. Prior capital-market-based 
evidence for the German enforcement system provided only weak support for an existing ad-
                                               
‡‡  Areas include both the federal authorities’ and the private panels’ procedural responsibility, pre-clearance 
responsibilities, examination subject, legal protection, and sourcing of the panels.  
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verse disclosure mechanism (Hitz et al. 2012). Also, considering the aforementioned discus-
sion on distinguishing effects of improved capital market properties (Barth and Israeli 2013 
vs. Christensen et al. 2013), investor reactions could be enhanced by investors not being used 
to IFRS information. That is, adopting IFRS allows for more managerial discretion in compar-
ison to former financial statements preparation in accordance with German Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch). Prior literature indicates that IFRS compliance improved over time 
(Glaum et al. 2013). Hence, it is necessary to reassess the early evidence on the adverse dis-
closure mechanism. 
We investigate investor reactions to error announcements issued in the federal gazette (Bun-
desanzeiger) from 2006-2013. Our sample comprises 88 firms that issued an error announce-
ment during this period. By doing so, we extend preceding capital-market-based evidence on 
the adverse disclosure mechanism by Hitz et al. (2012), who investigated the years from 
2006-2009. We hypothesize that investors react negatively to error announcements and that 
this effect is enhanced by error severity, core-income-effecting errors, and errors that second-
guess professional judgment. In order to investigate changes in investor perception, we further 
partition our sample into early (2006-2009) and current (2010-2013) years of enforcement.  
In contrast to our predecessors, we find that there is no significant investor reaction to error 
announcements for the extended period under investigation. Moreover, we do not find sup-
porting evidence that errors affecting core income or second-guessing professional judgment 
determine investor reactions. However, by partitioning our sample into early and current 
years, we find weak support for investor reactions in the early years. This is in line with initial 
evidence by Hitz et al. (2012). However, it has to be noted that we cannot attribute this devel-
opment to a change of investor perception over time, but rather to a change in error character-
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istics. In particular, changes in both profitability and financial leverage and effects on legal 
accounts predominantly determine investor reactions.  
Overall, our study contributes to the understanding of the adverse disclosure mechanism in 
Germany by shedding further light on investor reactions in the German enforcement setting. 
Bearing in mind the rather weak capital-market-based evidence for the adverse disclosure 
mechanism, we argue that future research should investigate complementary deterring chan-
nels of enforcement, e.g. management or auditor turnover.   
This manuscript has been accepted for publication in the International Business and Econom-
ics Research Journal (ISSN: 1535-0754; VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”; forthcoming). An earlier ver-
sion of the manuscript was published as HHL Working Paper No. 141 and on the Social Sci-
ence Research Network (www.ssrn.com). Moreover, the manuscript was presented at the 6th 
Doctoral Seminar on Accounting at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management in October 
2014 and at the European Accounting Association’s 38th Annual Congress in Glasgow in May 
2015. The paper is co-authored by Germar Ebner and Henning Zülch. Germar Ebner and the 
author of this dissertation contributed equally to the development and the design of this study. 
While Germar Ebner gathered the relevant data and conducted the statistical analyses, the 
author of this dissertation prepared the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the error 
announcements considered. Accordingly, Germar Ebner predominantly drafted the methodol-
ogy and results section, whereas the author of this dissertation drafted the sections on the in-
stitutional setting, preceding research, and hypotheses development. Henning Zülch was con-
stantly supervising and mentoring throughout the research process.  
Responding to the demand for research on complementary deterring channels of enforcement, 
manuscript D “The Association between Executive Turnover and Financial Misreporting: 
Evidence from Germany” provides an additional perspective on consequences to adverse 
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disclosure by turning to labor market consequences for management executives. The paper 
aims at investigating the association between both CEO and CFO turnover and error an-
nouncements. Prior research has shown that firms react to erroneous financial information by 
either shortening executive remuneration (Burks 2010) or terminating employment (Karpoff 
et al. 2008). That is, error announcements are unambiguous evidence for management misbe-
havior and impaired organizational legitimacy. Hence, executives are held responsible in or-
der to restore organizational legitimacy (Farber 2005). It thus “may be optimal to effect a 
managerial change to restore investors’ faith in the firm” (Desai et al. 2006, p. 87).  
This study covers error announcements published in the federal gazette from 2006-2013 for a 
sample of 206 industry-and-size-matched firms. Executive turnover comprises turnover inci-
dents for both CEO and CFO. That is, both executives are mainly responsible for deciding on 
transactions and corresponding accounting treatments that are recognized in financial state-
ments. We therefore hypothesize that the incident of financial misreporting increases the like-
lihood of executive turnover. We use a five-year period for identifying executive turnover, 
including two years before and after the year of the error announcement. We chose such a 
relatively long period because the period between the erroneous financial statement and the 
error announcement’s date of publication is almost as many as two years. 
Our results indicate that there are notable differences in the executive turnover likelihood be-
tween both groups at different points in time. In line with our predictions, executive turnover 
is notably higher (+13.6%) for the error group in the five-year period. Additionally, the results 
of our determinants model indicate that executive turnover is positively related to the issuance 
of an error announcement for the five-year model. However, the association scarcely misses 
levels of conventional statistical significance. Furthermore, our determinants model indicates 
that pre-announcement period turnover is strongly related to internal governance characteris-
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tics. Vice versa, post-announcement period turnover is strongly related to external governance 
mechanisms. All of our models have in common that firm-level (size and profitability) and 
executive-level characteristics (tenure) yield the strongest association with executive turnover.  
Moreover, we conduct an additional analysis for the error firm subsample in order to identify 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of errors exposed that determine executive turno-
ver. These characteristics include a process-immanent distinction, the errors’ quantitative im-
pact, the non-appropriate use of professional judgment, and the five most frequently exposed 
accounting errors by either FREP or BaFin. We find strong evidence that executives that re-
fuse to cooperate with FREP are more likely to leave the firm under investigation. In addition, 
we find errors related to non-appropriate use of professional judgment and false or incomplete 
explanations in the management report to display the strongest association with executive 
turnover.  
Hence, by providing an additional perspective on adverse disclosure consequences, our study 
on executive turnover augments prior capital-market-based evidence on adverse disclosure 
consequences in the German hybrid enforcement setting. Based on our results, we argue that 
joint governance by supervisory boards, auditors, and enforcement bodies ensures consistent 
and faithful application of all relevant accounting standards.  
This manuscript was recently published as HHL Working Paper No. 151 and on the Social 
Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com). Furthermore, we are going to submit it to select-
ed upcoming conferences. Possible outlets for this manuscript are the journals Research in 
Accounting Regulation (ISSN: 1052-0457; VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”) or Accounting in Europe 
(ISSN: 1744-9480; VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”). This manuscript is co-authored by Stephanie Jana 
and Henning Zülch. The author of this dissertation predominantly developed both the research 
idea and the study design and gathered the relevant data, whereas Stephanie Jana and the au-
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thor of this dissertation equally contributed to the development, design, and data gathering of 
the additional analyses. Accordingly, the author of this dissertation predominantly prepared 
the sections on the institutional background, prior research, hypotheses development, meth-
odology, and results. With regard to the additional analyses, Stephanie Jana and the author of 
this dissertation have proportionally prepared the section on additional analyses and robust-
ness tests. Henning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the research 
process.  
Due to the confidentiality of enforcement investigations, students regularly think of error an-
nouncements as clear and unequivocal decisions. However, as previously mentioned most 
errors established throughout the enforcement process refer to complex transactions or ac-
counting treatments that require extensive use of professional judgment. Hence, most error 
announcements are the result of intensive discussions between preparers, auditors, and 
FREP’s representatives. Thus, manuscript E “Enforcement of Financial Reporting in Pro-
fessional Football Firms: An Integrative Case” is a teaching case which is based on the 
real-world case of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA’s error announcement on July 16, 
2009. This case primarily covers the discussion scenario between a listed professional football 
firm and FREP within a sample-based enforcement investigation. By doing so, the case com-
bines conceptual knowledge of IFRS accounting and both students’ discussion as well as 
presentation skills. Hence, the case improves students’ application knowledge. Accordingly, 
the case learning objectives include reviewing, applying, and discussing accounting require-
ments for three different accounting treatments. First, students are required to evaluate the 
accounting treatment for professional football players as intangible assets according to IAS 
38. Second, students are asked to discuss pros and cons for updating the carrying amount of 
deferred tax assets resulting from loss carryforwards in accordance with IAS 12. Third, being 
subject to the real-world error announcement, students evaluate different recognition methods 
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for revenues from sponsoring taking into account the requirements of IAS 18. All of these 
accounting treatments have in common that students must analyze and evaluate the underly-
ing professional judgment of each decision in order to decide whether the treatment is errone-
ous or not.  
Students receive a blue-print solution and an outlook on what happens after FREP’s decision 
at the end of the teaching session, which is presented and discussed by the instructors. Hence, 
students additionally become aware of potential consequences that arise from enforcement 
investigations. That is, an erroneous accounting treatment is publicly disseminated if FREP 
comes to the decision that it is non-compliant with IFRS and, thus, enables the adverse disclo-
sure mechanism. Overall, students learn to review and apply IFRS accounting requirements in 
a real-world scenario. Moreover, students learn to understand consequences of management 
decisions based on professional judgment. Finally, students become aware of the cooperative 
approach that characterizes the German hybrid enforcement system. That is, they learn that 
accounting decisions regularly are non-binary decisions which need good reasoning and doc-
umentation.  
The manuscript was submitted to the Journal of Accounting Education (ISSN: 0748-5751; 
VHB-Jourqual: “C”) and is currently under review. It is co-authored by Henning Zülch. The 
case was equally developed, conceptualized, and tested by both authors. The manuscript was 
drafted by the submitting doctoral candidate and continuously discussed with the co-author.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of adverse disclosure as a deterrent 
in the German hybrid enforcement system. Figure 2 provides a final summary of each manu-








OVERVIEW OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE DISSERTATION: 
“ENFORCEMENT IN GERMANY: FOUNDATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
ADVERSE DISCLOSURE” 
 
No. Title Current Status 
A Enforcement of Financial Reporting: 
A Corporate Governance Perspective 
‘Revise and resubmit’ decision at Management Re-
view Quarterly (ISSN: 2198-1620). Currently under 
review for publication (2nd round) at Management 
Review Quarterly. 
Earlier versions published as HHL Working Papers 
No. 142 and No. 150. 
Selected findings of this article referring to the Ger-
man enforcement system were summarized in the 
article ’10 Jahre DPR – Ist das deutsche Enforce-
ment-System effektiv?’, published in Die 
Wirtschaftsprüfung (ISSN: 0340-9031), 2015, 68(13), 
pp. 656-666. 
B Deutschland und Österreich als Bei-
spiele der Implementierung hybrider 
Enforcement-Systeme in Europa 
Published in Die Wirtschaftsprüfung (ISSN: 0340-
9031), 2014, 67 (14), pp. 730-736.  
C Determinants of Investor Reactions to 
Error Announcements: Extended 
Evidence from Germany 
Accepted for publication in International Business & 
Economics Research Journal (ISSN: 1535-0754). 
Earlier version published as HHL Working Paper No. 
141. 
Presented at the 6th Doctoral Seminar on Accounting 
at HHL in October 2014 and at the 38th Annual Con-
gress of the European Accounting Association in 
Glasgow, Scotland, in April 2015.  
D The Association between Executive 
Turnover and Financial Misreport-
ing: Evidence from Germany 
Published as HHL Working Paper No. 151. 
E Enforcement of Financial Reporting 
in Professional Football Firms: An 
Integrative Case 







ARMSTRONG, C., GUAY, W., & WEBER, J. (2010). The role of information and financial report-
ing in corporate governance and debt contracting. Journal of Accounting and Econom-
ics, 50(2-3), pp. 179-234. 
BARTH, M., & ISRAELI, D. (2013). Disentangling mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in 
enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2-3), pp. 178-188. 
BERGER, A. (2010). The development and status of enforcement in the European Union. Ac-
counting in Europe, 7(1), pp. 15-35. 
BOCKMANN, R. (2012). Internationale Koordinierung nationaler Enforcement-Aktivitäten – 
eine kritische Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutschen Prüfstelle für 
Rechnungslegung. Doctoral dissertation, Wiesbaden.  
BROWN, P. & TARCA, A. (2005). A commentary on issues relating to the enforcement of Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards in the EU. European Accounting Review, 14(1), 
pp. 181-212.  
BURKS, J. (2010). Disciplinary measures in response to restatements after Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29(3), pp. 195-225. 
CHRISTENSEN, H., HAIL, L., & LEUZ, C. (2013). Mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in 
enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2-3), pp. 147-177. 
DESAI, H., HOGAN, C., & WILKINS, M. (2006). The reputational penalty for aggressive ac-
counting: earnings restatements and management turnover. The Accounting Review, 
81(1), pp. 83-112. 
ERNSTBERGER, J., STICH, M., & VOGLER, O. (2012). Economic consequences of accounting 
enforcement reforms: The case of Germany. European Accounting Review, 21(2), pp. 
217-251. 
ESMA [EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY] (2014). ESMA guidelines on en-
forcement of financial information. Retrieved from www.esma.eu. 
 
29 
ESMA [EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY] (2015). ESMA report on en-
forcement and regulatory activities of accounting enforcers in 2014. Retrieved from 
www.esma.eu. 
FARBER, D. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: does corporate governance matter? The Ac-
counting Review, 80(2), pp. 539-561. 
FREP [FINANCIAL REPORTING ENFORCEMENT PANEL] (2015). 10 Jahre Bilanzkontrolle in 
Deutschland. Retrieved from www.frep.info. 
FREP [FINANCIAL REPORTING ENFORCEMENT PANEL] (2016). Annual activity report 2015. 
Available at www.frep.info. 
GLAUM, M., BAETGE, J., GROTHE, A., & OBERDÖRSTER, T. (2013). Introduction of Internation-
al Accounting Standards, disclosure quality and accuracy of analysts' earnings fore-
casts. European Accounting Review, 22(1), pp. 79–116. 
HITZ, J., ERNSTBERGER, J., & STICH, M. (2012). Enforcement of accounting standards in Eu-
rope: capital-market-based evidence for the two-tiered mechanisms in Germany. Euro-
pean Accounting Review, 21(2), pp. 253-281. 
HOFFMANN, S. & HÖLTKEN, M. (2014). Deutschland und Österreich als Beispiele der Imple-
mentierung hybrider Enforcement-Systeme in Europa. Die Wirtschaftsprüfung, 67(14), 
pp. 730-736. 
HOMMELHOFF, P. & GUNDEL, A. (2014). Ist das deutsche Enforcement-Verfahren europa-
rechtskonform? Betriebs-Berater, 69(14), pp. 811-815. 
KARPOFF, J., LEE, D., & MARTIN, G. (2008). The cost to firms of cooking the books. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(3), pp. 581-612. 
LEUZ, C. (2007). Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 002 really that costly? A discussion of evi-
dence from event returns and going-private decisions. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics, 44, pp. 146-165. 
LEUZ, C. (2010). Different approaches to corporate reporting regulation: how jurisdictions 
differ and why. Accounting and Business Reseach, 40(3), pp. 229-256.  
 
30 
SCHIPPER, K. (2005). The introduction of International Accounting Standards in Europe: im-
plications for international convergence. European Accounting Review, 14(1), pp. 101-
126. 
SCHMIDT-VERSTEYL, M. (2008). Durchsetzung ordnungsgemäßer Rechnungslegung in 
Deutschland – Enforcement nach dem Bilanzkontrollgesetz. Doctoral dissertation, Ber-
lin.  
WAGENHOFER, A. & EWERT, R. (2015). Externe Unternehmensrechnung: 3rd updated edition, 
Graz: Springer.   
ZHANG, I. (2007). Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 44, pp. 74-115.  
ZÜLCH, H. & HÖLTKEN, M. (2013). Die „neue” (Konzern-)Lageberichterstattung nach DRS 
20: ein Anwendungsleitfaden. Der Betrieb, 66(13), pp. 2457-2465. 
ZÜLCH, H., HÖLTKEN, M., & BEYHS, O. (2014a). Rahmenbedingungen von Abschlussprüfung 
und Enforcement-Verfahren in Deutschland: Vergleich der beiden Prüfungsverfahren. 
WP Praxis, 2(3), pp. 73-77. 
ZÜLCH, H., HÖLTKEN, M., & BEYHS, O. (2014b). Verfahrensunterschiede und in der Person des 
Prüfers begründete Unterschiede zwischen Abschlussprüfung und Enforcement-
Verfahren. WP Praxis, 2(4), pp. 91-96. 
ZÜLCH, H., HÖLTKEN, M., BEYHS, O., & HIRSCHBÖCK, G. (2014c). Das österreichische En-
forcement-Verfahren: ein Praxisleitfaden für Bilanzierende. Zeitschrift für Recht und 
Rechnungswesen, 24(4), pp. 108-115. 
ZÜLCH, H., HÖLTKEN, M., & EBNER, G. (2015). Zehn Jahre DPR: Ist das zweistufige Enforce-







ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING:                                                            
A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
MANUSCRIPT A 











II.  ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
1! Introduction ....................................................................................................... 34!
2 Theoretical Background ..................................................................................... 37 
2.1! Corporate Governance .............................................................................. 37!
2.2 Enforcement ............................................................................................. 38 
2.3 Corporate Governance: the Role of Enforcement ...................................... 40 
3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature ......................................... 43 
3.1 Identification ............................................................................................ 43 
3.2 Description of Relevant Literature ............................................................ 45 
3.2.1! Enforcement Reforms ................................................................. 45!
3.2.2 Enforcement Strength .................................................................. 48 
3.2.3 Restatements ............................................................................... 54 
3.2.4 Enforcement Actions ................................................................... 60 
4 Critical Discussion ............................................................................................. 64 
4.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms ............................................. 65 
4.2  External Corporate Governance Mechanisms ............................................ 67 
4.2.1 Accounting Enforcement as External Corporate                                     
Governance Mechanism .............................................................. 67 
4.2.2 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on Other                               
External Corporate  Governance Mechanisms ............................. 69 
4.2.3 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on the                                  
Capital Market ............................................................................ 71 
5 Avenues for Further Research ............................................................................ 74 





Matthias Höltken§§/Germar Ebner 
ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING:                                                
A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Abstract  
The main objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information to a firm’s stake-
holders. However, it is questionable whether this goal can be fully realized without effective 
enforcement, which ensures faithful and consistent application of the relevant accounting 
standards. Within the multiplicity of studies investigating enforcement mechanisms and con-
sequences to enforcement actions, this paper provides an overview on the current state of re-
search on enforcement from a corporate governance perspective. We therefore analyze en-
forcement literature from both internal and external corporate governance perspectives in or-
der to show interactions between enforcement and other mechanisms of financial reporting 
oversight. As a result of our analysis, it becomes evident that most preceding research ad-
dresses neither efficiency nor efficacy of enforcement systems due to missing effect variables 
or data accessibility. Furthermore, we deduce further research opportunities with respect to 
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A recent and rapidly growing trend in financial reporting research analyzes the effect of en-
forcement on capital market and governance properties. For the purpose of our review, the 
term ‘enforcement’ refers to all procedures, mechanisms and consequences concerning the 
faithful and consistent application of the relevant accounting standards. This may also formal-
ly cover aspects of legal enforcement. However, unless explicitly stated, the term ‘enforce-
ment’ relates to aspects of ‘enforcement of financial reporting’. Enforcement research relies 
on the notion that faithful and consistent financial reporting facilitates efficient capital mar-
kets by mitigating information asymmetries. Hence, enforcement is designed to create, main-
tain, and restore investor confidence in capital markets, which can be also found in the SEC’s 
mission and vision statement. To the current day, SEC enforcement is the most frequently 
investigated financial reporting enforcement regime.  
A - at least partially - comparable enforcement regime1 has been introduced to the European 
capital market in the course of the so-called ‘IAS Regulation’ (EC/2002/1606), which requires 
listed firms on a European regulated market to apply International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards (IFRS). Additionally, backed by the ‘Transparency Directive’ (2004/109/EC) all Member 
States were required to install effective enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure consistent 
and faithful application of IFRS. Considering the IAS Regulation’s and ESMA guideline’s 
requirements, an efficient and effective financial information system should be developed and 
harmonized on the basis of clear and enforceable financial reporting standards, transparent 
                                               
1  Despite several activities that aim at harmonizing enforcement on financial reporting within the EU (see 
e.g. ESMA 2014), the fact that it is carried out on a national level inevitably leads to a non-uniform imple-
mentation among the member states. That is, there are both private (e.g. UK), authoritative (e.g. France), 
and hybrid (e.g. Germany) enforcement systems across EU member states. Therefore, we label the EU 
member states’ enforcement activities as only partially comparable. 
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corporate governance systems, auditing regulation, and independent institutional oversight. A 
harmonized enforcement system is thus regarded to be an effective tool to shape an efficient 
capital market within the European Union. To that effect, the task of enforcement research is 
to investigate both efficacy and efficiency of enforcement regimes. We consider enforcement 
to be effective if its goals can be achieved in practice, first and foremost the superior target of 
improved accounting quality. Correspondingly, we label enforcement efficient if it yields a 
positive cost benefit ratio and, therefore, justifies regulatory intervention. Consequently, re-
search needs to additionally examine enforcement’s interactions with and perception by other 
governance mechanisms to better understand the economic impact of enforcement actions.  
In the current literature, various approaches have been taken to explore the premises and con-
sequences of enforcement. To begin with, research regarding enforcement has examined insti-
tutional premises of different enforcement regimes. Using mostly cross-country settings, stud-
ies provide evidence for different levels of enforcement strength, its beneficial impact on fi-
nancial statement preparers and addressees, and positive effects of enforcement reforms. Fur-
thermore, research has investigated the operational level of enforcement, thereby assessing the 
preventative and sanctioning function of enforcement. In this context, prior research has 
shown the presence of a deterring effect with regard to accounting behavior, arguably driven 
by significant firm-level and personal sanctions following the disclosure of financial misre-
porting. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the applied research designs, with few exemp-
tions, permit only limited inferences regarding the efficiency or efficacy of enforcement 
mechanisms or systems. This is because it is not easy to properly define either the accounting 
quality target to be reached by enforcement or the degree to which enforcement is labeled as 
beneficial. As a consequence, there has only been little research on the efficacy or efficiency 
of enforcement systems so far. Additionally, only a small but growing number of studies ad-
dress the European financial reporting enforcement at all.  
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Recent reviews by Brüggemann et al. (2013), Hitz (2014) or Singleton-Green (2015) also in-
corporate enforcement research literature, however mainly focus on the economic impact of 
IFRS implementation, which is accompanied by enforcement reforms in some countries. Ac-
cordingly, those reviews take into account the economic consequences of enforcement but do 
not incorporate institutional premises or operational features. The same holds true for con-
necting factors with other governance mechanisms. Hence, based on the theoretically sound 
embedding of enforcement in corporate governance, the aim of our review is to summarize 
the current state of research on enforcement of financial reporting and its interactions with 
other corporate governance mechanisms. More importantly, by additionally addressing Euro-
pean financial reporting enforcement, we indicate avenues for further research in a different 
institutional setting compared to the most investigated field of SEC enforcement.  
We follow the standard procedure (Cooper and Hedges 1994; Tranfield et al. 2003; Webster 
and Watson 2002) for conducting a literature review (problem formulation, identification and 
evaluation of relevant literature, analysis, interpretation and discussion of relevant literature, 
and public presentation) in order to identify research gaps which ought to be addressed in fu-
ture research. The remainder of this literature review is outlined as follows: In section 2 we 
provide well-founded theoretical definitions of the terms corporate governance and enforce-
ment, and their corresponding interactions. Being the basis of the subsequent analyses, we 
identify existing financial reporting literature that has been focused on enforcement in section 
3. Thereafter, in section 4, we analyze, interpret, and discuss prior literature’s key findings 
from a corporate governance perspective. Consequently, section 5 illustrates the avenues for 
further research based upon prior research’s findings. Table A provides a comprehensive 
overview on the linkage between key findings and avenues for further research. Finally, we 
briefly summarize the main findings of our review in section 6.  
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
The need for corporate governance is rooted in the agency problem, which can be regarded as 
pivotal part of the contractual view of the firm (Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b). Broadly speaking, the agency problem describes undesirable 
effects that might arise from the separation of ownership and control. These include manage-
ment actions which do not comply with investors’ a priori expectations, as e.g. expropriation, 
waste or investments in unattractive projects of the capital provided by the financiers. This is 
a relevant issue, since a firm’s initial investors – unlike highly skilled managers – normally do 
not provide any benefits to the company after they have paid up their capital contribution 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The fact that external finance can be observed even in economies 
without pronounced investor protection indicates that basic mechanisms as reputation build-
ing and investor optimism can facilitate the occurrence of manager-owner relationships 
(Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Diamond 1989, 1991). Yet, research has 
shown that other mechanisms are more suitable to solve the latent potential for conflict be-
tween managers and investors. This is where corporate governance comes into play. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737), corporate governance ‘deals with the ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment’. Since this definition obviously only takes the interests of investors into account, 
it can be regarded as a shareholder-oriented corporate governance approach. Other researchers 
have argued in favor of a broader definition of corporate governance, since corporations can 
be regarded as socially significant institutions which do not only serve shareholders, but also 
multiple stakeholders (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001). While we 
acknowledge legitimate objections against a shareholder perspective of corporate governance, 
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we follow this definition throughout this paper since it appears most suitable to us for embed-
ding enforcement in the construct of corporate governance. The latter comprises different 
mechanisms that aim at aligning the interests of owners and managers; they can be partitioned 
in internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance. Internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, which are embedded in the company’s organizational structure, concern interac-
tions among firm insiders and thus incorporate aspects as performance-based remuneration, 
board monitoring, and the internal managerial labor market. External corporate governance 
mechanisms are constituted by the company’s environment, in particular through direct share-
holder and debtholder oversight (encompassing the market for corporate control), external 
managerial labor market,2 and the national legal and judicial system (Baber et al. 2012; 
Bushman and Smith 2001). The latter, without doubt, also comprises auditors’ and enforcers’ 
activities which are nowadays an essential part of statutory corporate supervision. In contrast 
to early voices, which proclaimed that competition would lead to a proper level of corporate 
governance (Alchian 1950; Stigler 1958), the multitude of more recent analytical and empiri-
cal studies dealing with this issue suggest contradicting evidence (for comprehensive cross-
country evidence see La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, and 2006). Consequently, Shleifer and Vish-
ny (1997) highlight the necessity of governmental intervention for the sake of investor protec-
tion. 
2.2 Enforcement 
There is no single definition of enforcement and, thus, the definition depends on the dimen-
sion or topical area observed. Citing a current example, Ernstberger et al. (2012a) refer to a 
                                               
2  While the internal managerial labor market as corporate governance mechanism basically comprises per-
sonnel turnover and thus sanctioning during employment (Agrawal and Cooper 2015; Arthaud-Day et al. 
2006), the external managerial labor market includes aspects which relate to post-employment issues as e.g. 




rather broad definition of enforcement ‘as comprising the procedures and mechanics that en-
sure the observance of, or obedience to, security laws or investor protection laws’ before turn-
ing to financial reporting enforcement as a specific area of enforcement. Building on this, we 
identify two dimensions and two topical areas of enforcement. 
First, with reference to the dimensions of enforcement, recent studies distinguish between 
private and public enforcement mechanisms (Djankov et al. 2008; Jackson and Roe 2009; La 
Porta et al. 2006). Public enforcement mechanisms, which involve public institutions, com-
prise detecting insider trading or market manipulation, enforcing disclosure requirements and 
consistent application of accounting rules, or examining broker-dealers and taking appropriate 
actions. Hence we label investigations by the SEC or PCAOB, the German FREP or BaFin, or 
the FRRP as public enforcement mechanisms. Conversely, private enforcement mechanisms, 
which concern private shareholders, comprise all procedures and mechanisms that relate to 
securities laws and investor protection laws. Class action suits against both preparers and au-
ditors of financial statements can be named as relevant examples (Kellog 1984). According to 
recent research, both public and private enforcement mechanisms are important to ensure ef-
fective enforcement (Jackson and Roe 2009). 
Second, in line with Bremser et al. 1991, we distinguish between two types of topical areas of 
enforcement. Firstly, audit enforcement relates to all procedures and mechanisms that ensure 
auditor independence and statutory audit oversight. Such enforcement actions target the fi-
nancial statements as a compromise between the preferences of auditor and management (De-
Fond and Subramanyam 1998) and, thus, investigate the manner in which audits of publicly 
held companies are conducted. If the enforcer detects insufficient audit quality, it may directly 
impose sanctions on individual auditors or audit firms (see Bannister and Wiest 2001 or 
Bremser et al. 1991 for SEC enforcement actions) or refer its findings to the relevant audit 
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supervisory authority (see Ernstberger et al. 2012, p. 220, for a short description of the Ger-
man Auditor Oversight Commission). Secondly, enforcement of accounting standards relates 
to all procedures, mechanisms and enforcement actions that ensure financial reporting com-
pliance. ESMA’s guidelines on enforcement of financial information contain a similar defini-
tion (ESMA 2014, p. 38):  
‘Examining the compliance of financial information with the relevant financial 
reporting framework, taking appropriate measures where infringements are 
discovered during the enforcement process, in accordance with the rules appli-
cable under the Transparency Directive and taking other measures relevant for 
the purpose of enforcement.’ 
Hence, enforcement of accounting standards focuses on the compliance of financial state-
ments with the respective accounting framework. In this context, we can identify enforcement 
mechanisms that cannot be publically observed and publically observable enforcement mech-
anisms. In the following, we concentrate on the latter, since publically observable enforce-
ment mechanisms are prerequisites of the empirical studies to be discussed below. If the en-
forcer establishes an accounting misstatement and the error is made publicly available, this 
facilitates the adverse disclosure mechanism (Bremser et al. 1991; Fearnley et al. 2002; Hitz 
et al. 2012). Besides this a posteriori sanctioning mechanism, adverse publicity is intended to 
deter other firms a priori from misstating financial reporting and, thus, to ensure accounting 
compliance preventively. 
2.3 Corporate Governance: the Role of Enforcement 
Based on the aforementioned notion that corporate governance aligns both principals’ and 
agents’ interests within a structure of relationships, corporate governance also contributes to 
maintaining investor confidence by ensuring compliant financial reporting. In turn, enforce-
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ment adds to the effectiveness of corporate governance by ensuring compliance with a certain 
set of standards or a code of behavior that is defined by the underlying corporate governance 
system. However, enforcement – by identifying erroneous or fraudulent financial statements – 
cannot provide accounting compliance on a stand-alone basis, but requires interaction with 
other external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, we subsume enforce-
ment under the corporate governance system. 
Enforcement of financial reporting affects internal corporate governance mechanisms, for 
example supervisory oversight. The unitary board system (e.g. USA, UK) comprises both 
inside directors and outside directors whereas the two-tiered board system, as in Germany, 
distinguishes between a company’s executive management and the supervisory board. Still, it 
is common to both systems that executive management is in charge of financial reporting and 
therefore needs to take responsibility for the selection of accounting policies and the imple-
mentation of sufficient internal control mechanisms in order to ensure accounting compliance. 
Emphasizing this issue, the establishment of errors within the enforcement process is regular-
ly associated with a failure in internal corporate governance (Agrawal and Cooper 2015°; Aier 
et al. 2005; Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Collins et al. 2009; Desai et al. 2006a; Feldmann et al. 
2009; Hennes et al. 2008; Land 2010; Srinivasan 2005; Wang and Chou 2011).  
External corporate governance mechanisms, for example regulatory or auditor oversight, en-
sure financial reporting compliance by providing and enforcing accounting standards. How-
ever, application of accounting standards often requires professional judgment or allows man-
agement to choose between different treatments. Exemplary for the European enforcement 
setting, consistent and faithful application of IFRS demands external enforcement through 
regulatory oversight as required by recital 16 of the IAS Regulation (enforcement bodies, 
henceforth referred to as enforcers) and statutory audits. The latter focus on the legal and con-
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tractual compliance of (non-)consolidated financial statements, together with the management 
report, the bookkeeping system and the company’s internal control mechanisms. Consequent-
ly, the scope of statutory audits is narrower than board-level examinations as those do not 
mainly focus on legal or contractual compliance but on the assessment of accounting policies. 
Analogous to board level failure, the establishment of errors within the enforcement process 
or the necessity to restate financial statements is regularly associated with a failure in auditor 
oversight (Bonner et al. 1998; DeFond and Smith 1991; Fearnley et al. 2002; Gietzmann and 
Petticchino 2014; Hennes et al. 2014; Kläs and Werner 2014°; Mande and Son 2013; Weber et 
al. 2008). 
Similar to supervisory oversight and statutory audits, enforcers focus on the faithful and con-
sistent application of particular accounting treatments. Thus, investigations performed by en-
forcers also constitute an external but more focused audit of financial reporting3 and contrib-
ute to ensuring the provision of reliable and relevant information to current or potential inves-
tors. Referring to this objective, several studies provide evidence that enforcement can benefi-
cially affect capital market properties and, thus, enhances capital market efficiency (Baber et 
al. 2013; Barniv et al. 2005; Barth et al. 2008; Beneish 1999; Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002; 
Byard et al. 2011; Christensen et al. 2013; Daske et al. 2008; Hope 2003; Hribar and Jenkins 
2004; Li 2010; Preiato et al. 2013°; Samarasekera et al. 2012°; Schipper 2005). Besides its 
institutional effects, the objective of enforcement is to proactively improve accounting com-
                                               
3  The enforcer who takes into consideration the prevailing circumstances determines the scope of an en-
forcement investigation. The scope of FREP’s investigations, for example, depends on the form of investi-
gation: FREP conducts ‘Examinations with cause’ if there are concrete indications by a third party or on re-
quest by the German securities authority BaFin. In addition, randomly selected firms are investigated in a 
proactive manner. However, FREP only addresses selected issues to assess the compliance with relevant 
accounting standards (Hitz et al. 2012). The SEC acts comparably by obtaining leads from different 
sources, for example public complaints, tips, referrals from other law enforcement agencies, financial press, 
and by reviewing financial statements (Bremser et al. 1991). SEC enforcement starts with an informal in-
vestigation that is turned into a formal investigation if a lead requires further scrutiny and pursues disclo-
sure requirements and emerging accounting problems (Feroz et al. 1991). 
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pliance and, at least partially, builds on adverse disclosure as a deterrent (inter alia Beneish 
1999; Dechow et al. 1996; Feroz et al. 1991; Hitz et al. 2012; Karpoff et al. 2008; Nourayi 
1994). Altogether, we define enforcement as a complementary stand-alone external corporate 
governance mechanism that additionally interacts with other both internal and external corpo-
rate governance mechanisms. Thereby, it contributes to relevant and reliable external financial 
reporting by both proactive and reactive investigations of (non-)consolidated financial state-
ments.  
We use the aforesaid distinctions between corporate governance mechanisms and aspects of 
financial reporting enforcement to structure the subsequent chapters 3.2 (description of rele-
vant literature) and 4 (critical discussion). Based on the dimensions and topical areas of en-
forcement defined in section 2.2, we divide section 3.2 into four sub-sections. The first pair 
elaborates on the two dimensions of enforcement by addressing both enforcement strength 
and enforcement reforms. In this context, prior research regularly investigates public and pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms in order to conclude on the benefits of different implementa-
tions. The second pair describes prior research in accounting and auditing enforcement and, 
thus, addresses the operational level of restatements and error announcements. In turn, we 
structure chapter 4 for our critical discussion of current literature’s contribution around en-
forcement’s interactions with other governance mechanisms.  
3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 
3.1 Identification 
We conduct a comprehensive web-based search in the Business Source Complete (BSC) data-
base, supplemented with Google Scholar by looking for articles that match our search terms 
‘enforcement’ or ‘restatement’, coupled with ‘financial reporting’ or ‘accounting standards’ or 
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‘IFRS’. We supplement the term ‘enforcement’ with ‘restatement’, since the latter can be re-
garded as operationalization of the first. Since a search with the sole terms ‘enforcement’ or 
‘restatement’ yields 42,569 results in BSC, which is basically driven by a huge number of 
unrelated articles dealing with enforcement of drug policy or speed limits, to name but a few, 
we add the search terms ‘financial reporting’ or ‘accounting standards’ or ‘IFRS’ in order to 
narrow down the scope of studies. Based on this approach, we obtain 413 findings, of which 
274 are labeled as being sourced from academic journals, in contrast to trade publications, 
magazines, or newspapers, which are less relevant for our purpose. Moreover, a less refined 
search in Google Scholar for the search terms ‘enforcement’ and ‘accounting standards’ (both 
in text) without the terms ‘legal’ or ‘law’ yields 1,820 findings. Sorted by relevance, we re-
view the first 500 suggestions; despite of several redundancies with BSC or irrelevant articles, 
this approach turns out to be of particular importance for working paper publications.4 In ad-
dition, we conduct forward and backward reference search in order to ensure a sufficient level 
of literature coverage. Nevertheless we emphasize that our study does not raise the claim to be 
fully comprehensive, yet we hope to present at least the most relevant findings.5  
All results with a recognizable reference to legal enforcement in general and enforcement of 
financial reporting in particular remain part of our collection, which comprises – apart from 
the vast majority of archival studies – also analytical, conceptual, experimental and interview-
                                               
4  Due to the fact that the enforcement setting – and thereby the availability of relevant datasets – is a quite 
young phenomenon, at least for several EU member states, it appears reasonable to us that several pieces of 
work did not yet finish the time-consuming review process of scientific journals. Therefore, we do not limit 
the scope of our analysis on articles already published in scientific journals, but also take into account stud-
ies that currently exhibit only working paper status (flagged by a °-symbol). We ensure working paper qual-
ity by checking the authors’ number of citations as stated on Google Scholar, the authors’ reputation (num-
ber of other publications in leading academic journals), and the uniqueness of the idea presented (e.g. first 
paper on a certain phenomenon). 
5  Although we use a corporate governance perspective to critically discuss prior research in section 4, we 
abstain from searching for corporate governance terms in order to restrict our findings to the accounting lit-
erature. Based upon our explanatory notes in section 2.3, we argue that enforcement is an integral part of 
corporate governance and enforcement literature can be therefore regarded as a section of corporate gov-
ernance literature.   
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based pieces of work. We delete all articles that solely focus on IFRS adoption or that com-
pare accounting properties of IFRS or US GAAP without being linked to enforcement mat-
ters. Furthermore, we do not pay attention to issues of legal, tax, or credit enforcement, teach-
ing cases, or studies published in ‘practitioner journals’. The majority of the studies in ques-
tion are published in mostly accounting, auditing or finance related scientific journals, the 
remaining ones did not (yet) exceed working paper status. Furthermore, our search is restrict-
ed to articles in English (with only one exception (Böckem 2000) due to the scarce coverage 
of UK enforcement in our sample) and to studies published prior to 10/31/2015. Our final 
collection comprises 164 enforcement-related studies (we provide a web-based appendix on 
those studies at http://www.hhl.de/enforcement-of-financial-reporting-appendix.pdf).6 
3.2 Description of Relevant Literature 
3.2.1 Enforcement Reforms 
Several studies aim at capturing the construct ‘enforcement’ by referring to events which have 
arguably changed the institutional setting of enforcement of accounting standards.7 Based on 
the notion that financial reporting is a function of both accounting standards and reporting 
incentives, reforms that yield a change in enforcement are expected to have an impact on fi-
nancial reporting practice and its perception by corporate outsiders. Due to the fact that many 
countries – especially those located in Europe – have made efforts to improve enforcement of 
                                               
6  The tabulated overview is additionally provided in Appendix B of this manuscript.  
7  While it can be argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) without doubt strengthened enforcement of 
accounting standards by establishment of the PCAOB and additional resources and competences of the 
SEC (Rashkover and Winter 2005, 2006), it also comprises several sections without clear link to enforce-
ment of accounting standards (Coates 2007), with the evaluation and disclosure of internal control effec-
tiveness in Section 404 being certainly the most controversial one (Lehn 2008°). Hence and similar to US 
cross-listings, it is not evident whether effect are driven by increased enforcement, rather than by other as-
pects of SOX. Consequently, we do not consider studies on SOX in this literature review, except for those 
which deal with other aspects of enforcement as e.g. restatements. For a thorough literature review on the 
effects of SOX see Lehn (2008)°. 
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accounting standards simultaneously with IFRS adoption, the influence of both accounting 
standard and enforcement reforms cannot be easily disentangled in many cases. Barth et al. 
(2008) illustrate this issue by admitting that they cannot state whether the increase in account-
ing quality after IFRS adoption is effectively driven by the change from national to interna-
tional accounting standards, or rather by simultaneous changes in the institutional environ-
ment. Marton and Runesson (2014)° apply a similar reasoning by controlling for changes in 
enforcement with a post-2005 dummy variable among others. They find an increase in ac-
counting quality for accounting standards being subject to a high degree of professional 
judgment, but the opposite for low-judgment standards. 
Christensen et al. (2013) tackle this issue by identifying temporal differences between IFRS 
adoption and substantive changes in enforcement like e.g. the set-up of new enforcement in-
stitutions or the strengthening of existing enforcement institutions’ competences. Since they 
observe increased liquidity only in those countries with concurrent changes in financial re-
porting enforcement, but rather independent of IFRS adoption, they conclude that the effects 
are arguably driven by enforcement reforms. Putting this into perspective, Barth and Israeli 
(2013) highlight the importance of both IFRS and enforcement reforms to facilitate capital 
market benefits. In this context, Neel (2013)° traces increased firm valuation and decreased 
forecast errors and dispersion back to IFRS adopters that exhibit increased comparability in 
terms of the association between earnings and return, price and earnings, and cash flow and 
earnings. While his results prove to be robust to alternative explanations as e.g. the beginning 
of proactive enforcement reviews in 2005, he provides evidence that the latter are the driving 
factor for increased liquidity, irrespective of the level of comparability. This result goes in line 
with the findings of Christensen et al. (2013) since the beginning of proactive reviews is a 
pivotal characteristic of their coding of ‘substantive changes’ in enforcement.  
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Focusing on the German setting, Ernstberger et al. (2012) exploit the fact that several firms 
without listing in the regulated market, i.e. without being subject to enforcement reforms, 
have voluntarily adopted IFRS, thereby providing a possibility to disentangle effects of IFRS 
adoption and enforcement. They find some evidence of decreased earnings management and 
increased stock liquidity as a result of regulatory reforms, namely the establishment of the 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) and Auditor Oversight Commission and more 
restrictive rules of auditor independence. Given the possibility of alternative explanations, the 
authors yet warn to blindly interpret their findings. Samarasekera et al. (2012)° present a dif-
ferent approach by examining UK listed firms which were all subject to IFRS adoption in 
2005, however only a subsample of firms with cross-listings in Germany was affected by the 
German enforcement reforms and, thus, subject to the launch of FREP’s review activities. 
While the authors find increased value relevance and less managing towards earnings targets 
for the whole sample, only the cross-listed subsample exhibits a decrease in earnings smooth-
ing and timely loss recognition, hinting at favorable effects of enforcement. This is not self-
evident, given the fact that UK firms have already been subject to financial reporting en-
forcement since the set-up of FRRP in 1991. Notwithstanding Samarasekera (2012)°’s find-
ings which suggest further improvements in accounting quality for companies that are subject 
to enforcement of numerous enforcement institutions, Fearnley et al. (2002) gain evidence 
from fifteen semi-structured interviews with finance directors and audit firm partners that 
FRRP’s activities have increased auditor independence and changed attitudes toward account-
ing compliance and hence positively affected audit quality, too. In summary, research on 
enforcement reforms yields strong evidence of positive capital market effects and, to some 
extent, improved accounting quality. Yet, the latter results are to date uniquely gained from 
single-country studies (F1). 
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3.2.2 Enforcement Strength 
The focus of studies that examine the impact of enforcement strength has been subject to 
change over time. As shown in the following, the measures to capture the construct ‘enforce-
ment’ became more sophisticated over time, changing from rather noisy indirect metrics to 
more direct ones. The articles of La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) mark the beginning of this 
research stream since they are among the first that systematically aimed to assess the strength 
and impact of legal environments. While we admit that the studies in question do not explicit-
ly aim to measure enforcement of financial reporting, the following two reasons speak in fa-
vor of their presentation: First, they are the methodological basis of subsequent studies which 
aim to measure enforcement of financial reporting (see e.g. Callao and Jarne 2010; Leuz et al. 
2003; Li 2010); second, the construct of financial reporting enforcement cannot be viewed on 
a stand-alone basis, since the underlying incentive structure of companies that prepare finan-
cial statements can be regarded as function of both legal and financial reporting enforcement 
(Holthausen 2009). Two ways to approximate the strength of legal environments have 
evolved, namely the construction of legal indices based on qualitative and quantitative input 
factors, and the partitioning according to legal origin and tradition. While the first approach 
appears straightforward, the reasoning of the second approach is as follows: By partitioning 
countries in clusters of common law and code law origin, researchers attempt to capture insti-
tutional cross-country differences in shareholder protection. The relevant studies argue that 
countries with a common law tradition exhibit a higher degree of investor protection due to 
less governmental influence on economic activities, probably as a result of the superior status 
of courts as counterpart to the government (La Porta et al. 2000).  
Based on a sample of 49 countries, the study of La Porta et al. (1997) provides empirical evi-
dence that common law countries exhibit larger and deeper capital markets than code law 
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countries, arguably driven by superior investor protection. The authors confirm their findings 
by conducting additional analyses with indicators that assumingly capture aspects of legal 
enforcement as e.g. the ‘rule of law’, which measures the law and order tradition of a country 
and the existence of anti-director rights. In a similar study, La Porta et al. (1998) approximate 
the strength of a legal setting via legal origin, existence of diverse shareholder and creditor 
rights, and enforcement measures as e.g. judicial efficiency, ‘rule of law’ and corruption. They 
find that these indicators are negatively associated with ownership concentration in an econ-
omy, arguably as a result of weak protection of small and diversified shareholders. While the 
studies named above do not explicitly assess the impact of enforcement institutions, La Porta 
et al. (2006) try to disentangle the effects of public and private enforcement on stock market 
development. They assess the strength of public enforcement via a summary index of supervi-
sory characteristics, rule-making and investigative power, and sanction competences of the 
main governance agency which is in charge of stock market supervision. In contrast, private 
enforcement is measured via a disclosure and liability standards index, further controlling for 
anti-director rights, judicial efficiency and legal origin. The authors reach the conclusion that 
private enforcement measures exhibit a more pronounced link to stock market development 
than those of public enforcement. Referring to critical voices, such as Coffee (2007) and Jack-
son (2008), Jackson and Roe (2009) conduct a similar analysis as La Porta et al. (2006). Un-
like their predecessors, they use a resource-based public enforcement proxy, capturing the 
budget and staffing levels of public enforcers instead of solely relying on their formal compe-
tences. They find that the resource-based enforcement measure yields superior results com-
pared to the one of La Porta et al. (2006). Lohse et al. (2014) conduct a similar analysis and 
detect a positive association between the SEC’s budget levels and firms’ legal compliance, 
approximated by the number of injunctions, in the medium and long run. While the studies 
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above are not explicitly linked to enforcement of accounting standards, they provide strong 
evidence that the legal institutional setting has an impact on capital market properties.  
Turning the view from a macro to a micro level and, thus, to company-specific behavior, a 
vast number of studies puts emphasis on the fact that legal enforcement in general and en-
forcement of financial reporting in particular are important determinants in shaping manageri-
al incentives, e.g. with regard to preparing financial statements (Ball 2006; Ball et al. 2003; 
Brown and Tarca 2005, 2007; Coffee 2007; Hail et al. 2010; Healy and Palepu 2001; Hol-
thausen 2003, 2009; Kleinman et al. 2014; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Consequently, en-
forcement is likely to have an effect on accounting quality and its perception by addressees. 
Leuz et al. (2003) provide strong evidence that both the legal origin and the presence of out-
side investor rights and legal enforcement, approximated by measures of La Porta et al. 
(1998), is negatively associated with earnings management. Applying identical measures, 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Haw et al. (2004) confirm these findings. Going in line with 
these findings, other studies detect a greater timeliness of earnings, i.e. a lower degree of in-
come conservatism (Ball et al. 2000); however, André et al. (2015) who employ a more so-
phisticated enforcement proxy by using the Brown et al. (2013) audit and enforcement index 
provide contradicting evidence. Furthermore, preceding research finds a higher value rele-
vance of earnings (Hung 2000), and – arguably associated with the prior studies’ results – 
superior forecast accuracy of financial analysts (Barniv et al. 2005) in common law countries. 
Given the evident impact of enforcement, there are a considerable number of studies that con-
trol for the effect of enforcement in the course of IFRS adoption. However, it is noteworthy 
that many countries have made considerable efforts to improve or establish financial reporting 
enforcement in the course of IFRS adoption (for a systematic overview see Christensen et al. 
2013) which is not properly reflected in the legal enforcement proxies. Consequently, the 
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studies’ findings should be interpreted with caution. Several of those studies basically support 
the findings stated above: Cai et al. (2008)° employ indicators of insider trading laws, judicial 
efficiency, ‘rule of law’, and shareholder protection in order to assess enforcement strength. 
They show that countries with stronger enforcement exhibit lower degrees of earnings man-
agement. Callao and Jarne (2010), who control for investor protection and legal enforcement 
by taking the proxies used by Leuz et al. (2003), provide evidence of a negative association of 
these measures with the level of discretionary accruals both before and after IFRS adoption. 
While Ahmed et al. (2013) confirm Callao and Jarne (2010)’s finding of decreased accounting 
quality after IFRS adoption in terms of income smoothing, accrual aggressiveness, and timely 
loss recognition, they provide counterintuitive evidence that these effects are basically driven 
by the subsample of countries with strong legal enforcement, approximated by the ‘rule of 
law’. Applying the same methodology in measuring enforcement, Byard et al. (2011) find a 
significant decrease in forecast errors and dispersion of financial analysts after IFRS adoption, 
however only for those countries with strong legal enforcement and high differences between 
domestic accounting standards and IFRS. While Neel (2013)° cautions that these effects are 
only observable for those firms which concurrently exhibited increases in their accounting 
comparability and financial reporting quality, Cascino and Gassen (2015) highlight that com-
parability of accounting information is itself positively affected by enforcement, thereby go-
ing in line with the other studies’ findings. 
Adopting a capital market perspective, Landsman et al. (2012) examine the effect of IFRS 
adoption on information content of earnings announcements, approximated via abnormal re-
turn volatility and abnormal trading volume. The authors find that firms in countries with 
strong legal enforcement exhibit more pronounced information content measures after IFRS 
adoption, compared to countries with a low level of enforcement. Daske et al. (2008) detect 
that those countries with large differences between domestic accounting standards and a high 
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level of legal enforcement yield the most pronounced capital market effects in terms of liquid-
ity, cost of capital, and market valuation after the change to IFRS. This finding is confirmed 
by Li (2010) who provides evidence that IFRS adoption reduces the cost of equity by 47 basis 
points, however only in countries with strong legal enforcement. These results give a hint to 
the fact that the interaction of IFRS adoption and strong enforcement positively affects capital 
market properties, thereby confirming prior believes articulated in section 3.2.1. Zaidi and 
Huerta (2014) argue that this in turn should have a positive impact on the economic growth of 
adopting countries: Although they find that IFRS adoption results in a decrease of GDP 
growth rates, enforcement has a positive moderating effect, reinforcing prior belief and evi-
dence that the benefits of IFRS adoption depend on an appropriate level of enforcement. 
Despite the fact that the presented results mostly confirm the previously stated expectation of 
positive impacts of enforcement, it must be kept in mind that the proxies used do not explicit-
ly capture enforcement of financial reporting. The following studies tackle this issue in both 
analytical and empirical manner by examining the effects of financial reporting enforcement.8 
Liang (2004) examines a setting in which earnings management is modeled as a consequence 
of interaction among managers, shareholders, and regulators. Based on various economic 
trade-offs giving rise to earnings management, he delivers practical policy recommendations 
in the sense that selecting and enforcing accounting standards without leaving managers the 
possibility of earnings management is not universally desirable. The optimal strength of en-
forcement of financial reporting is also subject of Königsgruber (2012)’s analysis. He finds 
that financial reporting quality strictly increases with more severe enforcement, whereas its 
                                               
8  Several empirical studies suggest that a US cross-listing can be also regarded as an enforcement proxy 
since cross-listed companies are also subject to SEC enforcement (see e.g. Hope 2003; Barth et al. 2008). 
The following arguments speak against this proposition: First, research provides evidence that the enforce-
ment intensity is mitigated for cross-listed foreign firms, compared to domestic US firms (Siegel 2005; 
Shnitser 2010); second, it is not that trivial to disentangle financial reporting enforcement from other effects 
of a cross-listing (Leuz 2003a). In an attempt to tackle this issue, Leuz (2003b) suggests that observable 
cross-listing effects are rather driven by ‘attention effects’ instead of stricter enforcement. 
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effect on capital allocation is non-monotonic since it might lead to overdeterrence of poten-
tially profitable projects. By extending this analysis to the interaction of accounting standards 
and their enforcement, Laux and Stocken (2013)° highlight the conditions under which ac-
counting standards and enforcement are substitutes or complements in order to guarantee op-
timal resource allocation. 
Turning to the empirical counterparts, the study of Hope (2003) is the first of its kind that in-
dicates the aim to create a measure that captures enforcement of accounting standards. By 
adding the indicator ‘audit spending’, defined as the total fees of a country’s ten largest audit 
firms over GDP, to already previously used insider trading laws, judicial efficiency, ‘rule of 
law’, and shareholder protection, he derives an enforcement measure which is positively re-
lated to financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. Brown et al. (2014) go one step further and de-
rive both an audit and an enforcement proxy which are designed to capture cross-country in-
stitutional differences in public company auditors’ working environment and the level of en-
forcement which is performed by independent enforcement institutions. The enforcement 
proxy is formed by six indicators which assess the following characteristics: monitoring of 
financial reporting, standard-setting power, reviewing of financial statements, reporting about 
review activities, taking enforcement actions, and the level of resourcing. The audit proxy 
measures aspects as e.g. auditor licenses, auditor oversight and possible sanctions, and the 
level of audit fees. Preiato et al. (2013)° conduct a similar analysis as Hope (2003), but em-
ploy several enforcement measures besides the audit and enforcement proxies from Brown et 
al. (2014) to assess the relationship with financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
While they can confirm the results of Hope (2003), they show that the audit and enforcement 
proxy of Brown et al. (2014) and to some extent the ‘rule of law’ measure yield the strongest 
association with the employed forecast properties and thereby clearly outperform measures 
used in prior literature. Rounding off these findings, Meser et al. (2015) provide evidence of 
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beneficial capital market impacts in terms of liquidity and stock valuation, arguably as a result 
of enforcement reforms in Germany. The enforcement proxy of their longitudinal analysis is 
similar to the one of Preiato et al. (2013)°, however yearly updated. In conclusion, research 
on the impact of enforcement provides mostly unambiguous evidence of positive effects on 
financial reporting and capital market properties, which holds for both legal and account-
ing enforcement proxies, getting additionally backed by scarce analytical evidence (F2). 
3.2.3 Restatements 
We present ‘restatements’ and ‘enforcement actions’ as separate sections for two reasons. 
First, restatements are not exclusively initiated by authoritative enforcers, but also on volun-
tary basis by firms or auditors. Second, several European enforcement regimes do not require 
error corrections on behalf of the enforcement institution. Instead, firms are required to cor-
rect their financial statements in accordance with IAS 8 following an error announcement. In 
consequence, both restatements end error announcements are indicators of either internal or 
external governance failure. Therefore, we will present both of them separately in order to 
discuss potential connecting factors of enforcement with other governance mechanisms in 
section 4. For the purpose of our review, we label the revision of previously reported financial 
statements as a restatement.9  
From a formal point of view, restatements are ex post corrections of previous accounting mis-
statements and, therefore, are commonly regarded as providing new information to the capital 
market. Firms can either voluntarily restate or are prompted to restate by auditors, enforcers 
or regulators. Announcements of restatements are made public via press releases or regulatory 
filings. However, with reference to the code of practice with restatements in the US, Palmrose 
                                               
9  The term ‘restatement’ refers to misstated financial statements and does not include other financial state-
ment changes, for example the adoption of new standards, which might also be subject to comparable fil-
ings (see also Scholz 2008).  
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et al. (2004) note that reporting specificity – defined as information on accounting issues in-
volved, circumstances, and impact – varies significantly. Corrections to financial statements 
have thus the ability to change investors’ perceptions of financial statements that play a major 
role in the monitoring of managerial action (Healy and Palepu 2001). Likewise, the restate-
ment firm’s financial reporting credibility is disrupted (Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2015; Karpoff 
et al. 2008). Accordingly, restatements often serve as an indicator for corporate governance 
failure or internal control failure that otherwise cannot be detected by outsiders (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007). It has to be noted that restatement research is almost completely focused 
on the US, exhibiting an increasing number of restatements over time (GAO 2002; GAO 
2006; Scholz 2008).10  
By providing new information to capital market participants, restatement announcements can 
affect a company’s market value. Prior research on market returns has shown that restatement 
firms experience negative stock market reactions for short windows (Anderson and Yohn 
2002°; Callen et al. 2006; Desai et al. 2006a; Files et al. 2009; Files et al. 2014; GAO 2002; 
GAO 2006; Gordon et al. 2013; Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Plumlee and 
Yohn 2010; Wu 2002°) and long windows (Anderson and Yohn 2002°; Desai et al. 2006b; 
Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Richardson et al. 2002°; Wu 2002°). In order to further investigate 
increases in both information asymmetry and firm risk, additional effects have been exam-
ined, including the presence of takeover bids (Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2015), analyst forecasts 
revision and dispersion (Barniv et al. 2009; Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004), 
bid-ask spreads (Anderson and Yohn 2002°; Dechow et al. 1996; Palmrose et al. 2004), trad-
ing volume (Burks 2011; Plumlee and Yohn 2008°), cost of capital (Baber et al. 2013; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Liu et al. 2012), and presence of securities liti-
                                               
10  The study by Sue, Chin and Chan (2013) who investigate the causes of family firm restatements in Taiwan 
is the only study in our sample which deals with non-US restatements.  
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gations (Karpoff et al. 2008; Palmrose et al. 2004). Regardless of the proxies applied, results 
unambiguously show the penalizing outcome of restatements.  
Building on this, research finds investor reactions to be more pronounced for restatements 
involving fraud (Palmrose et al. 2004; Swanson et al. 2007), affecting more accounts (Palm-
rose et al. 2004), affecting reported income (Anderson and Yohn 2002°; Palmrose et al. 2004; 
Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Swanson et al. 2007; Thompson and McCoy 2008; Wilson 2008), 
prominent presentation of press release information (Acito et al. 2009; Files et al. 2009; Gor-
don et al. 2013; Swanson et al. 2007), and being induced by executive management or the 
auditor (Blankley et al. 2014; Dechow et al. 1996; Files et al. 2014; Lobo and Zhao 2013; 
Palmrose et al. 2004; Sue et al. 2013; Wilson 2008). Although research on financial restate-
ments has grown over the last decade, current research investigates restatements differently by 
focusing on the underlying causes of restatements. Various reasons are addressed, including 
company performance (Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 1996), accounting complexity (Plumlee 
and Yohn 2010), second-guessing of management judgment and intention (Anderson and 
Yohn 2002°; Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010), proliferation of accounting rules 
(Plumlee and Yohn 2010), internal errors (Plumlee and Yohn 2010), level of both non-audit 
services fees and total fees (Markelevich and Rosner 2013), application of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Burks 2011), SEC enforcement activities (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011), home-
country characteristics of cross-listed firms (Srinivasan et al. 2015), underwriter or venture 
capitalist reputation (Agrawal and Cooper 2010), and transaction complexity (Plumlee and 
Yohn 2010). In addition, reasons include both internal governance failure and audit failure, 
which are discussed in more detail further below. Summed up, research related to restate-
ments becomes more elaborated over time and highlights the importance of distinguishing 
between the underlying causes of financial restatements with regard to understanding in-
vestor reactions (F3). 
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There is slight evidence that firms also respond to restatements by conservatively changing 
their accounting behavior (Alam et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2014b; Ettredge et al. 2013), increas-
ing the number of outside directors (Farber 2005), changing executive remuneration structures 
(Burks 2011), turning over executives, audit committee members or auditors, or even facing 
general economic consequences, as e.g. reduction in investments (Kedia and Philippon 2009). 
Concerning executives, being accountable for the accuracy and completeness of financial re-
ports, research suggests that certain characteristics of executives are associated with the like-
lihood of restatements, including the presence of opportunistic motives (regularly equated 
with fraud in US research), presence of female board members (Abbott et al. 2012), or the 
level of religious adherence (Dyreng et al. 2012). Studies regularly hypothesize that termina-
tion of executives may be partly to punish the respective manager for the loss in shareholder 
value and, thus, to contribute in restoring financial reporting credibility (Burks 2010; Collins 
et al. 2009; Farber 2005; Hennes et al. 2008).11 However, research provides rather mixed re-
sults for restatement-related executive turnover. Although several studies generally report a 
positive association between restatements and subsequent executive turnover (Agrawal and 
Cooper 2015°; Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Collins et al. 2009; Desai et al. 2006a; Feldmann et 
al. 2009; Land 2010; Wiedman and Hendricks 2013), some of their counterparts do not find 
consistent evidence (Beneish 1999; Collins et al. 2008). Building on this, other studies attrib-
ute the lack of evidence in the second stream of literature to the missing distinction between 
errors and irregularities (Hennes et al. 2008) or fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements 
(Burks 2010). Since terminating an executive’s employment nonetheless entails the risk of 
                                               
11  Some studies emphasize the importance to distinguish between the turnover of CEOs and CFOs. Burks 
(2010) finds that the strength of disciplinary penalties has only increased for CFOs. Feldmann et al. (2009) 




inferior replacement, firms tend to switch from termination towards remuneration penalties 
(Burks 2011; Cheng and Farber 2008; Collins et al. 2008).  
In addition, research also investigates the role of audit committee members, being responsible 
for internal financial reporting oversight, with regard to restatements. Independence, activity 
level and financial expertise of the audit committee decrease the likelihood of financial re-
statements (Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello et al. 2011), and accounting expertise on the audit 
committee improves the timeliness of restatement disclosure (Schmidt and Wilkins 2013). 
However, results conversely indicate that restatements as a threat to organizational legitimacy 
also affect audit committee members turnover (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Srinivasan 2005). 
Using both internal and external corporate governance indices, Baber et al. (2012) emphasize 
the relevance of taking into account the interactions between internal (board level characteris-
tics) and external mechanisms (shareholder oversight characteristics) when investigating the 
influence of corporate governance on financial accounting restatements.  
Moreover, restatements can be attributed to audit failure which often results in a termination 
of the auditor-client relationship (Hennes et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2009; Mande and Son 2013; 
Srinivasan 2005; Thompson and McCoy 2008; Wiedman and Hendricks 2013).12 Alternative-
ly, restatements can affect the auditor-client relationship as the auditor might severe ties to 
preserve the audit firm’s reputation or reduce its litigation exposure (Barua and Smith 2013; 
Feldmann et al. 2009; Scott and Gist 2014). Ultimately, auditors can resign from the mandate 
(Huang and Scholz, 2012). Likewise, shareholders’ trust in auditor credibility regularly gets 
                                               
12  Conversely, Agrawal and Cooper (2007)° cannot provide consistent evidence that restatement firms are 
more likely to change their auditors. Several studies show that restatements can also be the result of auditor 
changes (see Hennes et al. 2014, p.1054, for an overview on studies (inter alia Lazer et al. 2004° and 
Romanus et al. 2008) that provide evidence for this association) and that auditor industry specialization and 
audit fees are negatively related to restatement likelihood (Stanley and DeZoort 2007). Finally, Schmidt and 
Wilkins (2013) show that the length between financial misstatement discovery and financial misstatement 
announcement is negatively associated with auditor quality and audit committee quality.  
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disrupted, thereby negatively affecting shareholders’ vote for auditor ratification (Liu et al. 
2009). Research also shows that auditor turnover is positively associated with restatement 
severity and strength of firm-level corporate governance (Mande and Son 2013), and nega-
tively associated with switching costs and auditor replacement opportunities (Hennes et al. 
2014). In addition, both studies find positive market reactions to restatement-related auditor 
turnover and, thus, contribute to the literature by showing that firms improve their corporate 
governance mechanisms following restatements. In turn, auditors experience a decrease in 
reputation. Weber et al. (2008), investigating the case of ComROAD and KPMG Germany, 
show that this loss of reputation with regard to audit quality spills over to the overall client 
portfolio and, thus, affects the overall market position of the respective auditor. Finally, restat-
ing firms experience less severe SEC enforcement actions and penalties when they dismiss 
their incumbent auditor (Leone and Liu 2010) and are less likely to be subject of repeat re-
statements (Files et al. 2014). 
Using an experimental case, Almer et al. (2008) show that among non-professional investors, 
perception of management’s financial reporting credibility depends on both restatement nature 
and post-restatement actions taken (inter alia changes to the board of directors, internal audit 
functions, or external auditors). Finally, research provides evidence for positive economic 
consequences to improved financial reporting oversight mechanisms (Chakravarthy et al. 
2014; Chen et al. 2014a; Hennes et al. 2014; Wiedman and Hendricks 2013; Wilson 2008). 
Overall, restatement-related research indicates that firms and leadership members are pe-
nalized for failure in internal controls or audit oversight which eventually results in finan-
cial misstatements. Conversely, investors acknowledge firms’ efforts to enhance the firm 
level of corporate governance (F4). 
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3.2.4 Enforcement Actions 
In line with our preceding analysis, we define ‘enforcement actions’ as all appropriate 
measures that can be taken by the enforcer in the course of the enforcement procedure. As the 
investigation process is not publically observable, research focuses on the results of enforce-
ment, such as the announcement of the begin of formal investigations, the SEC’s Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), and the public announcement of misstated fi-
nancial reporting through press releases, financial press coverage or federal gazette entries. It 
has to be noted that AAERs occur significantly less frequently compared to restatements and 
litigations (Armstrong et al. 2010) which could be reasoned by the SEC’s preference for se-
lecting cases that might be more likely to win, given the authority’s resource constraints (Far-
ber 2005). In addition, AAERs are regularly used as an indicator of fraud or intentional mis-
statements when being jointly investigated with restatements (Beasley 1996; Bonner et al. 
1998; Burks 2011; Ettredge et al. 2010; Farber 2005; Gordon et al. 2013; Hennes et al. 2008; 
Palmrose et al. 2004). Receiving an AAER or an error announcement could thus have several 
negative effects, such as direct (non-)monetary SEC sanctions or reputational losses (Bremser 
et al. 1991). To date, research on error announcements is limited to the US, Germany, the UK 
and China.13  
Similar to restatements, the announcement of financial misreporting is an unexpected infor-
mational event about a firm’s actual financial reporting quality or credibility. Hence, the mar-
ket is likely to incorporate the economic implications of such new information either immedi-
                                               
13  We argue that this is due to the fact that most other enforcement regimes are limited to direct sanctions 
imposed by the respective oversight authority and do not (solely) build on the ‘name and shame’ mecha-
nism. Therefore, the US, Germany, the UK, and China are the only enforcement regimes where enforce-
ment actions are directly observable. Austria, having implemented a comparable enforcement regime as 
Germany in 2014, will also provide observable enforcement actions in the future. Besides the examination 
of drivers and impact of enforcement actions, there is some research on other enforcement regimes on a 
conceptual level: Brown and Tarca (2005) review ongoing and proposed enforcement regimes in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands plus the UK, Brown and Tarca (2007) analyze enforcement bodies in the UK and 
Australia, and Dao (2005) describes and comments on the French regulatory system. 
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ately or over some time. Research provides evidence for both ways, including negative short-
term reactions (Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 1996; DeFond and Smith 1991; Ebner et al. 
2015°; Feroz et al. 1991; Häfele and Rieger 2015°; Hitz et al. 2012; Karpoff et al. 2008; Kläs 
and Werner 2014°) and long-term effects (Farber 2005; Hitz et al. 2012; Leng et al. 2011). In 
line with restatement research, different measures of investor reactions, including stock mar-
ket returns, bid-ask spreads or trading volume, validate these negative investor reactions. In 
contrast to these unambiguous results for SEC and FREP enforcement, Böckem (2000) does 
not find consistent evidence for the public censure by the FRRP. 
Prior research has also investigated factors determining the likelihood of AAERs and error 
announcements, including company size (Beasley et al. 2010; Bremser et al. 1991), company 
performance or failure (Beasley et al. 2010; Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 2011; Leng et al. 
2011; Peasnell et al. 2001; Strohmenger 2014), interaction of financial and non-financial in-
formation (Feroz et al. 2000, Kim et al. 2012), government preferences (Heese 2013°), occur-
rence of qualified audit opinions (Bremser et al. 1991), audit risk (Correia 2010), presence of 
previous litigations or restatements (Collins et al. 2008; Collins et al. 2009), management mo-
tives (Beasley et al. 2010; Dechow et al. 2011; GAO 2006), management turnover (Collins et 
al. 2009; Leone and Liu 2010), management’s religious adherence (Dyreng et al. 2012), cor-
porate governance quality (Beasley 1996; Beasley et al. 2000; Beasley et al. 2010; 
Ernstberger et al. 2012b°; Farber 2005; Peasnell et al. 2001), and types of errors made (Bon-
ner et al. 1998; Bremser et al. 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; DeFond and Smith 1991; 
Ernstberger et al. 2012b°; GAO 2002; Hitz et al. 2012; Karpoff et al. 2008; Kläs and Werner 
2014°; Leng et al. 2011; Strohmenger 2014). In particular, studies investigating error types 
indicate that the majority of errors relates to income changing items as being the main driver 
of investor reactions. All in all, research that investigates the causes and consequences of 
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error announcements indicates the presence of the ‘name and shame’ mechanism, which is 
mainly determined by profitability impact and weak financial reporting oversight (F5). 
Firms may also respond to error announcements by conservatively changing their accounting 
behavior (Bannister and Wiest 2001; Jennings et al. 2011°)14 or delisting from the regulated 
market in order to avoid enforcement-related costs (Hitz and Müller-Bloch 2014°; Leuz et al. 
2008). Some studies use AAERs to identify cases of fraud and find a negative effect on execu-
tive level remuneration (Erickson et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2009). Prior research also sug-
gests that the presence of equity incentives is positively associated with the incidence of ac-
counting irregularities stated in an AAER (Armstrong et al. 2010). In turn, research provides 
evidence that the likelihood of enforcement actions is negatively associated with outside di-
rector ownership, tenure, and number of outside directorships (Beasley 1996) which represent 
indicators for the level of corporate governance quality. Investigating the role of intentional 
and unintentional factors that determine the likelihood of error announcements, Ernstberger et 
al. (2012b)° find consistent evidence for the German enforcement setting. They conclude that, 
besides the presence of opportunistic motives, governance quality decreases the likelihood of 
error announcements. The occurrence of an AAER can also result in firms investigating inter-
nal control deficiencies, which have to be reported to restore financial reporting credibility 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Conversely, Peasnell et al. (2001) do not find any evidence 
that public censure by the FRRP results in consecutive management turnover. However, the 
study by Farber (2005) indicates that fraud firms take actions to improve their governance and 
financial reporting oversight mechanisms. Contemporaneously, stock price performance in-
                                               
14  It has to be noted that Böcking et al. (2015) do not provide consistent evidence for the German enforcement 
setting. The authors conclude that the German enforcement regime is effective in detecting earnings man-




creases but analyst following and institutional holdings do not reflect improved financial re-
porting credibility.  
AAERs also relate to SEC sanctions against auditors, including practice suspensions, CPE 
(continuing professional education) hours, peer reviews and censures or injunctions (Bannis-
ter and Wiest 2001; Bremser et al. 1991). Firth et al. (2005), who analyze enforcement actions 
on auditors in China, provide consistent evidence. In addition, negative market reactions to 
SEC investigations or the presence of fraud cases may expose auditors to litigation (Bonner et 
al. 1998, Feroz et al. 1991). The SEC seems to have a propensity to punish smaller audit firms 
more severely than larger firms, which can be reasoned by the two facts that larger audit firms 
tend to have more resources to defend their audits and are members of the SEC’s Practice 
Section (DeFond and Smith 1991). Furthermore, error announcements can change the auditor-
client relationship as the auditor might reassess client risk, resulting in an audit fee premium 
(Barua and Smith 2013) or an increase in auditor conservatism (Bannister and Wiest 2001). 
Using the German enforcement setting, Brocard et al. (2015)° cannot provide evidence of 
increased likelihood of auditor changes subsequent to error announcements. In contrast, they 
find abnormal fluctuation of the employed audit firms in the aftermath of erroneous financial 
statements, i.e. already before the publication of the detected error. Extending this mixed evi-
dence, Kläs and Werner (2014)° suggest that investors impair auditors’ reputation following 
an error announcement. In sum, research on non-capital-market consequences to error an-
nouncements is rather focused on AAERs so far. However, there are first results for firm-




4 Critical Discussion 
Taking into account the evidence presented in chapter 3.2, we use a corporate governance 
perspective to critically discuss prior research contribution to the superordinate goal of re-
search. That is, as outlined at the beginning, the question for efficiency and efficacy of en-
forcement systems. Therefore, the analysis in section 4 focuses on the relevance of financial 
reporting enforcement from a corporate governance perspective and elaborates on connecting 
factors between enforcement and both internal and external corporate governance mecha-
nisms. Building on our distinction between internal and external governance mechanisms in 
chapter 2.1, we further disentangle external corporate governance mechanisms into three topi-
cal areas: External institutions, such as enforcers, regulators or legislators, other external in-
stitutions, focusing on auditors, and capital market participants. This allows us to separately 
discuss the perception of enforcement actions by investors, being the main addressees of fi-
nancial reporting enforcement as indicated in section 2. Moreover, it is noteworthy for this 
chapter that – besides a critical discussion of previous findings for the US – we especially 
emphasize the analysis of IFRS enforcement conducted within the European Union. Enforce-
ment actions in Europe can be observed within three countries, namely Germany, UK, and 
Austria.15 Due to differences in the overall institutional setting, but also with regard to the 
mechanisms of accounting enforcement (Leuz 2010), the empirical evidence of US studies 
does not necessarily need to hold for European countries (see e.g. Böckem 2000; Hitz et al. 
2012). Keeping this in mind, we aim to shed light on controversial or still missing insights on 
the European enforcement system as a potential basis of future research streams as set out in 
section 5. Without compromising the analyses and results of prior research but rather empha-
                                               
15  In 2014, Austria has implemented an enforcement regime that shows comparable characteristics to the 
German two-tiered enforcement system. Hence, it will take some time until first evidence for the Austrian 
enforcement will be available.  
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sizing the authors’ encouragement to cautiously interpret their findings (see e.g. Christensen 
et al. 2013, p. 172; Ernstberger et al. 2012, p. 246; Hope 2003, p. 265), the consideration of 
subsequently discussed conceptual and methodological issues might enhance the explanatory 
power of future research in enforcement. 
4.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Both restatements and error announcements, as stated in section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, may imply 
ineffective internal financial reporting oversight mechanisms and serve as indicators of inter-
nal corporate governance failure. In this section, we thus elaborate on current research in two 
areas of internal corporate governance: Enforcement consequences concerning executive 
management and internal financial oversight by audit committees. As highlighted in section 
3.2.3, prior US research has shown a strong association between executive turnover and re-
statements. In addition, US restatement research is regularly examining fraud cases (Burks 
2010; Hennes et al. 2008). However, we cannot find comparable studies with reference to 
error announcements in both the US and European enforcement regimes yet; although there is 
unambiguous US evidence for the important role of board level oversight in the financial re-
porting process. Evidence for the European setting is limited to the studies by Peasnell et al. 
(2001) and Ernstberger et al. (2012b)°, both indicating that the presence of an audit committee 
– amongst others – decreases the likelihood of an error announcement.  
Although all of the aforementioned evidence appears to be intuitive, several uncertainties and 
limitations of our knowledge remain. In the following, we thus further discuss the presence of 
European evidence and possible conclusions on the efficacy of enforcement consequences. 
First, there are some limitations with regard to the evidence on European enforcement re-
gimes. As previously highlighted, evidence for board level turnover following an error an-
nouncement is currently not available. Although there is initial evidence on the attenuating 
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effect of audit committees on the likelihood of error announcements, the presence or charac-
teristics of audit committees have not been separately investigated yet. Current European re-
search solely explains the occurrence of financial misreporting by using binary variables to 
indicate the presence of an audit committee, arguably representing good internal governance 
quality. Despite the intuitive character of this variable, the explanatory power of this approach 
is limited without further differentiating audit committee’s legislative framework, size, com-
position or expertise. All of these characteristics might be important factors in order to better 
understand the preventive effect of audit committees on financial misreporting. This might 
also enhance the overall picture of European enforcement regimes since incorporating specific 
national governance and institutional structures provides further insights on the interactions of 
enforcement and corporate governance mechanisms.  
Second, current research does not allow concluding on the efficacy of enforcement mecha-
nisms on board level executive’s behavior. In this context, efficacy could be defined either by 
a desirable deterrence level for executives and audit committee members or an increase in 
accounting quality after detection of accounting misstatements. Despite the fact that relevant 
research on effects of enforcement on board level turnover is still unavailable for European 
enforcement regimes, US enforcement research has hitherto only investigated the association 
between CEO turnover or auditor characteristics and the deterring effect of enforcement 
(Chen et al. 2014b; Wiedman and Hendricks 2013). With reference to the German enforce-
ment setting, Böcking et al. (2015) cannot find evidence for an increase in accounting quality 
following an error announcement. They conclude that an ‘educational effect’ concerning the 
deterrence effect of enforcement on executives engaging in earnings management is not ob-
servable. Audit committees shall therefore monitor executives in applying accounting stand-
ards. They are designed to internally ensure faithful and consistent application of financial 
reporting standards and, thus, are subject to both the deterrence and the sanctioning mecha-
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nism of enforcement. However, confirmation of this association is limited to the US and still 
does not exist for European enforcement regimes. Overall, research suggests that certain 
board characteristics are associated with the occurrence of financial misreporting; in addi-
tion, research finds a penalizing effect of detected financial misreporting on executives be-
ing responsible for financial reporting and financial reporting oversight. Nevertheless, 
studies that explicitly investigate one of the two associations for the European setting or 
allow concluding reasoning on enforcement efficacy do not exist yet (F7).  
4.2  External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
4.2.1 Accounting Enforcement as External Corporate Governance Mechanism 
As stated in sections 2.1 and 2.3, activities of enforcement institutions represent – besides 
providing the basis of interaction with other internal and external corporate governance mech-
anisms and thereby ensuring their functioning – stand-alone components of external corporate 
governance by shaping the institutional setting. Based on the notion that financial reporting is 
the outcome of both accounting standards and reporting incentives (Holthausen 2009), differ-
ences with regard to enforcement of financial reporting are supposed to affect financial report-
ing behavior and its impact on addressees (Ball 2006; Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Indeed, 
most studies mentioned in section 3.2.2 suggest that legal enforcement proxies are positively 
associated with accounting quality, their reception by addressees, and in turn capital market 
properties and economic prosperity (Byard et al. 2011; Cai et al. 2008°; Callao and Jarne 
2010; Daske et al. 2008; Zaidi and Huerta 2014). However, empirical evidence for explicit 
enforcement proxies is to date limited to reduced forecast errors and dispersion (Hope 2003; 
Preiato et al. 2013°). By examining effects of reforms that strengthen enforcement of account-
ing standards, as presented in section 3.2.1, researchers detect worldwide evidence for liquidi-
ty increases and ambiguous evidence for a reduction of earnings management, mainly based 
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on the case of Germany (Christensen et al. 2013; Ernstberger et al. 2012a; Neel 2013°; Sama-
rasekera et al. 2012°). While these findings, without doubt, have contributed in shaping our 
understanding of institutional factors and their influence on financial reporting outcomes, sev-
eral uncertainties and limitations of our knowledge remain. In the following, we demonstrate 
two major limitations of this research stream. 
The first issue affects the validity of the employed enforcement proxies: Do they really cap-
ture enforcement of accounting standards, or something else? While this question is a rather 
rhetoric one for legal enforcement proxies, it is also justified with regard to the more sophisti-
cated enforcement proxy of Preiato et al. (2013)°. The latter is basically formed by assessing 
the formal competences of a country’s primary enforcement institution, complemented by an 
ordinal measure which reflects the staffing level in relation to the whole population. Despite 
the quite appealing character of these indicators, they suffer from various limitations (see Cof-
fee 2007; Jackson 2008; Jackson and Roe 2009; Pope 2003). Formal competences, which on-
ly measure the ‘law on the books’, might be a noisy proxy in institutional settings with little 
enforcement of existing laws. The use of formal competences reasonably assumes that the 
‘law on the books’ is indeed applied in practice; however, in this case there is no need for en-
forcement anymore. Resource-based indicators also suffer from limitations as e.g. uncertainty 
about the efficient use of resources. These objections should be kept in mind when interpret-
ing the named findings. 
The second issue deals with the examined impact of enforcement: Referring to IFRS adoption 
in the European Union and the concurrent changes in enforcement of financial reporting to 
comply with the ‘IAS Regulation’ and ‘Transparency Directive’, to date there is still a lack of 
unambiguous evidence whether the mission of increased accounting compliance has been 
accomplished. Apart from those studies that employ legal enforcement proxies and propose 
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this effect, the studies of Ernstberger et al. (2012a) and Samarasekera et al. (2012)° are the 
only ones that tackle this issue. Though their findings suggest some evidence of increased 
earnings quality due to enforcement reforms, which also goes in line with other studies that 
detect improved forecast accuracy and positive capital market effects, their results are restrict-
ed to the German enforcement setting and thereby cannot be generalized within the European 
or worldwide context. Moreover, the external validity of both studies suffers from the re-
striction of certain analyses to rather special subsamples: Ernstberger et al. (2012a) try to dis-
entangle the effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement reforms by focusing on a small sub-
sample of companies in the non-regulated German stock market, whereas Samarasekera et al. 
(2012)° focus on a subsample of British firms which are cross-listed in Germany and the US, 
to name but a few countries.  
The bottom line is that the enforcement proxies used in current empirical research on en-
forcement of financial reporting suffer from inherent shortcomings, which might negative-
ly affect the validity of the gained results. Furthermore, it is obvious that to date no gener-
alized results covering the impact of enforcement on accounting quality have been pub-
lished (F8). 
4.2.2 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on Other External Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
As can be seen in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, research on other external corporate governance 
mechanisms that interact with accounting enforcement basically focuses on the role of and 
impacts on external auditors. Auditor characteristics as determinants of enforcement outcomes 
have been extensively studied in the US setting, hinting at the fact that Big 4 auditors provide 
higher quality audits than their non-Big 4 counterparts (see Francis et al. 2013 for an over-
view). While some critical studies provide evidence that this effect is rather driven by a supe-
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rior level of resources than the label Big 4 (Francis et al. 2013), the presented results do not 
seem to be subject of obvious methodological insufficiencies. Additionally, contrasting re-
search that focuses on specific institutional issues in the US as e.g. restatement initiation by 
auditors, the results appear to be transferable to the European context, given the comparable 
structure of the auditor market (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006). Examining the effects of en-
forcement on auditors, studies for the US suggest negative impact on auditor ratification (Liu 
et al. 2009) and higher auditor turnover for firms with financial restatements, which is signifi-
cantly driven by severity of restatements (Hennes et al. 2014; Mande and Son 2013; Thomp-
son and McCoy 2008). Turning to auditor reputation, Kläs and Werner (2014)° suggest a de-
crease in the aftermath of error announcements in the German enforcement setting, while a 
change of the audit firm can be observed already before error publication (Brocard et al. 
2015°). 
While it is noteworthy that the US studies’ methodology has become more elaborated over 
time by additionally addressing the information content of restatements (Hennes et al. 2014; 
Huang and Scholz 2012; Mande and Son 2013; Thompson and McCoy 2008) and thereby 
improving the reliability of conducted analyses, evidence for the European setting is to date 
almost completely missing. However, the often-cited institutional differences and deviating 
results of prior research (Böckem 2000; Hitz et al. 2012) cast some doubt on the assumption 
that US results can be readily transferred to the European context. Confirming this suspicion, 
Brocard et al. (2015)° cannot provide evidence of increased auditor fluctuation after error 
announcements, but already after the publication of the erroneous financial statements. While 
their findings do not suggest a prominent role of shareholders in the context of auditor 
change, we caution that Brocard et al. (2015)° can only provide evidence of changes of the 
audit firm, keeping the responsible auditors unobserved who conduct the audit. This distinc-
tion seems worth to investigate to us, since changes of the audit firm might also be affected by 
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other factors as e.g. non-audit services provided by the audit firm. Moreover, the findings of 
Wiedman and Hendricks (2013) in terms of increased accounting quality following adverse 
publication certainly require a deeper look: Can the enhanced accounting quality be attributed 
to the auditor change, or is it solely a signal of improved corporate governance, however 
without measurable effect? 
Apart from these issues, the proxy for the construct ‘auditor reputation’ as applied by Kläs 
and Werner (2014)° can be questioned: The authors try to capture a loss in auditor reputation 
after an error announcement of an auditor’s client firm by examining negative excess returns 
of other client firms in the auditor’s portfolio. Despite the fact that prior studies apply a simi-
lar approach (see e.g. Beatty et al. 1998), it appears questionable whether this metric indeed 
captures reputational loss of auditors, hinting at a potentially affected construct validity of the 
used proxy. Furthermore, based on the notion that the choice of a 7-day event window is the 
only measure of Kläs and Werner (2014)° to address potential confounding event issues gives 
rise to doubts of the reliability of the results. In summary, research suggests the presence of 
enforcement’s sanctioning function with regard to auditor turnover and ratification in the 
US, however lacking European evidence. Findings indicating decreased auditor reputation 
suffer from methodological limitations (F9). 
4.2.3 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on the Capital Market 
Enforcement is designed to ensure the faithful and consistent application of financial report-
ing standards in order to maintain and enhance investor confidence in capital markets. Vice 
versa, financial misreporting disrupts investor confidence and, thus, decreases capital market 
efficiency. As presented in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, several US- and EU-based studies have 
shown the existence of the adverse disclosure mechanism that presumably facilitates both the 
deterring and sanctioning mechanism of enforcement. However, results on European en-
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forcement regimes (Böckem 2000; Ebner et al. 2015°; Hitz et al. 2012; Kläs and Werner 
2014°) cannot provide comparable market reactions to their US predecessors. Besides the 
well-researched field of financial misreporting disclosure, research on capital market reactions 
to other enforcement consequences, such as executive or auditor turnover, is still mostly lim-
ited to US samples. Even though the presented associations between the detection of financial 
misreporting and capital market reaction are quite perceptive, there are some limitations to be 
addressed in the following.  
The first limitation to be addressed concerns the point in time when financial misreporting is 
disclosed. While prior research has observed dark periods – defined as the number of days 
between the reporting date of the erroneous financial statement and the date of the error an-
nouncement – of almost two years for the European setting (Hitz et al. 2012), the dark periods 
for their US counterparts investigating capital market reactions following restatements are 
significantly shorter. Keeping in mind that the Conceptual Frameworks for Financial Report-
ing defines timeliness in paragraph QC29 as ‘having information available to decision makers 
in time to be capable of influencing their decisions’, a dark period of over almost two years 
might decrease the likelihood of observable market reactions. That is, we suggest that inves-
tors are not that interested in errors related to financial misreporting some years ago instead of 
getting timely information, which is mostly the case for restatements. Two US studies (Ba-
dertscher and Burks 2011; Schmidt and Wilkins 2013) elaborate on this issue and show that 
fraud cases, complex issues of financial misreporting, auditor characteristics and internal gov-
ernance characteristics determine the length of the dark period. It is however an open empiri-
cal question for the European setting if such associations are existent and if the timeliness of 
error announcements enhances investor reactions. 
 
73 
The second limitation concerns the market participants’ ability to obtain and process financial 
misreporting disclosure. Studies regularly employ an event study approach in order to investi-
gate the assumed causality of financial restatement disclosure and abnormal capital market 
returns. However, this implies that market participants are capable of directly obtaining and 
processing relevant information. Against the background of the aforementioned deviating re-
sults between US and European studies, it is an open empirical question whether different 
ways of financial misreporting disclosure as investigated by Files et al. 2009 also shape mar-
ket reactions in the European setting. Additionally, the level of financial press coverage might 
also facilitate capital market reactions by disseminating information more broadly (Cohen et 
al. 2010; Soltani 2014). However, the role of financial press coverage has not been covered by 
studies on European enforcement, yet. In addition, a change in financial press coverage or 
financial press atmosphere could shed further light on a firm’s reputation following financial 
misreporting disclosure. Hence, this could supplement studies that solely assess reputational 
losses through capital market returns.   
The third caveat supplements the former one to a certain extent as the ability of capital market 
participants to process information also depends on the information provided. Although the 
legislative framework of US and German enforcement requires certain minimum details with-
in the disclosure of financial misreporting, de facto announcements vary significantly (see 
Palmrose et al. 2004 for restatements). Hence, it is necessary to investigate the effect of in-
formation provided in financial misreporting disclosures on market reactions. As outlined in 
section 3.2.3, US research finds a wide range of information from these disclosures, including 
the reasons for restatements. In contrast, error announcements in Germany are more standard-




Summed up, evidence on the deterring and sanctioning function of enforcement for Euro-
pean enforcement regimes is rather mixed. Initial evidence, using capital market proxies, 
on the German enforcement system partially suggests the ‘name and shame’ mechanism to 
be existent. Nevertheless, research designs applied so far do not allow finally concluding on 
the efficacy of enforcement systems (F10).   
5 Avenues for Further Research 
The preceding discussion emphasizes the major and increasing role of enforcement in shaping 
both capital markets and corporate governance mechanisms. That said, research needs to fur-
ther elaborate on the various enforcement regimes within the European setting, which have, at 
least in some countries, a significantly different institutional setting compared to the US (Leuz 
2010). Based on the aforementioned findings of enforcement research, we identify several 
research gaps that should be addressed in future research.. Table A provides a comprehensive 
matrix of the major findings from section 3 and 4 and the hereafter stated avenues for further 
research. The first pair of research opportunities concerns efficiency and efficacy and, thus, 
the possibility to conclude on the successful implementation and institutional embedding of a 
certain enforcement regime. However, research on both efficiency and efficacy of enforce-
ment requires a reliable assessment of underlying causes and consequences of enforcement 
actions. Hence, the second pair of research opportunities elaborates on the possibilities to fur-
ther assess the effects of enforcement mechanisms and their associations with other corporate 
governance mechanisms. As this operational sphere of enforcement has already been well-
researched for the US setting, we limit our suggestions in this context to IFRS enforcement in 
the EU.  
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First research opportunity (RO1): Investigate the efficiency of accounting enforcement 
regimes on a national and international level. Based on our literature review, we find that 
there is a tendency in investigating enforcement mechanisms separately in order to provide 
descriptive results on the occurrence of sanctioning or deterring effects. However, prior re-
search designs have in common that they do not allow concluding on the efficiency of the 
observed mechanism. In order to reliably measure efficiency, which describes the trade-off of 
economic benefits against costs, research needs to construct proxies for both benefits and 
costs of enforcement. While the latter can be derived from input factors, such as enforcement 
staff budgets (Jackson and Roe 2009), an overall assessment of enforcement’s efficiency also 
needs to account for indirect costs, e.g. company costs and costs borne by other capital market 
participants. Although input and output measures may be regarded as reliable determinants of 
enforcement, they are not to be interpreted as the sole determinants of enforcement strength 
(Holthausen 2009) and, thus, enforcement efficiency. Benefits of enforcement, however, are 
even harder to observe and are most likely to be approximated by capital market properties, 
for example liquidity (Barth et al. 2008; Christensen et al. 2013), or accounting quality con-
structs, such as earnings management (Ernstberger et al. 2012a). In order to capture the over-
all picture of enforcement efficiency, a cross-country perspective might be a promising ap-
proach to gain further insights on enforcement regimes’ efficiency. However, for this purpose 
research needs to overcome several challenges, as e.g. the identification of all relevant regula-
tory inputs which does not need to be straightforward across different institutional settings 
(Jackson 2008). 
In order to gain further insights on the efficiency of enforcement regimes, future research 
should elaborate on measures or indices that capture both benefits and costs of enforcement. 
Moreover, in pursuance of constructing these metrics, future research should also take differ-
ent indicators into consideration, including the timeliness of financial misreporting disclosure. 
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First US evidence (Badertscher and Burks 2011; Schmidt and Wilkins 2013) emphasizes the 
importance of timely financial misreporting disclosure. Future research might also analyze the 
efficiency of different review cycles and finally examine whether private or authoritative en-
forcement institutions exhibit comparative advantages with regard to efficiency.  
Second research opportunity (RO2): Extend research on enforcement regimes’ efficacy in 
order to better understand the underlying process. Analogous to the first research opportuni-
ty, we find a similar tendency regarding the efficacy of accounting enforcement regimes. Effi-
cacy, which measures the degree to which targets are achieved, depends on the ‘result’ of en-
forcement and the underlying ‘target’. Driven by the intended preventative and sanctioning 
function, the overarching target of enforcement is to ensure the faithful and consistent appli-
cation of financial reporting standards, which – going in line with current research – is opera-
tionalized by different concepts of accounting quality (e.g., abnormal accruals calculated on a 
Jones-model basis). However, the validity of results using the concept of accounting quality is 
thus dependent on the definition of accounting quality chosen by the individual scholar.  
It has to be noted that efficacy can be investigated in various areas of accounting enforcement, 
including identifying the ‘right’ firms to be investigated, penalizing managers for financial 
misreporting, improving auditors’ independence or internal financial reporting oversight, pre-
venting executives from engaging in earnings management, and increasing overall accounting 
quality. In a first step, future research on European enforcement should therefore extend the 
findings by Böckem (2000) and Hitz et al. (2012) in order to investigate the efficacy of the 
‘name and shame’ mechanism. Böcking et al. (2015) provide initial evidence that the German 
enforcement system is capable of identifying the right firms to investigate but cannot find a 
restraining effect of error announcements on the level of earnings management. Strohmenger 
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(2014), finding evidence for an increase in earnings quality, also labels the German enforce-
ment system to be effective.  
In a second step, future research also needs to address the association between the outcome of 
European enforcement mechanisms and national financial reporting oversight mechanisms, 
including auditors and internal financial oversight mechanisms. The study by Brocard et al. 
(2015)°, showing audit-firm turnover preceding error announcements, provides a suitable 
point of departure for further studies that investigate the efficacy of German enforcement in 
effectively influencing the auditor-client relationship. In contrast, there is solely one study 
investigating the ‘name and shame’ mechanism in the UK (Böckem 2000) and none for Aus-
tria, yet. Other European countries do not publically provide necessary information for com-
parable studies. Given the EU’s attempt to harmonize enforcement mechanisms, research 
needs to overcome this lack of information in order to investigate enforcement efficacy in 
different institutional settings. In this context, we put special emphasis on the distinction be-
tween data that is non-available and those which is only difficult to assess. While data on the 
investigation process of FREP and BaFin is also not publically available in Germany, the 
study of Böcking et al. (2015) encouragingly displays research opportunities being the result 
of cooperation between academia and enforcement institutions, thereby serving as a potential 
blueprint for other countries. Besides the operational level of enforcement, Ernstberger et al. 
(2012a) and Samarasekera et al. (2012)° - using samples of German and UK listed firms - 
provide first evidence for the efficacy of the German enforcement regime with regard to its 
preventative function. Building on this, future research should further elaborate on the impact 
of regulatory reforms, e.g. in a European cross-country setting. 
Third research opportunity (RO3): Use alternative measures to capture the overall picture 
of enforcement consequences. As stated above, the third research opportunity is supposed to 
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tie up with previous suggestions to extend research on both efficiency and efficacy of en-
forcement regimes. Since both concepts are to a considerable extent driven by the operational-
ization of enforcement consequences (in the form of ‘enforcement output’ over ‘enforcement 
input’ or ‘enforcement target’, respectively), it appears rewardingly to take a closer look at 
this issue. This inevitably gives rise to the question which kind of ‘enforcement output’ is rel-
evant for future analyses. Recalling the objectives of enforcement – namely improving ac-
counting compliance via preventive and sanctioning functions (Berger 2010) – illustrates that 
metrics which account for accounting quality and sanctioning effects are without doubt an 
appropriate starting point.  
Although prior enforcement literature employs several accounting quality metrics, the ques-
tion of construct validity is still relevant (for a comprehensive overview see Dechow et al. 
2011). Given the limitations of frequently used proxies as discretionary accrual models or 
earnings smoothing, the use of methodologically unrelated earnings management metrics as 
e.g. the ATO/PM model (Jansen et al. 2012) – besides other approaches of assessing account-
ing quality – might at least serve as promising robustness check. In addition, further investiga-
tions on the impact of enforcement on the institutional structure of corporate governance, as 
e.g. auditors’ activities and independence that in turn might also affect accounting compli-
ance, might generate precious insights. 
Turning the view to the postulated sanctioning function in the European enforcement setting, 
we emphasize that to date research has almost exclusively focused on capital market proper-
ties (Böckem 2000; Ebner et al. 2015°; Hitz et al. 2012). Auspicious avenues for further re-
search could be assessments of reputational damages apart from stock market declines, as e.g. 
the impact on earnings response coefficients (Wilson 2008), press or analyst coverage (for the 
latter see Barniv and Cao 2009), or qualitative metrics based on stakeholder or expert surveys, 
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to name but a few. Additional sanctioning mechanisms with lack of evidence for the European 
setting are executive turnover (Desai et al. 2006, Srinivasan 2005), changes in the compensa-
tion structure in the aftermath of error announcements (Burks 2011; Cheng and Farber 2008; 
Collins et al. 2009), and – in case of management fluctuation – post-employment labor market 
penalties (Collins et al. 2009; Desai et al. 2006a). With regard to Kläs and Werner (2014)° 
who suggest decreased auditor reputation – approximated by client firms’ negative excess 
returns – due to client restatements, the proposition of employing alternative reputation met-
rics apply by analogy. Shedding some light on these issues would without doubt enhance our 
understanding of enforcement and its interaction with other corporate governance mechanism, 
and moreover broaden the view with regard to the assessment of efficiency and efficacy of 
enforcement regimes. 
Fourth research opportunity (RO4): Examine the determinants of enforcement conse-
quences in a more detailed fashion. In the context and as a consequence of RO3, future re-
search also needs to further investigate the underlying causes of enforcement consequences, 
including the characteristics of financial misreporting, executive management, and auditors. 
In line with sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, prior research with reference to the US shows a strong 
association between certain auditor characteristics (e.g., size, independence or tenure) and the 
likelihood of financial misreporting. With reference to auditor size, studies focused on Euro-
pean enforcement regularly distinguish between Big 4/Big 5 auditors when investigating error 
announcements (Böcking et al. 2015; Hitz et al. 2012; Peasnell et al. 2001). However, future 
research regarding European enforcement regimes also needs to account for more detailed 
characteristics, including the proportion of audit and non-audit sales, independence and audit 
tenure to capture the overall determining effect of auditor characteristics.  
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Analogous to research regarding effects of auditor characteristics, European evidence on ex-
ecutive management characteristics affecting enforcement consequences is rather scarce. The 
working paper by Ernstberger et al. (2012b)° and the study by Peasnell et al. (2001) provide 
initial evidence on the positive association of both opportunistic motives and a weak level of 
corporate governance on the likelihood of financial misreporting in Germany and the UK. 
Hence, further research needs to address the association between enforcement consequences 
and executive management’s remuneration, expertise, and busyness. Additionally, characteris-
tics of internal financial reporting oversight mechanisms, such as presence or composition of 
the audit committee, should also be subject of further studies. In sum, further research needs 
to investigate the role of both executive and auditor characteristics within the European insti-
tutional and governmental setting in order to improve our understanding of the observed en-
forcement consequences.  
Apart from these two principally personalized determinants, prior research has identified error 
severity – measured as either number of errors established or changes in income related key 
performance indicators – as a major determinant of enforcement consequences (Burks 2010; 
Hitz et al. 2012; Mande and Son 2013; Palmrose et al. 2004; Srinivasan 2005; Sue et al. 
2013). However, US research identifies other information contained in both restatements and 
error announcements to drive enforcement consequences, including the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional errors (Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010), transaction 
complexity and accounting standard characteristics (both Plumlee and Yohn 2010). By com-
parison, evidence for European enforcement regimes is scarce to date. After all, a study on the 
German enforcement regime by Ernstberger et al. (2012b)° displays the accounting fields 
covered by error announcements without further investigating their effects on enforcement 
consequences. Building on this, future research should elaborate on the effects of error an-
nouncement information – besides the number of errors and the impact on overall profitability 
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– on enforcement consequences. In particular, information on accounting behavior of execu-
tives might shed further light on the circumstances of financial misreporting. This might also 
be helpful to further understand the effect of executive or auditor characteristics on enforce-
ment consequences or vice versa. 
In addition to investigating information content and personal characteristics, further research 
might also take a look at information intermediaries. Deriving from Cohen et al. (2010), 
Soltani (2014), who investigates European and US accounting scandals, highlights that cover-
age of financial misreporting by academic literature and financial press facilitates public dis-
cussion. However, the public discussion of financial misreporting is larger for US accounting 
scandals than for European comparative cases (Soltani 2014). Hence, differences in financial 
press coverage might explain differences in enforcement consequences.  
We argue that, although prior research has already dealt with a multitude of enforcement as-
pects and their association with different corporate governance mechanisms, an integrated 
perspective on enforcement of IFRS in the European setting is still incomplete. Therefore, we 
emphasize that further research needs to fill this research gap by overcoming two major chal-
lenges. First, it will be necessary to collect data on European enforcement regimes other than 
Austria, Germany, and UK to gain further insights on the comparative advantages of certain 
accounting enforcement regimes. We argue that this is a problem of data accessibility instead 
of data availability and, therefore, encourage enforcement institutions to cooperate with re-
searchers. The study by Böcking et al. (2015) serves as a positive example for our reasoning. 
Furthermore, for example by using surveys or single-firm case studies, additional research on 
firms under enforcement auspices or the impact of enforcement on auditors would allow dif-
ferent perspectives on the effectiveness and efficacy of enforcement. Nevertheless, both of 
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these data sets again require the cooperation of firms and auditors in order to gain further in-
sights on perception and impact of enforcement actions. 
Second, although both the aforementioned European accounting enforcement regimes and the 
US accounting enforcement regime rely on the ‘name and shame’ mechanism as a deterrent, 
differences in the institutional and governance setting might lead to a mitigated perception of 
accounting misstatement disclosure in the European setting. It is not without reason that Leuz 
(2010) labels US enforcement as a heavy outlier (see also Evans et al. 2015). We therefore 
propose to undertake additional research on European accounting enforcement regimes that 
also considers non-capital-market-based measures as an alternative. 
== Table A about here == 
6 Conclusion and Limitations 
Enforcement of financial reporting is designed to ensure the proper application of accounting 
standards, thereby providing valuable information about the underlying economic perfor-
mance to a company’s stakeholders which in turn might improve the functioning of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Consequently, theory suggests that stakeholders in general and 
shareholders in particular are supposed to benefit from accounting enforcement (Barth et al. 
2008; Brown and Tarca 2005; Christensen et al. 2013; Schipper 2005).  
The ability of enforcement regimes to take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with ac-
counting standards has been analyzed in different research approaches over the last decades 
and has clearly been focusing on financial misreporting in the US. Despite the broad research 
on US firms, there is a small but growing stream of literature on enforcement in the European 
setting to date. With the goal of describing the role of accounting enforcement as a corporate 
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governance mechanism, our literature review takes into account the different dimensions and 
areas of enforcement and highlights relevant connecting factors with both internal and exter-
nal corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, by conducting an extensive literature review, 
we provide a structured approach to research on enforcement of financial reporting. Further-
more, our approach allows us to identify key findings of prior research and to derive avenues 
for further research. 
There are two perspectives of prior research: The cross-country perspective, which investi-
gates the impact of enforcement strength or the implementation of enforcement mechanisms, 
and the country-specific perspective, which mostly examines causes and consequences of 
financial misreporting. We find that cross-country studies show positive effects of enforce-
ment on both capital market and financial reporting properties, although there is only limited 
evidence for the association between the concept of accounting quality and enforcement 
strength or reforms. For the country-specific perspective, we find that the majority of litera-
ture focuses on describing separate mechanisms or procedures of enforcement, for example 
the existence of the ‘name and shame’ mechanism. However, both perspectives do not derive 
any conclusions about the efficacy or efficiency of their research objective. In addition, there 
are only 16 studies (~10%) that investigate causes and consequences of enforcement within 
the European setting whereas the majority (~60%) of our sample studies explicitly investigate 
financial misreporting in the US.  
Based on the aforementioned key findings of prior research, we identify several avenues for 
further research. Firstly, underlying causes of error announcements have to be further evaluat-
ed in a more detailed fashion by looking at information provided by error announcements and 
corporate governance characteristics of misstating firms. Secondly, further research needs to 
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investigate the consequences of error announcements on both internal and external financial 
reporting oversight mechanisms.  
Finally, based on the observations of consequences of error announcements, future research 
needs to evaluate both efficacy and efficiency of enforcement mechanisms. In order to assess 
enforcement regimes’ efficiency further research needs separate and well-defined measures 
for ‘results’ and ‘effort’ to combine those for a cost-benefit analysis. While we acknowledge 
that even the most sophisticated cost-benefit approach will not be able to perfectly capture 
both constructs (Leuz 2007; Zhang 2007), the latter can be accessed from a resource-based 
view (Brown et al. 2014; Jackson and Roe 2009), whereas the former cannot be observed eas-
ily (Coffee 2007). In order to solve this problem, we suggest research to cooperate with en-
forcement bodies to gain access to the underlying population of firms being under investiga-
tion.  
Besides the previously mentioned key findings and avenues for further research, our review is 
subject to various limitations. First, although we conducted an extensive literature search, it is 
likely that we did not identify all relevant literature, as corporate governance, financial report-
ing and enforcement are multifaceted constructs. We additionally caution that the stream of 
literature on European enforcement is continuously growing. Furthermore, our search terms 
do not provide a complete list of possible search terms. Second, we limited our analysis to the 
areas of enforcement and different corporate governance mechanisms and focused our discus-
sion mostly on the implementations of enforcement in the European setting. Hence, there 
might be current or future literature that connects this particular field of research with other 
geographical or topical areas and thereby extends the area of relevant literature.  
Despite the aforementioned limitations, our approach provides essential insights into the in-
teraction of enforcement and other internal and external financial reporting oversight mecha-
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nisms. We hope that it provides a preliminary overview and contributes to the understanding 
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Table B: Overview of studies reviewed (studies are assorted alphabetically by author) 
Content Description Context-Related 

















Find that the independence and 
the activity level of the audit 
committee exhibit a significant 
and negative association with 
the occurrence of restatement. 
The same holds true if one 

















Suggest that female board 
presence contributes to the 
boards' ability to maintain an 
attitude of mental independence 
that increases the board's ability 
to monitor financial reporting 
and thus mitigates the likeli-

















Find that several quantitative 
and qualitative material consid-
erations explain a large portion 
of the variation of firms' error 
correction decisions. Results 
also indicate that accounting 
error decisions are influenced 




















Provide evidence that CEO, top 
management and CFO turnover 
is greater for restatement firms 
compared to the control sample 
and that there is a positive 
association between turnover 
likelihood and severity of error. 
Do not find consistent evidence 




















Find that restatement probabil-
ity for an IPO firm is positively 
related to the underwriter 
reputation and negatively 
related to VC backing, VC 
reputation, and VC maturity. 
Thus, VC has a positive influ-



















Suggest that IFRS adoption - 
due to the introduction of 
principles-based accounting 
standards - leads to lower 
accounting quality in strong 
enforcement countries. Thus, 
they use enforcement to distin-























Provide evidence that CFO 
literacy (years of work, ad-
vanced degrees like CPAs, 
experience at another company 
etc.) is negatively associated 

















Content Description Context-Related 
















Document that fraud firms have 
significantly lower levels of 
accounting conservatism in the 
pre-fraud period. In turn, they 
find an increase in accounting 
conservatism for fraud firms 
during the SEC investigation 
period. However, after publica-
tion of SEC investigation 






















Demonstrate that among non-
professional investors, percep-
tions of management's financial 
reporting credibility are affect-
ed both by the post-restatement 
















Show that firms that recently 
filed financial restatements are 
significantly less likely to 
become takeover targets or bids 
are more likely to be withdrawn 
or take longer to complete than 
a matched sample of non-
restating firms. Thus, they 
suggest that information risk is 
















Provide evidence that restate-
ments of 10-K reports lead to 
negative returns and increased 
bid-ask spreads. Investor 
reactions are more pronounced 
for revenue recognition errors. 
Firms show a lower earnings 


















Display that IFRS adoption 
leads to reduced conditional 
conservatism. However, this 
effect is mitigated in countries 























Contrast prior research by not 
finding evidence of a positive 
association between CEO 
equity incentives and account-
ing irregularities. Instead, the 
authors find evidence that 
accounting irregularities occur 
less frequently at firms where 
CEOs have relatively higher 

























Provide evidence that restate-
ment firms have higher CEO, 
CFO, director and audit com-
mittee member turnover rates 
and, thus, suggest the internal 
corporate governance mecha-
















Content Description Context-Related 


















Find that firms disclosing 
internal control deficiencies 
have more complex operations, 
recent organizational changes, 
greater accounting risk, more 
auditor resignations, have 
fewer resources available for 
internal control and have more 
prior SEC enforcement actions 


















Provide evidence that restate-
ments increase municipal debt 
costs. However, adverse conse-
quences of restatements are 
mitigated by strong audit 
oversight and by provisions 
that encourage direct voter 
















Results indicate that corporate 
governance characteristics and 
the probability of financial 
accounting restatements are 
related in 2005, but not in 
1997. In addition, they show 
the importance of considering 
interactions of different corpo-
rate governance mechanisms 
when investigating determi-


















Examine the length of disclo-
sure lags around restatements 
and identify the underlying 
causes indicating that lengthy 
lags are uncommon and are the 
















Ball (2006) Argues that IFRS will only 
partially lead to a convergence 
in actual financial reporting 
practice, e.g. due to a non-
uniform enforcement. Thus, he 
uses enforcement to distinguish 















law and code-law countries, 
provide useful insights and 
show the influence of account-
ing standard regulation and 
enforcement on income con-




















Indicate that preparers' finan-
cial reporting incentives depend 
on the sources of demand for, 
and political influence on, 
financial reporting. Hence, 
financial reporting outcome is 
determined by a variety of 
institutional factors, e.g. public 



















Provide evidence that client 
firms of auditors that are sub-
ject to an SEC investigation 




















Content Description Context-Related 















Find that investors tend to rely 
more on the information that 
analyst characteristics convey 
about forecast accuracy in 
restatement firms than in non-
restatement firms. Investors' 
reliance also depends on the 
level of restatement intensity 


















Provide evidence that common-
law countries - which are 
related to stronger investor 
protection laws - set better 
incentives for financial analysts 


























State that both IFRS adoption 
and enforcement are necessary 
to confer capital market bene-
fits and that individual effects 





















Find that application of IFRS 
leads to superior accounting 
quality which is not necessarily 
due to the standards alone, but 
also due to a better institutional 






















Provide evidence that compa-
nies that are subject to a SEC 
enforcement action (AAER) 
experience audit fee premiums 


















Indicates that no-fraud firms 
have boards with significantly 
higher percentages of outside 
directors than fraud firms but 
evidence does not support a 
positive effect of the presence 
of an audit committee on the 






















Provide evidence that fraud 
firms have very weak corporate 
governance mechanisms, 
including fewer and less active 
audit committees, less inde-
pendent boards and less inter-





















Provide a comprehensive 
analysis of fraudulent financial 
reporting occurrences investi-
gated by the SEC between 
1998-2007 and find 347 alleged 
cases. Provide additional 
insights on involvement of 
executive management, fraud 























Content Description Context-Related 

















Document that a SEC investi-
gation of an underwriter im-
poses indirect penalties on the 
underwriter and its past clients. 
Hence, underwriters experience 
IPO market share declines, 
increased regulatory scrutiny 
and client risk. In addition, 



















Documents that managers in 
firms that overstate earnings 
are more likely to engage in 
insider trading prior to the 
public discovery of the over-
statement. On discovery, 
investors react negatively to the 
error announcement. On the 
contrary, managers do not face 
labour market consequences or 
























Find that cost of equity does 
not change after the introduc-
tion of insider trading laws, but 





















Provide evidence that firms 
with abnormal audit report lags 
(time span between fiscal year 
end and report publication) are 
more likely to be subject to 

















Find that the German enforce-
ment system is effective in 
detecting firms with erroneous 
financial reporting, although, it 
shows weak ability in con-
straining earnings management 





















Provide evidence that auditors 
are more likely to be sued when 
financial statement frauds are 
of a common variety or when 




















Provide information about the 
registrants subject to an AAER, 
their auditors, the types of 
violations made, and the sanc-
tions required by the SEC. 
Indicate that those firms receiv-
ing sanctions were significantly 
larger and had a higher propor-
tion of opinion qualifications 
than their industry counterparts 
while their auditors received 
SEC sanctions only a small 



















Cannot provide significant 
evidence of increased auditor 
turnover after error announce-
ments, but already after the 
publication of erroneous finan-
cial statements. Changes from 
Non-Big4 auditors to Big4 
auditors are more likely, argua-


















Content Description Context-Related 

















Calculate two new indices and 
suggest their indices have 
additional explanatory power 
(over more general legal prox-
ies) for country-level measures 
of economic and market activi-



















Present the views of people 
involved in financial reporting 
standard settings and enforce-
ment in France, UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands as well as 
the IASB, FEE and EFRAG 
about the challenges of achiev-
ing effective uniform enforce-
ment. The goal of uniform 
enforcement is identified as a 
major challenge, in particular 
the coordination of enforce-





















Present material about the 
enforcers' activities in Australia 
and the UK and show that both 
types of bodies can fulfill an 
enforcement role. Suggest that 
cross-country differences are 
mitigated through international 
coordination activities. In 
addition, they indicate a rela-
tion between enforcement 
actions and political views held 
in government, corporate sector 






















Provide evidence that earnings 
management is affected by 
companies' reporting incentives 
and, hence, strong legal sys-



















Finds that when disciplining 
CEOs after SOX, boards gravi-
tate away from termination and 
toward bonus penalties. In 
contrast, boards appear to 
strengthen disciplinary actions 
against CFOs after SOX de-
















Finds that the initial price 
reaction to restatement an-
nouncements becomes signifi-
cantly less negative after SOX 
and suggests that price effi-
ciency actually improves after 
SOX. However, does not find 
an increase in disagreement 























Provide evidence that IFRS 
adoption leads to a decrease in 
analysts' forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion, but only in 
those countries with strong 
enforcement and domestic 
standards which differ signifi-
















Content Description Context-Related 

















Provide evidence that IFRS 
adoption leads to a decrease in 
earnings management but that 
this only holds true for coun-




















Show that IFRS adoption leads 
to increased earnings manage-
ment and that firms in countries 
with stronger legal enforcement 





















Identify factors that drive the 
capital market reaction after 
restatements and show that 
income-increasing restatements 
do not yield any significant 
reaction, which is probably due 


















Argue that CEO involvement in 
the director selection process 
decreases audit committee 
effectiveness. In addition, 
negative stock market reactions 
are mitigated if the firm main-
tains a completely independent 
audit committee. However, 
results are also driven by 




















Find only a marginal effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability. 
However, the effect is more 
pronounced for those firms 
with high compliance incen-
























Provide evidence that restate-
ment firms undertake more 
reputation-building actions 
after the restatement than a 
control group and exhibit a 
more positive stock market 
reaction to these actions. Show 
that firm characteristics predict 
the types of stakeholders tar-




















Find that material restatement 
firms experience a significant 
decrease in the ERC over a 
prolonged period. They further 
find that among restatement 
firms, those that are subject to 
more credibility concerns and 
those that do not take prompt 
actions to improve reporting 
credibility experience a longer 













restatements capital market 
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Content Description Context-Related 

















Provide evidence that restate-
ment firms with negative 
market reactions report their 
financial statements more 
conservatively in the year 
following the restatement. They 
also indicate that reaction 
severity and the audit by Big N 























Find that the proportion of 
CEOs' compensation in the 
form of options declines signif-
icantly in the two years follow-
ing the restatement and docu-
ment that this is accompanied 






















Find that, across all countries, 
mandatory IFRS reporting had 
little impact on liquidity and 
that liquidity benefits are 
limited to EU countries that 
concurrently made substantive 






















Find that SEC prefers to target 
smaller capitalization issuers 
and those that show a high 
level of financial distress. That 
said, they find evidence that 
private litigations are more 
likely to target large firms. 
Hence, they suggest that the 
SEC cannot and does not 
prosecute all violations and is 




















Labels US - private and public 
- enforcement to be strong and 
highlights a positive association 
to cost of equity capital. Dis-
tinguishes common-law and 
civil-law countries but attrib-
utes different levels of en-
forcement intensity to the level 























Find that audit committee 
members who are both ac-
counting and industry experts 
perform better than those with 
only accounting expertise and, 
thus, highlight the relevance of 






















Suggest that restatements lead 
to higher CFO turnover and 
severe labor market penalties 
whereas the former is unaffect-
ed by SOX and the latter in-



















Content Description Context-Related 


















Results indicate that CFO 
turnover and bonus compensa-
tion are affected by restate-
ments, but only when the 
restatement firm is the target of 
a class-action suit. The same 















Finds that politically connected 
firms are less likely to be 
involved in SEC enforcement 















Dao (2005) Describes and comments on the 
methods used by the French 
stock exchange regulator 
(AMF) for monitoring compli-
ance with the national reporting 
rules as this bears upon the 
issue of enforcement of IFRS. 
Public enforcement in France is 
subject to double scrutiny 
although investigations are 
focused on disclosure verifica-





















Document that IFRS adoption 
capital-market benefits are 
limited to those countries with 
transparency incentives and 
strong legal enforcement and, 
thus, underscoring the central 
importance of firms' reporting 
incentives and countries' en-
forcement regimes for the 





















Find that managers tend to be 
hiding diminishing perfor-
mance during misstatement 
years. Results also indicate that 
accruals are high and firms 
have a higher proportion of 
assets with valuations that are 
more subject to managerial 
discretion. Finally, they devel-





















Argue that a an important 
motivation for earnings man-
agement is to attract external 
financing at low cost and show 
that firms manipulating earn-
ings are more likely to have a 
weak level of corporate gov-
ernance. They also document a 
significant increase in firms' 
cost of capital after discovery 





















Content Description Context-Related 






















Argue that error announce-
ments are often related to fraud 
issues or material effects on net 
income. The observed negative 
market reaction further indi-
cates that the market did not 
fully anticipate these misstate-
ments. Finally, they argue that 
smaller auditors are punished 
more frequently due to less 
defending resources or being 





















Provide evidence that restating 
firms exhibit a higher manage-
ment turnover within 24 
months. In addition, employ-
ment prospects of the displaced 
managers due to restatements 
are poorer than for those of a 
control group. Hence, private 
enforcement violations are 
severe and may serve as partial 
substitutes for public enforce-



















Find that short sellers accumu-
late positions in restating firms 
several month in advance of the 
restatement and subsequently 
unwind these positions after the 
drop in share price induced by 
the restatement. This effect is 
larger for firms with high level 
of accruals prior to restate-
ments. Heavily shorted firms 
experience poor subsequent 


















Suggest that higher levels of 
religious adherence are associ-
ated with both lower likelihood 
of financial restatement and 
less risk that financial state-
ments are misrepresented 
because of overstated (under-
stated) revenues/assets (ex-
penses/liabilities). Accruals 
also exhibit smaller deviations 
from expectations. In addition, 
relation holds for tax sheltering 
and forthcoming with bad news 


















Find pronounced investor 
reactions in the years 2006-
2009, however not for the 
subsequent years 2010-2013. 
Identifying the drivers of 
investor reactions, impacts on 
profitability and financial 
leverage enhance the observed 
stock price decline, whereas the 
number of errors, as well as 
core-earnings violations, atten-
uates investor reactions. More-
over, the authors do not find 
evidence of a change in inves-


















Content Description Context-Related 


















Find that the probability of 
accounting fraud is increasing 
in the percent of total executive 
compensation that is stock-
based and the likelihood of 
management wanting to obtain 
external financing. In addition, 
they find negative wealth 
consequences for managerial 























Provide evidence that the three 
enforcement reforms in Ger-
many in 2005 have decreased 
earnings management, in-
creased stock liquidity and 
partially market valuation. 
They find more pronounced 
effects for firms with to date 

























Find that the presence of oppor-
tunistic motives is conducive to 
erroneous accounting, while 
governance quality decreases 
the likelihood that firms pre-
pare compliant financial state-
ments. However, results do not 
indicate that IFRS reporting 






















Provide evidence that firms 
exhibit a decreased propensity 
to issue quarterly earnings 
forecasts following restate-
ments. Those that do make 
forecasts issue fewer forecasts 
in post-restatement periods and 
published post-restatement 
forecasts are less precise and 






















Document increasing balance 
sheet bloat in years prior to the 
restatement periods and find 
that firms which fraudulently 
misstate their results engage 
significantly more in balance 
sheet bloating. This is also for 





















Content Description Context-Related 















Documents firm characteristics 
of fraud firms and shows that 
restating firms have fewer 
numbers and percentages of 
outside board members, fewer 
audit committee meetings, 
fewer financial expers on the 
audit committee, smaller per-
centage of Big4 auditors and 
higher percentage of CEOs 
who are also chairmen of the 
board of directors. After fraud 
detection, the firms take actions 
to improve governance, alt-
hough, analyst following and 
institutional holding do not 
increase. However, results also 
indicate that firms that take 
actions to improve corporate 
governance have superior stock 
price performance suggesting 

























Find the FRRP to have moti-
vated auditors to improve 
accounting compliance by 
increasing the possibility of 
some errors being exposed and 
to have enhanced the independ-
ence of auditors at the pre-
conventional level of ethical 
cognition by changing the cost-






















Provide evidence that restate-
ments lead to higher subse-
quent audit fees reflecting 
higher cost of both an increase 
in perceived audit risk and a 
loss or organizational legitima-
cy. In addition, results indicate 
a positive association between 






















based enforcement activities to 
anticipate emerging reporting 
problems and to maintain the 
credibility of the disclosure 
system. Material income mis-
statements affect financial 
analysts' expectations and 
enforcement targets' managers 
often suffer negative [labor 
market] consequences. SEC's 
auditing enforcement activities 
encourage auditors to conscen-
tiously apply GAAP, although, 
smaller firms appear to be 



















Content Description Context-Related 

















Provide evidence of firm 
characteristics and consequenc-
es of repeat restatements and 
document that repeat restate-
ments are more likely for firms 
with non-Big N auditors and ex 
ante lower accounting quality. 
Results also indicate that 
auditor switch mitigates likeli-
hood of repeat restatement and 
that repeat restatements are 
positively associated with more 



















Find that disclosure promi-
nence is significantly negative-
ly associated with returns in a 
model that controls for error 
severity, restatement magnitude 
and other restatement charac-
teristics. Similarly, the likeli-
hood of class action lawsuits is 

















Find that auditors are more 
likely to be sanctioned by the 
regulators for failing to detect 
and report material misstate-
ments frauds (e.g., revenue-





















Provide evidence that restate-
ments are more likely to occur 
for the clients of smaller Big 4 
auditor offices and that there is 
no difference in probability 
between small Big 4 auditor 
offices and non-Big 4 auditor 
offices concerning the likeli-

















Provides a descriptive statistic 
of restatements in the US 
between 1997 and 2002. Thus, 
the statistic is an often-used 
basis of many studies' datasets. 
It also provides empirical 
evidence for the impact on 













restatements capital market 
GAO 
(2006) 
Provides a descriptive statistic 
of restatements in the US 
between 2002 and 2005. Thus, 
the statistic is an often-used 
basis of many studies' datasets. 
It also provides empirical 
evidence for the impact on 














restatements capital market 
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Content Description Context-Related 

















Provide evidence that a SEC 
comment letter - which is the 
primary regulatory instrument 
by which the SEC can start the 
process of requesting additional 
information about the account-
ing treatment - leads to audi-
tors' reassessment of risk of the 
specific firm and upward 
adjustment of audit fees for the 
period of the comment letter. If 
auditors do not assist the client 
respond to a specific CL the 
























Provide evidence that manage-
ment's disclosure choices 
related to a restatement are 
associated with the market 
reaction at the time the restate-
















Argue that the role of account-
ing standards for the quality of 
corporate reporting is limited 
and that other supporting 
institutions - such as manageri-
al reporting incentives or 
enforcement - play an im-


















Provide evidence that income 
management is restricted by the 
strength of statutory protection 
of minority rights and, thus, the 
efficiency of the judicial sys-
tem. But, results indicate that 
tax enforcement is more effec-
tive than the effects of a com-



















Show that error announcements 
yield stock price declines of 
unaffected companies in the 
same industry with the error 
firm, thereby hinting at conta-
gion effects of mitigated inves-
tor confidence. Peer firms react 
with more informative financial 
reporting, which does not lead 
to more accurate financial 
forecasts, though. Moreover, 
the authors cannot find evi-
dence of increased auditor 





















Argue that regulated financial 
reports are informative to 
investors and also refer to 
enforcement with regard to 
distinguishing between coun-
tries that have established 













Posits that SEC's enforcement 
actions are influenced by 
government's preferences for 
firms that contribute to the 
government's policy of foster-
















Content Description Context-Related 


















tional errors and intentional 
irregularities in restatements 
plus provide evidence that 
investor reactions are larger to 
irregularities. CEO/CFO turno-




















Find that non-Big 4 auditors are 
more likely to be dismissed 
after more severe restatements. 
Positive market reactions to 
auditor dismissal indicate the 
important role of auditors in the 
financial markets with regard to 





















Evidence indicates that inves-
tors react to error announce-
ments and, thus, the name and 
shame mechanism exists. 
Investor reaction is mainly 



















Suggest that the costs of IFRS 
compliance and enforcement 
play a decisive role for firms' 
decisions to migrate from the 

























Argues that adoption of IAS 
standards by countries with 
weak incentives and enforce-
ment mechanisms will likely 
lead to damaging the perceived 
quality of IAS standards. 
Hence, strength of enforcement 





















Argues, based on the notion 
that both public and private 
enforcement are correlated with 
capital-market outcomes, that 
enforcement has an important 
effect on how the IFRS adop-
tion effects financial reporting 
outcomes. In addition, en-
forcement has to be aligned to 
the overall portfolio of coun-















Constructs a comprehensive 
measure of enforcement and 
finds a strong association 
between level of enforcement 


















Show that accounting restate-
ments lead to both decreases in 
expected future earnings and 













restatements capital market 
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Content Description Context-Related 
















Provide evidence that restate-
ments increase the odds of an 
auditor resignation and that this 
is driven by restatements 
involving fraud, reversing 
profit to loss, and press disclo-
sure. In addition, restatement 
firm tend to hire smaller audit 
















Shows that the use of accrual 
accounting negatively affects 
the value relevance of account-
ing performance for countries 
with weak shareholder protec-
tion. In addition, accrual ac-
counting does not negatively 
affect the value relevance for 




















Cautions to compare the 
strength of enforcement sys-
tems based on superficial 
analysis of regulatory intensity. 
Provides an analysis of regula-
tory intensity by looking at 
regulatory inputs (staffing or 
budget) and regulatory outputs 
















Use securities regulators' 
resources to proxy for regulato-
ry intensity and provide evi-
dence for the positive associa-
tion between private enforce-















By looking at peers of restate-
ment firms, they find signifi-
cant deterrence associated with 
both SEC enforcement actions 
and class action lawsuits. 
Discretionary accruals are 
reduced by firms subject to 





















Show that fraud firms have 
significantly greater incentives 
from unrestricted stockholdings 
and that those are their largest 
incentive source. In addition, 
fraud firms have characteristics 
that suggest a lower likelihood 



















Measure the market penalty in 
response to firms cooking the 
books and provide evidence 
that the reputational penalty - 
measured as expected loss in 
the present value of future cash 
flows - exceeds penalties 























Content Description Context-Related 
















Show that during periods of 
suspicious accounting, firms 
hire and invest excessively, 
while managers exercise op-
tions. When the misreporting is 
detected, firms shed labor and 



















Suggest that firms located 
closer to SEC and areas with 
greater past SEC enforcement 
activity are less likely to restate 
their financial statements and, 





















Find that socially responsible 
firms are less likely to manage 
earnings, to manipulate real 
operating activities and to be 



















Find negative economic conse-
quences that spill over to other 
firms audited by the auditor of 
the respective erroneous finan-
cial statement. Reactions are 



























Description of institutional 
cross-country differences in the 
field of audit oversight and 
implications for consistent 















Shows - based on a game-
theoretic model - that reporting 
quality strictly increases with 
tighter enforcement, although, 
the effect of stricter enforce-

















Provide little evidence that 
public enforcement benefits 
stock markets, but strong 
evidence that laws mandating 
disclosure and facilitating 
private enforcement through 


















Determine legal environment 
[character of legal rules and 
quality of law enforcement] to 
matter for the size and extent of 
a country's capital market 
because it protects potential 
investors [financiers] against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs. 
Construct a measure of investor 
protection to illustrate differ-
ences between legal environ-













Content Description Context-Related 



















Show that common-law coun-
tries generally have the strong-
est, and code-law countries 
weaker, legal protections of 
investors. Concentration of 
ownership in larger public 
companies is negatively related 


















Describe the differences in 
laws and effectiveness of their 
enforcement across countries 
from a corporate governance 
perspective. Argue that the 
legal approach is a more fruit-
ful way to understand corporate 
governance and its reform than 
the conventional distinction 















Shows significant associations 
between measures of earnings 
restatement severity and the 
probability of CEO turnover. In 
addition, firms with CEO 
turnover and earnings restate-
ment are more likely to be 
issued an SEC AAER indicat-


























Suggest that information con-
tent increased in countries that 
mandated adoption of IFRS, 
although the effect depends on 
the strength of legal enforce-
ment in the adopting country. 




















Find that isolated changes to 
standards can have unintended 
consequences on reporting 
quality if respective enforce-
ment remains unchanged. In 
addition, increase in enforce-
ment should be combined 
either with tougher or weaker 

















Provide evidence that firms 
which switched auditors have 
significant higher incidence and 
magnitude of quarterly restate-
ments compared to those that 
did not. Show that incoming 
auditors exercise tighter con-
trols over new audit clients than 



















Provide evidence on perfor-
mance for firms having faced 
an AAER in previous years. 
Those firms also face higher 
failure risk in the post-AAER 
period. Hence, evidence sug-



















Content Description Context-Related 















Document that the probability 
of CEO (CFO) turnover in the 
wake of an accounting irregu-
larity is lower (higher) when 
the firm's CEO is also a found-
er. Hence, board mechanisms 
differ for firm where the CEO 


















Show the negative relationship 
between earnings management 
and [level of] investor protec-
tion as the latter limits insiders' 
ability to acquire private con-
trol benefits. Hence, a endoge-
neous link between [level of] 
corporate governance and 




















Argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act motivated several firm to 
deregister. Those firms go dark 
due to poor future prospects, 
distress and increased compli-
ance costs. In addition, control-
ling insiders of low-level 
governance firms protect 






















Li (2010) Finds evidence that the IFRS 
mandate significantly reduces 
the cost of equity capital and 
that this reduction is present 
only in countries with strong 
legal enforcement, increased 
disclosure and enhanced com-

















Show that various economic 
trade-offs give rise to endoge-
neous earnings management, 
i.e. the owner may reduce 
agency costs by designing a 
compensation contract that 
tolerates some earnings man-
agement because compensation 
risk allocation works more 
efficiently. As a consequence, 
applying a zero-tolerance 

















Provide evidence that share-
holders of restating firms are 
more likely to vote against 
auditor ratification compared 
with firms without restatements 

















Indicate that restatement mag-
nitude, duration, and the con-
tent impact credit-rating re-
sponse and, thus, provide 
evidence of the SOX-

















Content Description Context-Related 
















Find a robust negative associa-
tion betweeen audit effort and 
annual report restatements after 
controlling for auditor risk 





















Provide evidence - based on an 
SEC-enforcement perspective - 
that an increase in resources 
available for public enforce-



















Argue that restating firms in 
response to pressure from 
capital markets will dismiss 
their auditors to increase audit 
quality and restore reputational 
capital lost when the restate-
ments are announced to the 
investing public. Association is 




















Show that firms that pay signif-
icantly higher audit fees, non-
auditing service fees and total 
fees are more likely to be 
sanctioned for issuing material-
ly misstated/fraudulent finan-




















Provide evidence - focused on 
the recognition of incurred 
losses in banks - that enforce-
ment increases accounting 
quality for high-judgment 
standards, but decreases quality 
for standards that limit man-






















Display that higher regulatory 
levels of disclosure and en-
forcement are associated with 
increased stock liquidity and 
















Finds that benefits of mandato-
ry IFRS adoption are restricted 
to countries in the EU that have 
a high level of enforcement or 
implemented proactive finan-
cial statement review in 2005. 






















Uses stock price changes as 
indicator for the enforcement 
effect and reveals a negative 
market reaction to the an-
nouncement of investigations. 
Violations of disclosures or 
recognition/measurement issues 



















Content Description Context-Related 


















Document that restatements 
involving fraud, affecting more 
accounts decreasing reported 
income and attributed to audi-
tors or management are associ-
ated with more negative market 
reactions. Hence, violations 
against management compe-

















Find that companies with core 
restatements have higher 
frequencies of intentional 
misstatements (fraud) and 
subsequent bankruptcy or 
delisting. Likewise, these 
companies have more material 
misstatements and more nega-
tive security price reactions. 
Overall, they find an associa-
tion between accounting items 


















Provide evidence that firms 
subject to adverse rulings by 
the FRRP are associated with 
weak performance in the defect 
year and tend to have a non-Big 
Five auditor, no audit commit-




















Document that the restatements 
related to earnings and restate-
ment disclosures through an 8K 
filing are positively associated 



















Provide evidence that compa-
nies regularly attribute restate-
ments to basic internal errors 
but also to certain characteris-
tics of accounting standards 
such as lack of clarity or prolif-
eration of the literature due to 



















Demands further research to 
investigate the role of enforce-
ment and disclosure as funda-
mental determinants of useful-
ness of an accounting regime, 
or as complements to recogni-





















Construct two indexes that 
focus specifically on auditing 
and accounting enforcement 
and find that in countries with a 
stronger enforcement of finan-
cial reporting financial analysts 
exhibit a higher forecast accu-



















Content Description Context-Related 

















Document that firms restating 
earnings have high market 
expectations for future earnings 
growth and face higher levels 
of outstanding debt. In conse-
quence, firms are motivated to 
adopt aggressive accounting 
policies and, thus, operating 
and investing accruals are key 
indicators of the earnings 




















Find that auditor industry 
specialization is negatively 
associated with the likelihood 
of accounting restatement in 
general and restatements affect-
ing core income. In addition, 
changing to specialized audi-




















Document an increase in value 
relevance under IFRS [com-
pared to UK GAAP] for all 
firms and that firms are less 
likely to manage towards 
earnings targets. Further results 
point to a favorable impact of 
changes in the regulatory 
scrutiny of cross-listed firms in 





















Find that companies that en-
gage Big 4 auditors have 
shorter dark periods (time 
between identification and 
correction of financial mis-
statements) than companies that 
do not engage Big 4 auditors. 
The effect is stronger for firms 
that have financial experts on 
the audit committee and even 



















Investigates the increase in 
restatements over the decade 
from 1997 to 2006 and de-
scribes the characteristics and 
consequences of financial 
statement restatements. Restat-





















Find a positive and significant 
relation between an SEC inves-
tigation event and audit fees 
and, thus, indicate that auditors 
charge a statistically and eco-
nomically significant audit fee 




















Content Description Context-Related 
















Argue that accounting quality 
is affected directly by the legal 
and political system through 
enforcement and litigation 
against managers and auditors. 
Enforcement is especially 
important if it comes to apply-














Finds significant labor market 
penalties for directors of firms 
being penalized by SEC en-
forcement actions. For firms 
that overstate earnings, the 
likelihood of director departure 
increases in restatement severi-
ty. Overall, results indicate, 
especially for audit committee 
members, that outside directors 
bear reputational costs for 



















Provide evidence that foreign 
firms which are cross-listed in 
the US are less likely subject to 
a restatement than their US 
peers. The authors suggest that 
this difference is mainly driven 
by home country characteristics 
of the respective firm, i.e. firms 
from rather weak enforcement 


















Results indicate that a negative 
relation between the length of 
auditor-client relationship and 
the likelihood of restatement. 
For short tenure engagements, 
auditor industry specialization 
and audit fees are negatively 
related to the likelihood of 
restatement. For long tenure 
engagement, nonaudit fees 


















mance of firms with erroneous 
financial statements in im-
portant financial ratios and the 
inferior level of earnings quali-
ty. Hence, the German en-



















Show that financial reporting 
quality of family firms is 
conditioned on both divergence 
of voting and cash flow rights 
and the firm's reputation for 
integrity. Moreover, detection 
of accounting irregularities is 
associated with more serious 

















Find that restatements generally 
lowered rather than increased 
reported income and that the 
likelihood of changing the 
auditor increases with restate-















Content Description Context-Related 
















Provide evidence that the 
likelihood of CEO/CFO turno-
ver increases with restatement 
severity. The effect is stronger 
for restatements related to core-
earnings and magnitude of 
amounts. Strong evidence 





















Show, by studying the stock 
and audit market effects associ-
ated with an accounting scan-
dal, that the auditor's clients 
experience negative abnormal 
returns. Additionally, the find 
this effect to be stronger for 
firms with a higher demand for 
audit quality. Finally, the 
auditor loses clients that are 























Find that accrual quality im-
proves significantly following 
the restatement and that this 
improvement is observed for 
both earnings and non-earnings 
error restatements. The extent 
of real earnings' management 
also decreases. Overall, the 


















Provides evidence about the 
decline in Earnings Response 
Coefficient after restatements 
and shows that duration is 
higher for revenue recognition 
errors and those that lead to a 
large stock price decline. 
Further results indicate that 
there is no loss in information 
content of earnings for firms 
that change their corporate 





















Finds a strongly negative short-
term market reaction to re-
statement announcements and 
shows that both quantitative 
information and qualitative 
characteristics of restatements 
carry significant explanatory 
power. In addition, she shows a 
significant downward pattern in 
the six-month period leading up 
to the restatement and a nega-
tive post-announcement drift up 















IFRS can positively affect the 
economic growth of a country, 
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Abstract  
This paper investigates personal consequences for management executives in the context of 
financial misreporting exposed by German enforcement institutions. More specifically, we 
examine CEO and CFO turnover in the context of an error announcement. By doing so, we 
compare 103 firms that issued an error announcement between 2006 and 2013 with industry-
and-size-matched control firms. First, we find notable differences in executive turnover for 
the five-year period including two years before and after the year of the error announcements. 
Second, we show that the likelihood for executive turnover is significantly associated with 
executive tenure, firm size, firm performance, and chairperson turnover. However, multivari-
ate analysis does not provide similar evidence for financial misreporting. Third, our analysis 
of the error announcements’ characteristics indicates that the probability for executive turno-
ver particularly increases for errors related to professional judgment and management report 
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1  Introduction 
The objective of our paper is to investigate the association between executive turnover and 
adverse disclosure of financial misreporting exposed by German enforcement institutions. 
That is, management executives are ultimately responsible for providing reliable financial 
information. Admitting financial misreporting by issuing an error announcement increases 
both internal and external pressure on executives to restore their firms’ credibility. Conse-
quences may range from remuneration cutbacks to labor penalties, including managers being 
replaced.  
The German enforcement system includes both a private (Financial Reporting Enforcement 
Panel – FREP) and a federal (BaFin; Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – Ger-
man Financial Supervisory Authority) enforcement institution. Since 2005, FREP regularly 
investigates financial statements of listed firms (FREP 2015). To the present day, this two-
tiered enforcement has augmented the preceding two other financial information governance 
bodies, including supervisory boards and auditors. In contrast to the backward-looking en-
forcement by FREP and BaFin, the enforcement by supervisory boards and auditors ensures 
financial information compliance during the compilation process. For the last ten years, ap-
proximately one out of five financial statements per year has been labeled erroneous by the 
enforcement institutions. According to FREP, the main reasons for financial misreporting are 
difficulties in applying certain International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), complex 
transactions, and insufficient disclosure in both management commentary and notes (FREP 
2016).  
This paper is motivated by the determination to identify potential personal consequences on 
executive level due to adverse disclosure of financial misreporting. In this context, our analy-
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sis will contribute to the understanding of the ‘name and shame’ mechanisms serving as the 
sole deterrent within the German enforcement setting. This is of particular interest, as preced-
ing capital market evidence provides rather mixed results (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015) 
on the mechanism’s sanctioning function. By contrast, personal consequences might have an 
even stronger deterring effect on managers because they are affected more directly. There is a 
large body of literature on executive turnover triggered by financial misreporting and its de-
terminants. However, most of the preceding research focuses on SEC enforcement and, thus, 
there is yet no comparable evidence for this association in the German enforcement setting. 
This leaves us with three interesting questions. First, does financial misreporting enhances 
probability of executive turnover? Second, does strong internal governance facilitate the in-
ternal labor market and, thus, increase the likelihood of executive turnover? Third, what is the 
association between external governance quality and the likelihood of executive turnover?  
We assume that the likelihood of executive turnover is a function of reliable financial infor-
mation, governance, and performance-related firm characteristics. Reliable financial reporting 
is impaired when the enforcement bodies mandate firms to issue an error announcement. With 
regard to governance, we distinguish between internal (e.g. implementation of audit commit-
tee) and external (e.g. type of auditor) governance mechanisms, which are responsible for 
ensuring reliable financial information for both control and investment decisions. Considering 
this, errors established by the FREP or BaFin are unambiguous evidence of malfunction in 
both external and internal governance mechanisms that should have initially ensured IFRS 
compliance. On top, executives bear the ultimate responsibility for their firms’ current and 
future performance. Errors established by the FREP or BaFin regularly impact profitability or 
financial leverage (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015) and, thus, change the firms’ current 
performance evaluation. We therefore assume that impaired financial reporting reliability, 
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both strong internal and external governance systems, and poor company performance in-
crease the likelihood of executive turnover.  
Our paper investigates the association between executive turnover and financial misreporting 
for a sample of 103 firms that issued an error announcement between 2006 and 2013. We 
compare those firms with an industry-and-size-matched control sample of 103 firms without 
error announcement in the corresponding year. Using univariate testing, we find executive 
turnover to be significantly higher for error firms compared to non-error firms. This holds true 
for different period definitions including the five-year period comprising two years before and 
after the error announcement.  Building on this, we use logistic regressions that control for the 
incident of financial misreporting and other determinants associated with executive turnover 
including internal and external governance characteristics, performance-related measures and 
executive tenure. Our results indicate that executive tenure, firm size, and firm performance 
are the dominant characteristics associated with executive turnover. Moreover, we find simul-
taneous turnover of the supervisory board chairperson to be contagious for both CEO and 
CFO. With regard to the post-announcement period, it becomes evident that financial leverage 
is positively associated with executive turnover, indicating external pressure by creditors. 
Considering the discreteness of the enforcement investigation until an error announcement is 
published, results indicate that enforcement conjointly with other governance mechanisms 
enables the adverse disclosure’s sanctioning function. However, we cannot find unambiguous 
evidence that exposing financial misreporting by enforcement institutions increases the prob-
ability of executive turnover on a standalone basis.  
In addition, we conduct a multivariate analysis on error announcement characteristics for the 
error-firm subsample, including a process-immanent distinction, the errors’ quantitative im-
pact on the firms’ financial statements, the second-guessing of professional judgment, and the 
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most frequently exposed accounting issues by FREP. Our results indicate that the probability 
for executive turnover increases with enforcement institutions second-guessing managements’ 
professional judgment and false or incomplete explanations in the management report. In ad-
dition, the probability for executives to leave increases with the refusal to cooperate with 
FREP. Overall, this shows the contribution by the German enforcement bodies to ensuring 
faithful and consistent application of all relevant accounting standards.  
Those findings contribute to the existing literature on executive turnover due to financial mis-
reporting which we augment along two dimensions. First, to our knowledge this is the first 
paper to investigate personal consequences due to enforcement actions for the German set-
ting. Second, besides solely investigating the association between financial misreporting and 
executive turnover, we also examine the interaction of enforcement and other governance and 
performance-related characteristics, which might also determine executive turnover. By doing 
so, we further expand the stream of literature that investigates the association between corpo-
rate governance mechanisms and accounting irregularities as demanded by Armstrong et al. 
(2010). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we briefly recap the inter-
dependence of corporate governance and financial reporting, sketch the most relevant charac-
teristics of the German two-tiered enforcement system, and introduce the association between 
financial misreporting and personal consequences. Section 3 firstly summarizes related prior 
research and, in a second step, derives our empirical expectations. Following this, we present 
our methodology in section 4 before showing and discussing our results in section 5. Section 
6 provides concluding remarks and avenues for further research.  
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2 Corporate Governance, Financial Misreporting, and Management Turnover 
2.1 Enforcement and Corporate Governance 
European listed companies have been required to prepare their financial statements in compli-
ance with IFRS since 2005 (EC/1606/2002, ‘IAS Regulation’, recital 2). In order to ensure 
IFRS compliance, recital 16 of the ‘IFRS Regulation’ mandates EU member states to imple-
ment effective enforcement mechanisms. By adapting these requirements via the Accounting 
Enforcement Act (Bilanzkontrollgesetz, BilKoG) in 2004, Germany implemented the first two-
tiered enforcement system.1 It combines cooperative investigations by a private panel as first 
tier (FREP) with authoritative power of a federal public agency (BaFin) as second tier. BaFin 
is also capable to make error firms publish individual error announcements. Those announce-
ments are published in the federal gazette (Bundesanzeiger) and, at the same time, in two dai-
ly financial newspapers. Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview on investigations performed 
and errors established, thus highlighting the fact that for the overall period between 2005 and 
2015 still one out of five firms is exposed to prepare erroneous financial statements. 
== Insert table 1 about here == 
From a corporate governance point of view, we follow the distinction by Höltken and Ebner 
(2015) that enforcement is an external corporate governance mechanism itself. In this context, 
enforcement contributes to ensuring reliable financial information, which is essential to inter-
nal and external control decisions. Internal control decisions include choices on maintaining 
or dismissing current executives. In addition, internal governance mechanisms are supposed 
to monitor management’s faithful choice of accounting principles and appropriate use of pro-
                                               
1  We recommend the following literature for comprehensive information on financial reporting regulation 
reforms surrounding the German Enforcement Act (Ernstberger et al. 2012b), the enforcement-related in-
teraction between FREP and BaFin (Hitz et al. 2012) and the investigation process (Hitz et al. 2012, Böck-
ing et al. 2015). 
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fessional judgment. In consequence, financial misreporting serves as unambiguous evidence 
for insufficient accounting compliance and partial governance failure. As outlined by Farber 
(2005), firms tend to react to these findings in order to restore organizational legitimacy, in-
cluding replacing responsible executives or adjusting governance structures. Whereas the lat-
ter includes changes of auditors or composition of the supervisory board as well as the audit 
committee, we concentrate on executive turnover for the purpose of this paper.  
2.2 One-Tier vs. Two-Tier Board Systems 
The separation of ownership and control requires the monitoring of managers in order to en-
sure the return of one’s investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As outlined by Leuz (2010), 
there are significant differences between governance structures that persist over time. One-
tiered and two-tiered board systems are perfect examples for this kind of distinction: For the 
first, being the prevailing system in case law countries, monitoring management’s decisions is 
a task of non-executive board members. With regard to the latter, being the dominant system 
in code law countries, a separate supervisory board takes responsibility for monitoring execu-
tive management (cf. Jungmann 2006 for a detailed comparison). In Germany, the independ-
ent supervisory board appoints members of executive management, sets up strategic goals and 
guidelines. In consequence, the supervisory board also evaluates executive management’s 
performance in achieving the aforementioned targets. Hence, if executive management is not 
sufficiently successful or violates pre-set guidelines they might experience personal conse-
quences, including remuneration cutbacks or termination of employment. That might also 
hold true for the case of preparing erroneous financial statements. 
2.3 Financial Misreporting and Executive Turnover 
Prior research indicates that managers are driven by personal and capital market incentives in 
order to increase their own reputation. On the one hand, equity-based compensation plans not 
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only align management’s and shareholders’ interest but also prompt managers to inflate com-
pany performance (Beneish 1999, Erickson et al. 2003). On the other hand, incentives like 
meeting or beating own or analysts’ forecasts and the need for external financing cause man-
agers to cook the books (Dechow et al. 1996). Financial misreporting or accounting malfea-
sance is regularly observed using restatements or error announcements and yields more or less 
pronounced capital market reactions. US-based research has shown that restatements lead to 
significant negative market adjustments (Dechow et al. 1996, Beneish 1999, Hribar and Jen-
kins 2004, Palmrose and Scholz 2004, Callen et al. 2006, Karpoff et al. 2008). In contrast, 
capital-market-based evidence for adverse disclosure consequences for Germany is rather 
mixed (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). However, adverse disclosure does not only facili-
tate firm level penalties but also personal level penalties. That is, ”it may be optimal to affect 
a managerial change to restore investors’ faith in the firm and try to recover the firm’s reputa-
tion” (Desai et al. 2006, p. 87). 
There is a range of US-based literature investigating personal consequences because of SEC 
enforcement actions including not being reemployed at other firms (Desai et al. 2006, Collins 
et al. 2009). Moreover, most of preceding research focuses on firms replacing executive man-
agement due to intentional or unintentional financial misreporting. Initial evidence by 
Agrawal et al. (1999) or Beneish (1999) does not provide evidence for increased executive 
turnover following the exposure of financial misreporting. By contrast, more recent studies 
find significant turnover rates for either CEO (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006, Desai et al. 2006, 
Hennes et al. 2008, Karpoff et al. 2008, Collins et al. 2009, Feldmann et al. 2009, Efendi et al. 
2013) or CFO (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006, Collins et al. 2008, Hennes et al. 2008, Feldmann et 
al. 2009, Burks 2010, Leone and Liu 2010, Efendi et al. 2013). The same holds true for other 
executives such as outside directors (Srinivasan 2005, Arthaud-Day et al. 2006), audit com-
mittee members (Srinivasan 2005, Arthaud-Day et al. 2006), other executives as chairman or 
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president (Desai et al. 2006, Karpoff et al. 2008), and non-executive perpetrators (Karpoff et 
al. 2008). Overall, prior research thus indicates that there are personal consequences to execu-
tive management for preparing non-compliant or erroneous financial statements. 
However, replacing management executives offers benefits and costs to firms. That is, argu-
ments differ over whether executive turnover in enhanced by executive misbehavior, includ-
ing the preparation of erroneous financial statements or commitment of fraud. In line with 
theory, firms would replace executive management when the benefits arising from executive 
turnover exceed the costs involved. The reasons for management turnover therefore include 
the opportunity to reverse prior losses in firm value (Weisbach et al. 1988) or the chance to 
restore reputational capital or organizational legitimacy (Argrawal et al. 1999). Research has 
additionally identified various reasons that enhance management turnover including execu-
tive, performance and governance characteristics. First, executive fluctuation is negatively 
associated with tenure (Desai et al. 2006, Collins et al. 2008, Burks 2010) but positively with 
age (Srinivasan 2005). Second, company characteristics also facilitate executive turnover in-
cluding poor performance (Srinivasan 2005, Desai et al. 2006, Jungmann 2006, Collins et al. 
2008, Hennes et al. 2008) or the level of financial distress (Jensen 1986, Agrawal and Cooper, 
2015). Third, firms’ internal and external governance characteristics are associated with exec-
utive turnover. With regard to internal governance, management entrenchment (Arthaud-Day 
et al. 2006, Desai et al. 2006, Karpoff et al. 2008, Burks 2010) and less independent boards 
(Srinivasan 2005, Karpoff et al. 2008) are supposed to attenuate the probability of executive 
turnover. Vice versa, strong external governance mechanisms, including high-quality audits 
(Rezaee 2004, Francis et al. 2013) or lender monitoring (Jensen 1986), are supposed to in-
crease the probability of executive turnover.  
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By contrast, the benefits of changing executive management do not always outweigh the re-
lated costs. In such cases, financial misreporting is unlikely to be related to executive turno-
ver. That is, internal governance mechanisms are insufficient to initiate executive changes in 
order to react to managerial misbehavior (Jensen 1993). In addition, financial misreporting 
might not impose reputational losses or economic penalties to different firms as they are oper-
ating in industries regularly related to fraud or misreporting. Moreover, firms might not have 
much reputational capital to lose (Agrawal et al. 1999). Overall, against the background of 
these diverging US insights on the relation between executive turnover and financial misre-
porting, we aim at investigating this relation in a very different governance and enforcement 
environment.2 
3  Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions 
3.1 Prior Research 
The objective of our paper is to examine the association between enforcement actions and 
personal consequences on the executive level in order to shed further light on the deterring 
function of the ‘name and shame’ mechanism in Germany. Taking into account that the deter-
ring function includes both preventive and sanctioning mechanisms, this setting particularly 
deals with the adverse disclosure’s sanctioning mechanism. Hence, we augment two literature 
streams: First, by investigating the German enforcement setting, we complement the current 
literature on the adverse disclosure mechanism in a single-country setting. Prior research fo-
cuses on capital market discounts as firms’ penalty for financial misreporting indicating a cer-
                                               
2  The study by Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013) investigates a similar research issue for the Canadian envi-
ronment and, thus, also transfers the hypothesis of a positive relation between executive turnover and fi-
nancial misreporting to a deviating governance and enforcement setting. Unlike their US predecessors, they 
find different firm characteristics and other governance factors to determine executive turnover.  
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tain level of effectiveness with regard to the sanctioning function (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et 
al. 2015). By looking at personal consequences, we further contribute to the understanding of 
the adverse disclosure consequences from an additional perspective.  
Second, we contribute to the stream of literature that examines the association between finan-
cial misreporting and executive turnover (for overviews cf. Agrawal and Cooper 2015 or 
Habib and Hossain 2013). As outlined in section 2.3, there is broad evidence of an enhancing 
influence of financial misreporting on executive turnover and other factors that determine 
executive turnover. Although most of the preceding US research uses a restatement setting 
instead of an enforcement setting (e.g. by employing AAERs), we think that this association 
also holds for the enforcement setting. In addition, we predict executive turnover in the Ger-
man enforcement setting to be further enhanced by governance quality (Arthaud-Day et al. 
2006, Desai et al. 2006, Karpoff et al. 2008) and weak company performance (Srinivasan 
2005, Desai et al. 2006., Hennes et al. 2008), too.  
To the present day, we are not aware of any other study investigating the association between 
enforcement actions and executive turnover for the German enforcement system so far. In 
order to address our objective, we explore a range of determinants for firms’ executive turno-
ver decisions to infer whether enforcement actions themselves or in combination with other 
governance mechanisms are encouraging the executive turnover decision. 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
In this context, we first investigate the occurrence of executive turnover amongst firms that 
face an error announcement and compare it to matched non-error pairs within the same peri-
od. Second, we add firm and executive characteristics to our analysis. This approach allows us 
to distinguish between the driving characteristics of executive turnover.  
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As we point out in the preceding sections, US research suggests that the detection of financial 
misreporting increases the likelihood of executive turnover. However, most of these studies 
use restatements as indicators of financial misreporting. There are several parties including 
firms, auditors and regulators that can prompt a restatement, which makes it quite difficult to 
infer a direct impact of enforcement actions on executive turnover. By contrast, the German 
enforcement system allows us to investigate the direct association between enforcement ac-
tions and executive turnover because preparers or auditors cannot prompt error announce-
ments. Error announcements are therefore unambiguous evidence for non-reliable financial 
information exposed by enforcement institutions. But only reliable financial reporting allows 
an effective monitoring of management by either stakeholders or supervisory board members. 
Regarding the latter, financial misreporting is a critical factor in deciding whether to maintain 
or replace responsible executives. We measure the incidence of financial misreporting by the 
occurrence of error announcements in the German federal gazette. Overall, we expect that 
firms with erroneous financial statements exhibit comparatively higher executive turnover 
than their matched pairs. We therefore hypothesize: 
H1:  Firms that face an error announcement exhibit a higher rate of executive turn-
over compared to non-error firms. 
However, financial misreporting is not the sole driver of executive turnover. There are addi-
tional firm level and personal level characteristics that can influence its occurrence. With re-
gard to the former, stronger governance mechanisms are not only supposed to initially restrict 
management from preparing erroneous financial statements but also to penalize management 
after financial misreporting becomes public. In consequence, the likelihood for executives to 
be replaced is higher for firms with strong governance mechanisms. In addition, executive 
management is responsible for the firm’s economic development. Thus, the likelihood of ex-
ecutive turnover increases for firms which have poor performance. We briefly discuss those 
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determinants in the following. Regarding the latter, long-serving executives are less likely to 
leave the firm due to financial misreporting; whereas older executives become even more re-
placeable.  
3.2.1 Internal Corporate Governance  
Financial misreporting impairs investors’ faith and, thus, forces boards to react in order to 
limit reputational damages and regain their trust. In line with prior literature (Armstrong et al. 
2010, Desai et al. 2006), we argue that financial misreporting detected throughout the en-
forcement process prompts such reactions. Preceding research also suggests that high levels 
of internal corporate governance increase the ability to internally detect financial misreporting 
(Hazarika et al. 2012). Correspondingly, prior research indicates that a lack of board inde-
pendence (Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Carcello et al. 2011) or financial expertise (Abott et al. 
2004, Krishnan 2005, Keune and Johnstone 2012) decreases the effectiveness of internal con-
trol decisions. Hence, we argue that internal governance quality increases the likelihood of 
executive turnover in the context of financial misreporting. 
We use four different variables to measure the quality of internal corporate governance. First, 
we use the size of the supervisory board as an indicator of monitoring effectiveness. In line 
with Agrawal and Cooper (2015), we expect executive turnover to be negatively related to the 
board’s number of directors. Second, we suggest that the presence of an audit committee in-
creases financial expertise on board level and, thus, internally ensures financial reporting 
compliance (Abbot et al. 2004). Consequently, we assume that having implemented an audit 
committee, indicating financial expertise (Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Rezaee 2005), increases 
the probability of executive turnover. Third, we hypothesize that the simultaneous departure 
of the supervisory board’s chair as key to personnel decisions increases the probability of fur-
ther executive turnover. Fourth, we use GCGC non-compliance as indicator for overall man-
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agement and supervisory quality in the respective firm. A higher number of violations there-
fore indicate a lower level of internal governance, which is in line with prior research on 
German enforcement (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). In consequence, we expect a nega-
tive relation between the number of GCGC violations and executive turnover.  
3.2.2 External Corporate Governance  
We assume that strong external governance mechanisms are capable of increasing executive 
turnover likelihood. First, ‘Big 4’ auditors, which have greater ability to withstand client pres-
sure (Rezaee 2005), are less likely to become the scapegoat for errors that enforcement bodies 
establish by hindsight. In addition, financial statements audited by one of those four firms are 
arguably of higher quality (Francis et al. 2013). Considering these aspects, we expect that 
firms react to financial misreporting rather to turn to their executives than to dismiss their 
auditor. In order to measure the quality of external governance by auditors, we employ a bina-
ry variable indicating the presence of a ‘Big 4’ labeled auditor. 
Second, in line with prior literature, we argue that corporate debt disciplines managers in their 
decisions (Jensen 1986, Beneish 1999). That is, external finance providers mostly rely on fi-
nancial reporting or accounting-based control mechanisms. Regarding the latter, debt provid-
ers usually contract certain covenants that build on accounting numbers in order to restrict 
management from making inopportune decisions. Thus, we use financial leverage as an indi-
cator for the disciplinary impact of debt.  
Third, concentrated external shareholders are mostly not limited to financial statement infor-
mation but receive additional private information through other channels. In turn, this type of 
concentrated shareholdings is supposed to monitor management more effectively. Conse-
quently, we use the level of concentrated shareholdings by external shareholders (Hartzell and 
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Starks 2003) as an indicator of blockholder monitoring. Overall, we argue that external gov-
ernance quality increases the likelihood of executive turnover.  
3.2.3 Executive Characteristics and Firm Performance 
There are other determinants potentially driving executive turnover, including executive and 
firm characteristics. First, executives’ organizational tenure is positively associated with pow-
er and influence (Zhang and Rajagopalan 2003). In consequence, we use the number of years 
the executive has served at the firm as executive tenure. Second, preceding research provides 
evidence that executive turnover increases following poor operating performance (Weisbach 
1988, Murphy and Zimmerman 1993). We therefore assess the firms’ economic situation by 
looking at two different measures. On the one hand, we use return on assets as a typical indi-
cator of overall performance (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006, Desai et al. 2006). On the other hand, 
we employ a binary variable that takes the value of one if a firm realizes a negative net in-
come in the relevant period. Third, firm size might be an additional driver of executive turno-
ver. That is, larger firms receive more scrutiny from information intermediaries, including 
analysts or financial press (Agrawal and Cooper 2015). 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Sample 
Our study is based on a sample of Prime Standard-listed German firms where either FREP or 
BaFin exposed financial misreporting within the period from 2006 to 2013.3 By the end of 
2013, the federal gazette (Bundesanzeiger) states a total number of 200 error announcements. 
                                               
3  It has to be noted that FREP already started its investigations in 2005. However, the first error was an-
nounced in 2006 and therefore determines the starting point for our investigation. We did not consider error 
announcements from 2014 because we need two years after the publication of the error announcement for 
executive turnover identification purposes.  
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However, there are 15 firms restating their initial error announcement and 6 firms separately 
publishing error announcements for single and consolidated statements on the same date. Af-
ter controlling for these circumstances, we have an adjusted total sample of 179 firms. Based 
on this, we conduct the following adjustments for comparability reasons: we exclude 12 com-
panies that are not headquartered in Germany, 16 companies that went bankrupt in the after-
math of the error announcement, 18 companies which have been delisted, 6 firms which is-
sued non-equity instruments, and 24 companies where relevant data is missing. Hence, we 
remain with a final sample of 103 firms that have been subject to an error announcement by 
either FREP or BaFin.  
In order to examine the probability and determinants of executive turnover, we use an indus-
try-size matched control sample. Following prior literature (Agrawal and Cooper 2015, Peter-
son 2012), we construct matched pairs where the control firms are drawn from the total popu-
lation of German firms that have listed equity. The dataset is available at ESMA’s website 
(www.mifiddatabase.esma.europe.de). General comparability of firms is secured by the fol-
lowing criteria: firms must (1) not exhibit an error announcement during the investigation 
period, (2) apply the same accounting standards, and (3) be headquartered in Germany. In 
order to maximize comparability between matched pairs, we follow the matching scheme by 
Peterson (2012). Hence, companies with 70-130% of the error firms’ total assets are identified 
as potential matches. Based on this, we chose the firm with the most comparable market capi-
talization as a matched firm. In conclusion, we end with a sample of 206 firms including 103 
error and 103 non-error firms.4 Table 2 summarizes the distribution of error announcements 
and industry segments covered by our sample. Data peaks in 2009 for error announcements 
                                               
4  We acknowledge that the matching procedure is a pivotal determinant for our results. Hence, matched pairs 
regularly rely on a single matching factor. Instead of conducting additional sampling procedures in order to 
support our initial sampling (e.g. sampling according to Fama French 12-industry Classification or market 
cap), we combined different sampling methods in order to maximize the quality of our sampling results. 
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and in the financial industry. Nevertheless, overall distribution points to a well-balanced data 
set.  
== Insert table 2 about here == 
4.2 Executive Turnover Model 
In order to test our first hypothesis, we estimate separate logistic regressions for overall exec-
utive management turnover and both CEO and CFO turnover separately. In consequence, the 
dependent variable is ETO that takes the value of one if there was a change in executive man-
agement (CEO/CFO) within the investigation period. We estimate various models for differ-
ent periods around the error announcement [0]. By including pre-announcement periods, we 
control for swift actions by internal governance mechanisms and the time lag between the 
erroneous financial statements’ reporting date and the date of the error announcement.5 This 
period lasts almost two years on average according to preceding research on the German en-
forcement system (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). Hence, we investigate the period of 
two years before and after the error announcement [-2;+2].  
There are two groups of explanatory variables concerning the spheres of internal and external 
corporate governance. We characterize internal governance by the overall size of the supervi-
sory board, the presence of an audit committee, personnel fluctuation and overall compliance 
with the GCGC. With regard to supervisory board size, prior research indicates that larger 
boards are less effective in monitoring management executives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Thus, SBS denotes the number of supervisory board members. However, as most of the pre-
ceding research investigates the US unitary board, setting implications for the German two-
                                               
5  This is in line with prior literature’s methodology (Hennes et al. 2008). However, we acknowledge that this 
identification process for executive turnover is somewhat imprecise, as we cannot infer if the respective ex-
ecutive is directly responsible for financial misreporting (Karpoff et al. 2008). 
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tier governance structure are somewhat unpredictable. The establishment of an audit commit-
tee is supposed to increase financial reporting expertise at the board level and seems to be a 
legitimate indicator of strong internal financial reporting oversight (Abbott et al. 2004, Krish-
nan 2005). Thus, AC takes the value of one if the firm has an audit committee. In addition to 
that, we expect the fact that the supervisory board’s chair simultaneously leaves the firm to 
increase probability for executive turnover. To be precise, we see the chairman’s departure in 
the context of an error announcement as an indicator of internal corporate governance failure 
that needs further action to re-establish organizational integrity (Farber 2005, Arthaud-Day et 
al. 2006). In consequence, CHTO takes the value of one if the chair leaves the firm in the 
same year of the error announcement. Finally, GCGC states the number of non-compliant 
GCGC’s recitals, which the firm under investigation presents in its compliance statement. The 
level of compliance therefore points to the overall quality of internal corporate governance. 
That is, the codex ”presents essential statutory regulations for the management and supervi-
sion of German listed companies and contains in the form of recommendations and sugges-
tions, internationally and nationally acknowledged standards for good and responsible corpo-
rate governance” (GCGCC 2015). 
External governance mechanisms include external audits, lender monitoring, and shareholder 
monitoring. Prior research advocates that Big Four auditors improve accounting compliance, 
in particular, as they are supposed to better withstand client pressure (Rezaee 2005). We there-
fore employ AUDIT as a second explanatory variable that takes the value of one if a Big Four 
company audits the firm under investigation. Furthermore, in line with Beneish (1999) we use 
the level of financial leverage (FINLEV) as an indicator for lender monitoring. Another sug-
gestion by prior research is that firms with more concentrated shareholdings are more effec-
tively monitored (Hartzell and Starks 2003). Hence, we use BLOCK as a third explanatory 
within the external governance perspective.  
 
231 
Moreover, prior research proposes that other determinants including executive and company 
characteristics affect the probability of management turnover. We control for these variables 
by including them as control variables into our multivariate analysis. First, we control for ex-
ecutive tenure and assume a typical five-year contract for management executives (Kaplan 
1995); hence, assuming that executives with consecutive contracts are highly valuable to their 
supervisory board, we suggest that probability of executive turnover generally decreases with 
tenure. Second, we control for general characteristics of firms under investigation by control-
ling for SIZE. We expect firms that are larger to exhibit higher rates of executive turnover 
because such firms are subject to higher public scrutiny (Agrawal and Cooper 2015). Third, 
we control for the firms’ temporary situation by assessing the levels of performance and fi-
nancial distress. Prior research suggests that poor economic performance (Murphy 1999) in-
creases the likelihood of executive turnover. We therefore employ return on assets (ROA) and 
a binary variable indicating the occurrence of negative net income (NINCOME) to evaluate 
firm performance.  
== Insert table 3 about here == 
Following prior literature (Desai et al. 2006, Agrawal and Cooper 2015), we collect all gov-
ernance, personal and company characteristics from the year before the error announcement 
(see table 3 for a summary of variables and sources). The only exception to this is the turno-
ver by the supervisory board’s chair, which we measure within the same period as executive 
turnover. In consequence, we estimate the following logistic model: 





5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for all of our explanatory variables used. First, we find 
that internal governance characteristics provide a rather mixed view on differences between 
both subsamples. That is, audit committees exist in less than half of all non-error firms 
(48.5%), whereas error firms have established an audit committee in 54.4%. In addition, non-
error firms exhibit significantly higher rates of turnover for supervisory board chairs (18.5%) 
compared to error firms (8.7%). In addition, we find supervisory boards to be larger at non-
error firms, whereas the number of GCGC violations point to a better overall governance 
quality at non-error firms.  
Second, we find significant differences for external governance mechanisms. Non-error firms 
regularly have their financial statements audited by one of the Big Four companies (63.1%), 
whereas the majority of error firms has their financial statements audited by second-tier and 
small or medium sized audit firms (44.7%). As well, we find significant differences for the 
level of financial leverage, which is 65.8% for error firms compared to just 57.1% for non-
error firms. Furthermore, share blockholders are more common for error firms (51%) in com-
parison to non-error firms (46.8%). However, differences are only significant for medians 
(51% and 47% respectively). Overall, the descriptive analysis of both internal and external 
governance characteristics does not provide a superior governance structure for one of the 
subsamples. 
Third, we find that error firms (8.93 mEUR) are comparatively larger than their matched pairs 
(5.2 mEUR), although differences lack statistical significance. A comparison of return on as-
sets shows that there are some firms in both samples that recognize highly negative values 
 
233 
(medians of -4.3% and -3.5%, respectively); by contrast, the median indicates that firms in 
both samples recognize returns of about 2% and 3%. In total, error firms are more likely to 
recognize negative income (35%) compared to their matched pairs (24.5%). Yielding a p-
value of 0.1030, the difference is almost significant at conventional level. With regard to the 
three tenure measures, we do not find notable differences. However, we find that CEOs regu-
larly serve for a longer period than their CFO counterparts do. 
== Insert table 4 about here == 
Table 5 gives an overview on executive turnover rates for each of the five years covered and 
different periods. First, for the single-year observations for total executive turnover (PANEL 
A) it becomes evident that there is a significant difference between error and non-error firms 
two years before the error announcement. We find that about 22.3% of the error firms to 
change either CEO or CFO two years before the error announcement, whereas only 11.7% of 
the matched pairs change their executives during this period. In addition, we find executive 
turnover to be also higher for all other years except the year before the error announcement, 
although differences are not statistically significant. The results for CEO (PANEL B) and 
CFO (PANEL C) turnover are mostly comparable. However, we find CFO turnover for non-
error firms to be significantly higher in the pre-announcement period. Second, the multi-year 
observations provide different interesting scenarios worthwhile looking at. For the full period 
[-2;+2] we find 65% of error firms to replace their executives, whereas only 51.5% of the 
non-error firms do so (p-value: 0.0482). Other scenarios that yield significant differences for 
higher turnover rates in error firms are: (1) the pre-announcement period including the an-
nouncement’s year [-2;0] (p-value: 0.0927), (2) the post-announcement period including the 
announcement’s year [0;+2] (p-value: 0.0687) and (3) the extended pre-announcement period 
including the first year after the error announcement [-2;1] (p-value: 0.0326). An analysis of 
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individual turnover does not provide notable differences, although, results do not yield statis-
tically significant differences between error and non-error firms. In the following, we use ten 
different multi-year combinations for our regression analysis (table 5).  
== Insert table 5 about here == 
We report Pearson correlations for all variables employed in table 6. PANEL A provides cor-
relations for total executive turnover. Turnover of the supervisory boards’ chairpersons is 
positively correlated to executive turnover. CHTO’s turnover also is significantly negatively 
correlated to error announcements. The same holds true for Big Four audits that are signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with the occurrence of an error announcement. We also find sig-
nificant correlations for FINLEV/ETO, TENURE/ETO, ROA/ETO and NINCOME/ETO. For 
the first, financial leverage is significantly positively correlated with ETO. By contrast, execu-
tive tenure is significantly negatively correlated with ETO. The same holds true for ROA, 
whereas NINCOME provides significantly positive correlation. Correlations also indicate that 
larger firms have stronger governance mechanisms (SIZE/GCGC, SIZE/AUDIT, AU-
DIT/AC). We find similar correlations for CEO (PANEL B) and CFO (PANEL C) datasets.  
== Insert table 6 about here == 
However, we note that the choice of our variables bears the risk of multi-collinearity for our 
regression analysis. We therefore employ an additional factor model, which combines the sep-
arate variables of internal governance, external governance and performance characteristics 





5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
We estimate a logistic regression model where executive turnover serves as dependent varia-
ble which takes the value of one in the incidence of executive turnover within a specific peri-
od. We investigate eight different combinations of time periods, ranging from a five-year 
model [-2;+2] to different three- and two-year combinations in the pre- and post-
announcement period. In addition, we further distinguish executive turnover in both CEO and 
CFO turnover. The results for each type of executive turnover in all eight models are reported 
in table 7. 
5.2.1 Executive Turnover  
5.2.1.1  Multi-year Periods 
The results from both the five-year model [-2;+2] and the three-year model [-1;+1] indicate 
that for a comparably long period executive tenure and firm size are the main drivers of exec-
utive turnover. In addition, recording losses becomes a relevant factor for the three-year mod-
el. There is only weak evidence that the incidence of an error announcement increases the 
likelihood of executive turnover. That is, assuming the impact of error announcements (ER-
ROR) on executive turnover probability to be positive, one-sided t-test for the five-year model 
yields a p-value of 0.1344, thus scarcely missing the level of conventional statistical signifi-
cance. However, we do not find a comparable association for the three-year period. We find 
turnover of the supervisory board’s chairperson (CHTO), presumably increasing executive 
turnover through a kind of contagion effect, to increase the likelihood of executive turnover 
(p-value: 0.0834). Again, we do not find this association for the three-year period.  
No other variables of interest provide evidence for significant relations to the likelihood of 
executive turnover. It has to be noted, however, that FINLEV scarcely misses the level of 
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conventional statistical significance (p-value: 0.1458), indicating the disciplinary factor of 
debt, which is emphasized by the results for the post-announcement period. This association 
also holds true for the three-year period. Moreover, performance-related measures ROA and 
NINCOME also fail statistical significance for two-tailed assessment in the five-year model. 
In line with prior literature, we argue that the likelihood for executive turnover is higher for 
firms that perform badly. With regard to NINCOME, results indicate that recognizing losses 
increases the likelihood of executive turnover. This is particularly true for the three-year mod-
el, which provides a highly significant association between executive turnover and negative 
income (p-value: 0.0072).  
Models 9 and 10 also provide crossover periods, comprising both pre- and post-
announcement years. We find it noteworthy that results yield a statistically significant (p-
value: 0.0168) association between error announcements and executive turnover for the four-
year period [-2;+1]. 
5.2.1.2 Pre-Announcement Periods  
The models 3, 4, and 5 comprise different pre-announcement periods. The first result to be-
come evident is the predominantly significant relation between internal governance character-
istics (SBS, CHTO and GCGC) and executive turnover. As previously mentioned we suggest 
that larger supervisory boards are less effective in monitoring executive management and, 
thus, decrease turnover likelihood. In line with our predictions, we find that larger supervisory 
boards (SBS) are significantly negatively related to executive turnover in two of three models. 
Conversely, we assume that a change of the supervisory board’s chairperson (CHTO) results 
in a certain contagion effect, which consequently increases the likelihood of executive turno-
ver. Supporting our prediction, we find a highly significant positive relation between CHTO 
and ETO for all three models. Furthermore, the number of GCGC violations serves as an indi-
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cator of overall governance quality. Hence, prior literature assumes the governance quality to 
decrease with the number of violations. Consequently, we assume a negative relation between 
lower governance quality and the likelihood for executive turnover. In line with this reason-
ing, all three models indicate that there is a significant negative relation for GCGC violations 
and executive turnover.  
No other variables of interest provide evidence for significant relations to the likelihood of 
executive turnover. In accordance with our observations from models 1 and 2, we find several 
significant relations for control variables. First, executive tenure is significantly negatively 
related to executive turnover indicating that executives with a record of accomplishment at a 
firm are less likely to be removed. By contrast, there is a significant positive relation for firm 
size and executive turnover suggesting that larger firms might fear or face public pressure. 
There is also a significant positive relation for negative income and executive turnover proba-
bility in two of three models indicating that executive turnover is more likely for badly per-
forming firms.  
5.2.1.3 Post-Announcement Periods 
Vice versa, models 6, 7, and 8 cover the post-announcement period. We notice that with re-
gard to internal governance only turnover of the supervisory boards’ chairpersons shows a 
strong relation to executive turnover in this period for all three periods. Regarding external 
governance, financial leverage provides a significant positive relation to executive turnover in 
all three models. This is in line with prior literature, which attributes disciplinary influence to 
corporate debt (Jensen 1986). Again, executive turnover is significantly negatively related to 
executive tenure in two of three models. Although size initially fails statistical significance, 
we assume larger firms to exhibit higher rates of executive turnover. Considering this, we find 
a significant positive relation between size and executive turnover. Contrasting the relation 
 
238 
assumed for negative income, return on assets indicates a good performing company, which 
will be less likely to dismiss its executives. In line with this reasoning, we find a significant 
negative relation between ROA and executive turnover for two of three models.  
== Insert table 7 (PANEL A) about here == 
5.2.2 CEO and CFO Turnover 
(a)  Multi-year Periods 
Panel B of table 7 displays the results for CEO turnover and Panel C provides results for CFO 
turnover. It becomes evident that almost none of our variables of interest are significantly as-
sociated with CEO turnover. Again, financial leverage scarcely misses conventional statistical 
significance for the three-year period. In addition, the associations of AUDIT and BLOCK 
significantly contradict our predictions, indicating that major external holdings (model 1) and 
Big 4 audits (model 2) decrease the likelihood of executive turnover. Nevertheless, we again 
find tenure to be the main driver of CEO turnover. Model 2 furthermore reveals that negative 
income increases CEO turnover, thus, supporting prior literature.  
With regard to CFO turnover, we find supervisory board size and the chairperson’s turnover to 
be significantly associated with CFO turnover (model 1). In addition, we repeatedly find ten-
ure, firm size, and negative income to be highly associated with CFO tenure. Hence, results 
indicate that primarily personal and firm characteristics determine CFO turnover.  
(b) Pre-Announcement Periods 
In accordance with overall executive turnover, models 3-5 comprise pre-announcement peri-
ods. We find turnover of the supervisory boards’ chairpersons and the number of GCGC viola-
tions to be significantly associated with executive turnover in almost all models. Regarding 
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the former, this association holds true for both CEO and CFO turnover, whereas the number 
of GCGC violations is only associated with CEO turnover. Also, we again find the aforemen-
tioned associations of tenure, firm size, and negative income with turnover in almost all mod-
els.  
(c) Post-Announcement Periods 
Models 6-8 again provide results for the post-announcement period. We find the SBS to be 
significantly negatively associated with both CEO and CFO turnover for most of the models. 
In addition, all three external governance indicators show almost unambiguous strong associa-
tions to CEO turnover for all models. By contrast, they do not yield statistically significant 
associations for almost all CFO turnover models. Again, we find strong associations between 
tenure, firm size, and negative income and both CEO and CFO turnover for the post-
announcement periods. 
== Insert table 7 (PANEL B) about here == 
== Insert table 7 (PANEL C) about here == 
5.2.3 Discussion 
To sum this up, we find executive tenure, firm size and negative income to be the main drivers 
of executive turnover. This indicates that both personal and firm characteristics mainly deter-
mine executive turnover. Both external and external governance characteristics only show a 
strong association to executive turnover in certain periods. We find internal governance char-
acteristics, particularly changes in the person of the supervisory boards’ chairpersons, to be 
more relevant for the pre-announcement period. This is quite intuitive, keeping in mind that 
enforcement investigations are confidential and do not become public unless an error is estab-
lished. Regarding the external governance characteristics, we find financial leverage to be 
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significantly positively associated with executive turnover for the post-announcement period. 
Building on prior literature and the confidential enforcement procedure, this is an indicator for 
the disciplinary factor of debt on executive management. Finally, we can only find a signifi-
cant positive relation between error announcements and executive turnover for our tenth mod-
el (four-year model comprising the pre-announcement period to the first year of post-
announcement period).  
Hence, we cannot provide unambiguous evidence for significant differences in employment 
losses due to error announcements across both samples. This is in line with prior research 
(Agrawal et al. 1999, Beneish 1999), who cannot find significant differences for firms that 
overstate their earnings by misreporting financial numbers. Other studies, which find signifi-
cant differences for restatement firms use settings of material restatements (Arthaud-Day et al. 
2006, Desai et al. 2006) or intentional misreporting (Hennes et al. 2008). Unlike those studies, 
we cannot distinguish between intentional and unintentional financial misreporting due to 
insufficient public information.  
However, we can think of different reasons that antagonize the reinforcing effect of error an-
nouncements on executive turnover, which are comparable to the arguments outlined by 
Agrawal and Cooper (2015). First, executive dismissal always comes with opportunity costs 
with regard to finding a comparable or even better replacement. Second, internal governance 
mechanisms are insufficient to react to management’s misbehavior (Shleifer and Vishny 
1988). Given the aforementioned regular negative association of supervisory board size and 
different executive turnover decisions, our results are partly pointing to this reason. Third, not 
every error announcement is associated with significant reputational losses (e.g. omitting sev-
eral notes that might not be that relevant to investors). That might be especially true for those 
companies that show good economic performance around the dissemination of an error an-
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nouncement. In this context, Agrawal and Cooper conclude that the “net benefits from replac-
ing managers can be small” (Agrawal and Cooper 2015, p. 4). Fourth, we cannot identify the 
actual culpable executive or manager6 who is responsible for conducting the financial misre-
porting disclosed in the error announcement. Hence, managers from the second or third tier 
face personal consequences instead of their executives. 
5.3 Additional Analyses 
5.3.1 Pre-Announcement vs. Post-Announcement Period 
As mentioned before, errors can trigger executive turnover prior to the error announcement 
due to internal governance effectiveness or in reaction to an error announcement in order to 
restore organizational legitimacy by scapegoating the responsible executives. We think that 
comparing the pre- and post-announcement period allows us to distinguish between two types 
of information sets. That is, enforcement investigations are confidential and only become pub-
lic in the case of an error announcement. However, it is best practice to inform supervisory 
boards on all enforcement-related matters, which allows internal reaction before financial 
misreporting becomes public. Hence, executive turnover within the pre-announcement period 
might indicate effective internal governance mechanisms. By contrast, enforcement investiga-
tions become public after the announcement is disseminated through the federal gazette.   
We therefore investigate two different subsamples of our five-year window, which we also use 
as a multi-year period in model 10. We divide our sample in the pre-announcement period [-
2;-1] where the enforcement investigation does not become public and the two-year period 
following the error announcement [0;+1] (table 8 shows the different periods and correspond-
ing results). Panel A shows the levels of executive turnover in both sub-periods. Our results 
                                               
6  We acknowledge that our study therefore is subject to Type I or Type II errors as outlined by Karpoff et al. 
(2008) because there is not sufficient data on second or third tier managers, yet.  
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indicate that there are no significant differences between the pre- and post-announcement pe-
riod. By further subdividing executive turnover into CEO turnover (Panel B) and CFO turno-
ver (Panel C), we find mostly comparable results.  
== Insert table 8 about here == 
5.3.2 Characteristics of Error Announcements 
Error announcements can evoke considerable investor reactions depending on the nature of 
errors exposed by the enforcement institutions. Prior research indicates that certain error char-
acteristics are key to such reactions, including restatement materiality and error impact on 
financial statements (Feroz et al. 1991; Palmrose et al. 2004; Plumlee and Yohn 2010). How-
ever, we assume that this additionally holds true for the association between error characteris-
tics and personal consequences at the executive level. Therefore, we conduct a content analy-
sis of the 103 error announcements included in our initial sample in order to examine the as-
sociation between both qualitative and quantitative characteristics and executive turnover.  
We use ten additional variables in order to assess the error characteristics, including a process-
immanent distinction, the error’s quantitative impact, the second-guessing of professional 
judgment, and the most frequently exposed accounting issues by FREP. First, we distinguish 
between errors where the firm under investigation refuses to cooperate with FREP and, in 
consequence, the BaFin exposes the accounting mistreatment (BAFIN). This allows us to gain 
an understanding of the firm’s general attitude to cooperate within the enforcement process 
(Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). In consequence, we assume executive turnover to be 
more likely in the case of a firm not cooperating with FREP. Consistent with prior research, 
we additionally employ LEGAL which captures the firm’s risk of litigation due to errors that 
also affect legal accounts (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). We expect both variables to be 
positively associated with the probability of executive turnover. 
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Second, prior research has shown that investor reactions are mainly driven by more severe 
accounting errors (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). Considering a similar association for 
the executive turnover setting, we also examine the association between the errors’ quantita-
tive impact on both profitability (DROE) and financial leverage (DFINLEV), and executive 
turnover. That is, we expect both variables to be positively associated with executives to be 
dismissed.  
Third, prior research has shown that more severe or complex accounting errors yield stronger 
investor reactions (Palmrose et al. 2004). However, the study by Plumlee and Yohn (2010) 
provides evidence that accounting complexity is but one driver of financial misreporting. 
They argue that financial misreporting is caused by either missing accounting standard clarity 
or misused professional judgment. We therefore examine whether the error second-guesses 
professional judgment (PROFJUD). In line with prior literature, we argue that errors which 
second-guess managements’ professional judgment indicate a lack of management integrity 
(Ebner et al. 2015) and are, thus, positively related with executive turnover.  
Fourth, we follow the second idea by Plumlee and Yohn (2010). The authors argue that errors 
which do not second-guess professional judgment are an indicator for either lack of clarity or 
complications in applying the respective accounting requirements. Therefore, we employ five 
different variables which capture errors that have been frequently exposed by either FREP or 
BaFin.7 Those accounting issues include income taxes (IAS 12; INCTAX), impairment of 
assets (IAS 36; IMPAIR), financial instruments (IAS 39, IAS 32; FININST) business combi-
nations (IFRS 3; BUSCOM), and the management report (DRS 5, DRS 15; MGMTREP).  
                                               
7  For detailed analysis of accounting issues included in error announcements and enforcement priorities see 
Loy and Steuer (2015). A comparable analysis of selected accounting issues is employed by Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (2013). 
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With regard to the descriptive analysis of our additional variables, we find for our error firms 
subsample that in about one out of five cases the firm under investigation refuses to cooperate 
with FREP. Also, a similar number of errors relates to legal accounts. Furthermore, on average 
errors result in reduced profitability, which indicates that firms in our subsample regularly 
overstate their income figures. By contrast, we find a decreased level of financial leverage. 
That is, firms included in our subsample tend to understate their financial situation. Regarding 
the most regular accounting issues, we find around 20% of all errors to be related to income 
tax, impairment or management report issues. In addition, we find about 25%-30% of all er-
rors to be related with financial instruments and business combination issues.  
Multivariate analysis provides us with insights on the association between executive turnover 
and the aforementioned characteristics of error announcements. We still employ all other gov-
ernance and control variables. Table 9 shows results for overall executive turnover (Panel A), 
CEO turnover (Panel B), and CFO turnover (Panel C). It becomes evident that executive turn-
over likelihood shows a significant and positive association with the incident that firms refuse 
to cooperate with FREP on the first stage of the enforcement process. In contrast to prior 
shareholder-oriented research on German enforcement (Hitz et al. 2015, Ebner et al. 2015), 
we cannot find a consistent or significant association between error severity (DROE, 
DFINLEV) and executive turnover for any of our different executive turnover definitions. By 
contrast, we find errors that second-guess professional judgment to be almost unambiguously 
positively and significantly associated with executive turnover measures. That is, the results 
indicate that particularly CFOs are penalized for non-appropriate use of professional judg-
ment. Also, we find some evidence for executive turnover to be significantly positively asso-
ciated with errors related to statements in the management report. Taking into account that the 
majority of errors exposed in the management report concern forward-looking statements and 
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the firms’ risk assessment, our results indicate that both CEO and CFO are penalized for false 
or incomplete explanations in the management report.  
Overall, our results show that the probability of executive turnover depends on certain charac-
teristics of errors exposed by either FREP or BaFin. Considering our findings that profession-
al judgment and management report enhance the probability for executive turnover, it be-
comes evident that enforcement significantly contributes to ensuring faithful and consistent 
application of all relevant accounting standards. That is, investigations by either FREP or 
BaFin regularly tackle management decisions that cannot be observed or tracked by share-
holders. Hence, we conclude that at least for the aforementioned two topics the adverse dis-
closure mechanism appears to be effective. 
= Insert Table 9 about here == 
5.4 Robustness Test 
As already mentioned in section 5.1, our data comprises the risk of multi-collinearity and, 
thus, we employ the following factor model:  
!"#=$%& ! '"13$#(3+4##=$#(3+4#>#(2%(?+3,## ,789:7;<& 
That is, we calculate first-order components of the following factors, including INTERNAL 
(comprising SBS, AC, CHTO, and GCGC), EXTERNAL (comprising AUDIT, FINLEV, and 
BLOCK), and PERFORMANCE (comprising ROA and NINCOME). In consequence, we still 
employ executive tenure and firm size as separate variables. In line with our findings for the 
main analysis, our results (not tabulated) confirm our aforementioned results for executive 
tenure and firm performance to have a significant relation to executive turnover. Still, tenure 
negatively relates to executive tenure, whereas firm performance displays a positive relation. 
Again, we find a significant positive association of error announcements and executive turno-
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ver for the [-2;+1] period. That is, by presuming an enhancing effect of error announcements 
on executive turnover, results yield 0.0565 as p-value (one-sided t-test; two-sided test yields 
0.1130 as p-value). 
6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the influence of adversely disclosed financial misreporting on person-
al consequences for executive management (CEO and CFO). We augment prior literature by 
being the first to investigate this relation for the German setting. This setting is of particular 
interest as it provides unique institutional premises with regard to enforcement and govern-
ance structures compared to prior research that concentrates on code-law countries. By com-
paring 103 error announcement firms with industry-and-size-matched non-error control firms 
between 2006 and 2013, we investigate the association between governance characteristics, 
personal characteristics, and firm performance and the likelihood of executive turnover.  
We initially provide evidence that executive turnover is higher for firms that have issued an 
error announcement. About 65% (49%) of the error announcement firms experience executive 
turnover within two years (one year) before and after the error announcement. Vice versa, 
only 51% (42%) of all non-error firms experience executive turnover within the correspond-
ing period. By using logistic regressions, we analyze different determinants of executive turn-
over for both samples. Partially contrasting our predictions, we find only weak evidence for a 
positive relation between the incidence of an error announcement and executive turnover. Our 
results further indicate that internal governance mechanisms are strongly related to executive 
turnover in the pre-announcement period, whereas external governance mechanisms yield 
strong associations for the post-announcement period. In addition, we find strong evidence 
that executive tenure, firm size, and firm performance are predominantly associated with ex-
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ecutive turnover. By analyzing different characteristics of error announcements, we find evi-
dence for an increased probability of executive turnover for errors related to non-appropriate 
use of professional judgment and false or incomplete statements in the management report. In 
addition, executives that refuse to cooperate with FREP are more frequently replaced. Overall, 
our results support the idea of a joint governance approach of supervisory boards, auditors, 
and enforcement bodies in order to ensure reliable financial reporting.  
The results of our paper contribute to the growing stream of literature on the two-tiered en-
forcement system implemented in Germany. More importantly, our results shed additional 
light on the consequences of adverse disclosure by looking at the personal level. As this is the 
first paper to explore this issue for the German enforcement system, we believe that future 
research should further investigate this aspect of possible adverse disclosure consequences 
and try to verify or counter our findings. Furthermore, in order to contribute to the better un-
derstanding of internal governance mechanisms to error announcements, further research 
should investigate whether boards reduce short-term compensation for those executives that 
retain their jobs (Burks 2010) or personal consequences for second- and third-tier managers 
(Karpoff et al. 2008). Considering these ideas, future research could also investigate personal 
consequences for audit committee members (Srinivasan 2005). This would provide additional 
insights into the sanctioning function of the ‘name and shame’ mechanism. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the association between the involvement of financial intermediaries (i.e. analysts 
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Note: Panel A displays distribution for error announcement firms only (103 companies). Panel B comprises
the full sample, including error and non-error firms (206 companies). Industry classification is based on
ICB Codes.
Total 206 100%
(8) Financials 50 24%
(9) Technology 30 15%
(6) Telecommunications 4 2%
(7) Utilities 4 2%
(4) Health Care 18 9%
(5) Consumer Services 40 19%
(2) Industrials 30 15%
(3) Consumer Goods 20 10%
PANEL B. Distribution of Industries Covered
Year of Error Announcement Number of Firms % of Total Sample












Table 2. Distribution of Error Announcements Published and Industries Covered
Year of Error Announcement Number of Firms % of Total Sample






Negative net income NINCOME Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
records a negative net income the year before the error
announcement.
Datastream
Return on assets ROA Ratio of net income over lagged total assets the year
before the error announcement.
Datastream
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets the year before the error 
announcement.
Datastream
CFOTN Number of years the CFO serves on the firm's board as
CFO.
Handcollected
CEOTN Number of years the CEO serves on the firm's board as
CEO.
Handcollected
GCGCV Denotes the number of DCGC violations as presented in
the firm's compliance statement according to paragraph
161 of the German Stock Corporation Act.
Handcollected
Control variables
Executive tenure EXTN Mean value of CEO and CFO tenure.
Other External Corporate Governance Indicators
Big Four Auditor AUDIT Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firn's
financial statement in the year before the error






CHTO Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the chair of
the supervisory board leaves the firm in the same year of 
the error announcement, 0 otherwise.
Handcollected
AC Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
supervisory board has an audit committee the year




SBS States the number of supervisory board members as
stated in the firm's financial statement the year before
the error announcement.
Handcollected
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO leaves
the company within two years before or after the error
announcement; 0 otherwise.
Handcollected
ERROR Binary variable that takes the value of 1 in case of an











Table 3. Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Abbreviation Definition Data Source
Dependent variables
Internal Corporate Governance Indicators
External Corporate Governance Indicators
CFO Turnover CFOTO Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if CFO leaves




Executive Turnover EXTO Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO, CFO or
both executives leave the company within two years
before or after the error announcement; 0 otherwise.
CEO Turnover CEOTO





BLOCK Denotes the percentage of closely held shares as stated
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PANEL A. Executive Turnover in Error and Non-Error Firms
ERROR FIRMS NON-ERROR FIRMS
Mean Mean
-2 0.2233 0.1165 0.0415 0.1854
-1 0.1942 0.2427 0.4016 0.5472
0 0.2427 0.1845 0.3101 0.4701
+1 0.1942 0.1845 0.8597 0.9042
+2 0.2039 0.1748 0.5958 0.7180
[-2;+2] 0.6505 0.5146 0.0482 0.0919
[-1;+1] 0.4854 0.4175 0.3294 0.3994
[-2;0] 0.4952 0.3786 0.0927 0.1486
[-1;0] 0.3495 0.3398 0.8841 0.9042
[0;+1] 0.3786 0.2913 0.1857 0.2786
[0;+2] 0.5049 0.3786 0.0687 0.1176
[-2;-1] 0.3689 0.3107 0.3799 0.4701
[+1;+2] 0.3495 0.3204 0.6597 0.7180
[-2;1] 0.6019 0.4563 0.0326 0.0710
[-1;2] 0.5631 0.4854 0.2666 0.3355
Table 5. Executive Turnover for Error and Non-Error Firms
Years Around 
Error Announcement











PANEL B. CEO Turnover in Error and Non-Error Firms
ERROR FIRMS NON-ERROR FIRMS
Mean Mean
-2 0.1068 0.0777 0.4725 0.7180
-1 0.1262 0.1359 0.8374 0.9042
0 0.1456 0.0777 0.1227 0.3994
+1 0.0874 0.0874 1.0000 0.0000
+2 0.1359 0.1456 0.8422 0.9042
[-2;+2] 0.4563 0.4077 0.4843 0.5472
[-1;+1] 0.3107 0.2621 0.4434 0.5472
[-2;0] 0.2913 0.2614 0.6423 0.7180
[-1;0] 0.2427 0.1942 0.4016 0.5472
[0;+1] 0.2233 0.1456 0.1522 0.3350
[0;+2] 0.3301 0.2718 0.3645 0.4701
[-2;-1] 0.2136 0.2039 0.8647 0.9042
[+1;+2] 0.2136 0.2136 1.0000 0.0000
[-2;1] 0.3592 0.3301 0.6619 0.7180
[-1;2] 0.4078 0.3786 0.6705 0.7180













PANEL C. CFO Turnover in Error and Non-Error Firms
ERROR FIRMS NON-ERROR FIRMS
Mean Mean
-2 0.1456 0.4854 0.0185 0.2286
-1 0.0971 0.1845 0.0720 0.2786
0 0.1165 0.1262 0.8320 0.9042
+1 0.1359 0.1456 1.0000 0.0000
+2 0.0971 0.0971 1.0000 0.0000
[-2;+2] 0.4466 0.4563 0.8893 0.9042
[-1;+1] 0.3107 0.3689 0.3799 0.4701
[-2;0] 0.3398 0.3010 0.5526 0.6301
[-1;0] 0.2136 0.2621 0.4157 0.5472
[0;+1] 0.2330 0.2621 0.6302 0.7180
[0;+2] 0.3010 0.3398 0.5526 0.6301
[-2;-1] 0.2427 0.2330 0.8708 0.9042
[+1;+2] 0.2039 0.2233 0.7354 0.8097
[-2;-1] 0.4175 0.3981 0.7780 0.8097
[-1;2] 0.3592 0.4272 0.3204 0.3994
Table 5. Executive Turnover for Error and Non-Error Firms
Note: The table shows mean turnover rates of error and non-error firms and tests for differences between the means and medians of
the two groups. Turnover is shown for the years -2 to +2, where 0 is the year of announcement. Turnover values for individual
years are summed to calculate turnover for periods. P-values are from two-tailed matched pairs t-test for differences in means and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PANEL A. Differences over time in ETO
[-2;-1] [0;+1]
Mean Mean
Total Sample 0.5922 0.5825 0.8881 0.8879
Error Firms 0.3689 0.3786 0.8862 0.8856
Non-Error Firms 0.3107 0.3107 1.0000 0.9984
PANEL B. Differences over time in CEOTO
[-2;-1] [0;+1]
Mean Mean
Total Sample 0.3981 0.3495 0.4739 0.4575
Error Firms 0.2136 0.2233 0.8669 0.8544
Non-Error Firms 0.2039 0.1456 0.2732 0.2900
PANEL C. Differences over time in CFOTO
[-2;-1] [0;+1]
Mean Mean
Total Sample 0.3884 0.4272 0.5728 0.5653
Error Firms 0.2427 0.2330 0.8708 0.8710
Non-Error Firms 0.2330 0.2621 0.6302 0.5916




























Note: The table shows mean turnover rates of error and non-error firms and tests for differences in means between
the means and medians of the two groups . Turnover is shown for the years -2 to +1, where 0 is the year of
announcement. Turnover values for individual years are summed to calculate turnover for periods. P-values are
from two-tailed matched pairs t-test for differences in means and Wilcoxon signed rank tests for differences in
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Matthias Höltken*/Henning Zülch 
ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN PROFESSIONAL FOOT-
BALL FIRMS: AN INTEGRATIVE CASE 
 
Abstract  
By covering an enforcement investigation at a listed German football club, this integrative 
case covers three discretionary accounting issues: professional football players as intangible 
assets (IAS 38), impairment of deferred taxes from loss carryforwards (IAS 12) and revenue 
recognition from sponsoring contracts (IAS 18). By acting as preparers, auditors, and examin-
ers-in-charge, students are required to assess whether the football firm prepared erroneous 
financial statements. This would entail a correction of the company’s financial statements 
including publication of an error announcement in the federal gazette. Besides reviewing the 
accounting requirements for the three issues discussed in the case, students are required to 
critically assess and interpret the situation at the company and develop a discussion strategy to 
either question or defend the football firm’s current accounting practice. By doing so, students 
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Generally, advanced accounting courses include separate sections on applicable accounting 
standards and corresponding enforcement, which are mostly taught in separate sessions or 
even lectures. This case study presents an integrative approach to both topics. This integrative 
case therefore enhances students’ ability to think critically and solve accounting-related prob-
lems independently by asking students to (1) determine the recognition and the subsequent 
measurement of professional football players as intangible assets [IAS 38], (2) justify the 
recognition and the subsequent measurement of deferred tax assets from loss carryforwards 
[IAS 12], and (3) evaluate the timing of revenue recognition depending on the underlying 
sponsoring contract [IAS 18]. All of these accounting issues have in common that they in-
clude a significant degree of professional judgment.  
By doing so, this integrative case helps to increase students’ conceptual knowledge on both 
accounting and enforcement. In addition, students are required to actively discuss their pro-
ceedings in groups and discuss their line of argument amongst groups in order to determine 
whether a certain accounting treatment is erroneous. In line with prior literature’s idea (Rob-
inson-Backman and Chandra, 1999), this enables students’ application knowledge based on a 
real-world situation.   
To the present day, only one German professional football firm is geared towards the capital 
market. Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA is listed since October 2000 and took a re-
markable financial and sporting development after having struggled enormously in the first 
years after their IPO. This period of financial and sporting aberration almost led to bankruptcy 
in 2005. This case study is based on true events in this context, but was adapted for teaching 
purposes. That is, the 2007/2008 financial statements were subject to an investigation by 
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FREP. In consequence, these financial statements still comprise transactions and decisions of 
previous years, including the years of financial distress. Finally, we would like to emphasize 
that this case study is intended to be used as the basis for class discussion of accounting issues 
rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective management. 
2  Student Material 
2.1 Company Profile 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA is a German company that is best known for being 
engaged in the operation of the professional football club BVB (Ballspielverein Borussia). 
The club has won eight German championships, three German cups, the European cup win-
ners’ cup in 1966, the UEFA Champions League as well as the Intercontinental Cup in 1997. 
In addition to the football activities, the operations of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. 
KGaA mainly revolve around the marketing of the SIGNAL IDUNA PARK, the football sta-
dium in which the club plays its games. The football-specific arena is the largest stadium in 
Germany and holds nearly 81,500 people. Moreover, it has one of the largest offers of Hospi-
tality/VIP areas in the Bundesliga (4,369 seats). 
Further subsidiaries of the company include the wholly owned BVB Merchandising GmbH 
and Sports & Bytes GmbH. While the former entity trades and distributes merchandise and 
acquires and grants licenses in trademark rights, the latter provides support to the group in 
technical and structural matters such as IT. The group also includes the travel agency B.E.S.T. 
Borussia Euro Lloyd Sports Travel GmbH, which, in addition to providing travel agency ser-
vices, organizes and plans events, conferences and congresses. Finally, the Borussia Dort-
mund GmbH & Co. KGaA is affiliated with Orthomed GmbH, which offers medical rehabili-
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tation, especially for professional athletes. Figure 1 gives an overview of the group structure 
of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Starting in the late 1990s, the club has aimed to position itself as a modern football company. 
By focusing on its main sources of revenue – sale of television rights and tickets, sponsoring, 
and merchandising – the club wanted to combine its sporting success with a sustainable in-
crease in revenues, operating results and value of the company. As a consequence, Borussia 
Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA on 26 February 2000 decided to list its shares on the stock 
exchange, being the only football club in Germany to pursue a listing. 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA received a considerable amount of money from their 
initial public offering on 31 October 2000. The company largely invested the approximately 
130 million Euros it had received in its football team as well as its stadium. While the club 
celebrated the German championship in 2002 as well as its reaching the finals of the UEFA 
cup, the club did not perform well in subsequent seasons and lost out on revenue it increasing-
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ly needed. As a result, financial problems started to add to the company’s woes and Borussia 
Dortmund neared bankruptcy a few years later. 
Facing a tremendous amount of debt, the company appointed a new executive team which 
joined efforts with creditors to turn the company around. Slowly, Borussia Dortmund’s finan-
cial position improved and management’s restructuring measures, which were combined with 
a conservative investment approach, seemed to pay off slowly. Table 1 presents key figures of 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA. 
 2003/04* 2004/05** 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Final Table          
(Bundesliga) 
6. 7. 7. 9. 13. 
Revenue (m, €) 98.1 74.7 89.1 97.1 107.6 
Net Income (m, €) -67.7 -54.5 -20.8 10.1 -3.9 
Equity (m, €) 80.8 28.5 37.6 86.5 80.8 
Total Assets (m, €) 232.2 255.4 277.4 258.2 256.7 
Equity to Debt-Ratio 34.8% 11.2% 13.6% 33.5% 31.5% 
Table 1: Key Figures of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA1 
The company’s current strategy foresees to further bolster its financial base by the exclusive 
marketing rights for Signal Iduna Park, more effective use of the “Borussia Dortmund” brand 
and the establishment of football-related lines of business. Nonetheless, professional football 
will remain as the core business, contributing to the company’s regular revenue streams based 
on TV marketing, sponsorship, ticketing, and merchandising. 
                                               
1  Figures based on consolidated financial statements based on IFRS. * denotes figures based on German 
Commercial Code (HGB). ** denotes figures based on the 2005/06 financial statements displaying IFRS 
figures for the comparative financial year 2004/05. 
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2.2 Enforcement Investigation 
On 24 September 2008, the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) informs the com-
pany that it was selected at random for an enforcement examination according to § 342b para. 
2 HGB (see Exhibit I). 
Since Borussia Dortmund does not have any experience in the examination process of the 
FREP, the Board of Management decides to use professional support services for the exami-
nation. To do so, the company assigns their auditors as consultants on 29 September 2008. 
The auditors provide the company with enforcement experts specialized on supporting com-
panies during enforcement examinations. 
In cooperation with the auditors Borussia Dortmund’s management decides that there is no 
realistic alternative other than cooperating with the FREP in the examination process. The 
team therefore communicates in a letter sent on 2 October 2008 to the FREP its willingness to 
cooperate (see Exhibit II). The head of Borussia Dortmund’s finance division will act as a 
contact person for the FREP. 
Prior to receiving the FREP’s letter with specific questions, the company discusses potential 
topics with their enforcement consultants. The basis for their discussion is a document pub-
lished annually by the FREP, which lists their enforcement priorities (FREP 2007), including 
financial instruments (IAS 39), consolidated companies (IAS 27, SIC 12), impairment of as-
sets (IAS 36), risk reporting within the management report (GAS 15), related party transac-
tions (IAS 24) and business combinations (IFRS 3). While the company and their consultants 
consider impairment of assets and risk reporting as possibly relevant topics for the examina-
tion, the FREP on 27 November 2008 sends a letter with questions regarding three other is-
sues (see Exhibit III). 
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Subsequent to receiving this letter, the company and their auditors develop a response strate-
gy. This strategy is reflected in the response letter which is finalized in a 9 December 2008 
personal meeting with the auditors in Dortmund. The response is sent to the FREP on 10 De-
cember 2008, i.e. within the stated response deadline (see Exhibit IV). 
On 7 January 2009, Borussia Dortmund is contacted by the FREP via phone regarding the 
answers to the FREP’s questions. After a short discussion, the company agrees with the FREP 
to meet in person at the FREP’s office in Berlin in order to discuss open questions and issues. 
Two days later, the company receives a written invitation from the FREP for the meeting on 
13 January 2009. The letter includes a preliminary agenda that suggests discussion of all three 
issues addressed in the letter by the FREP. When preparing for the meeting with the FREP, the 
company consults with their auditors/consultants in order to come up with an appropriate 
strategy to avoid an error finding. 
2.3 Requirements 
Please form three groups that consist of company representatives, their auditors and consult-
ants, and representatives of the FREP. In addition, please consult the following guidelines for 
your respective group. For the sequence of events, please refer to Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Chronological Sequence of FREP examination 
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2.3.1 Company Representatives 
You are employed in the accounting department of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
and have been working for the company for more than 13 years. As a result, you have gained 
both comprehensive accounting skills and a profound knowledge of the business activity of 
the company. Part of your responsibility is preparing the company’s consolidated financial 
statements based on IFRS. One of your major challenges in the past consisted of converting 
the company’s financial statements from German Commercial Code (HGB) to IFRS for the 
financial year ending 30 June 2006. 
In the role play, your objective is to answer the questions addressed by the FREP. You should 
develop a “defense strategy” in order to convince the FREP that the accounting treatment you 
chose is according to IFRS. Thus, it is your objective to avoid an error notice/error statement. 
2.3.2  Auditors/Consultants 
You are employed at a Big Four audit firm. After gaining five years of experience in audit, 
you have been working in the Accounting Centre of Excellence since 2006. Your key area of 
responsibility is enforcement advice, i.e. you regularly counsel companies in enforcement 
examinations. 
In the role play, your objective is to optimally prepare your client for the discussion with the 
FREP. You should provide recommendations as well as advice to the client regarding their 
“defense strategy” in order to convince the FREP that BVB’s accounting treatment is faithful 
and consistent with corresponding IFRS requirements. It is important that your reasoning 
supports the current accounting treatment. Your objective must be to avoid an error no-
tice/error statement for your client. 
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2.3.3  FREP Representatives 
You have been employed at the FREP in Berlin since 2006. The FREP has been examining the 
financial reporting of firms listed in the German regulated market since 1 July 2005 in the 
course of a so called enforcement examination. In the past years, you were able to gather ex-
perience as a FREP examiner-in-charge in both random sampling examinations as well as 
reactive examinations, i.e. when the FREP had indications of accounting errors. You are ap-
pointed as examiner-in-charge for the examination of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. 
KGaA. 
In the role play, your objective is to identify errors in the IFRS consolidated financial state-
ments of the company. For this purpose, you need to develop a “question strategy” that helps 
you obtain as much information as possible regarding the accounting issues from the compa-
ny representatives and the consultants, respectively.  
After the simulated discussion, your team will get together for 15 minutes to discuss whether 
your findings lead to an error notice/error statement. This discussion will be a public hearing 
in which the other teams will act as the audience. Please keep this consultation in mind when 
preparing for the discussion with the company and their auditors. 
2.4 Tasks 
In your teams, please prepare the discussion in Berlin from the perspective of the party that 
you represent. By doing so, it is important that you pursue your group’s strategy as outlined in 
section B.3 and check for both strengths and weaknesses of your line of argument. In prepara-
tion for the discussion, please keep in mind that you will have 30 to 45 minutes of discussion. 
As a guideline, please proceed as follows: 
 
282 
! First, obtain an understanding of the relevant issues and their accounting treatment and 
analyze which accounting issues are addressed in the list of questions from the FREP (Ex-
hibit III). Take into account the response strategy as displayed in the letter sent by Borus-
sia Dortmund (Exhibit IV). For reasons of time management, it may be appropriate to split 
the issues within your team (allow 40 to 60 minutes). 
! Next, develop a strategy for the meeting in Berlin to address each issue examined. Keep in 
mind the response sent by the company (Exhibit IV). Think about appropriate questions 
that you want to ask and might be asked, respectively. Take into account that you need to 
address the transactions underlying the accounting issues such that the FREP can decide 
whether the transactions were accounted for in accordance with the respective accounting 
standards (allow 30 to 40 minutes). 
! The company representatives may wish to discuss a joint discussion strategy with the en-
forcement consultants and auditors (allow up to 30 minutes). 
! Summarize the major arguments prepared and agreed upon within your team on a flipchart 
or in a brief presentation (allow up to 30 minutes). 





2.5 Supporting Materials 
Exhibit I: Introductory letter from the FREP 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 - 10969 Berlin 
 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 
44137 Dortmund 
23 September 2008 
 
Enforcement examination pursuant to § 342b para. 2 HGB 
Our reference no. S0074711/2105Y 
Dear Sirs, 
Pursuant to § 342b para. 2 sent. 3 no. 3 HGB (random sampling examination), the 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) intends to examine your company’s 
 
 
! consolidated financial statements (incl. group management report) as of 30 
June 2008 as well as 
! separate financial statements (incl. the management report) as of 30 June 
2008. 
We kindly request you to inform us whether your company is willing to cooperate in 
the performance of this examination. If so, you, and the persons designated by you to 
assist with the examination, are obliged to provide complete and accurate infor-
mation and documentation.  
You are permitted to refuse to provide information and documentation if such infor-
mation exposes you, or the persons you have designated to provide information, to 
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Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 - 10969 Berlin 
the risk of criminal prosecution or proceedings pursuant to the German Act on 
Breaches of Administrative Regulations (§ 342b para. 4 HGB). 
We are not aware of any reason of § 342b para. 3 HGB (nullity of financial state-
ments or appointment of a special auditor) applying to your company, which would 
preclude the enforcement examination. If this is not the case, however, we kindly 
request you to provide the relevant information to us. 
Please inform us within the next 14 days of your decision regarding your cooperation 
in the enforcement examination. For reasons of formality, your response should be 
signed by the company’s legal representatives. If you wish to cooperate, we kindly 
request you to send us your audited consolidated financial statements and the group 
management report for the year ended June 2008.  
Where applicable, please additionally provide the individual financial statements and 
management report as well as the corresponding audit report issued by your external 
auditor – if possible also electronically. Furthermore, we request the list of unadjust-
ed audit differences (where not applicable, the statement that there were none) as 
well as the interim reports published subsequent to the balance sheet date. 
 
If you choose to cooperate in the enforcement examination, the relevant chamber of 
the FREP will appoint a responsible panel member for the particular case (examiner-
in-charge) who will contact you in the event of further queries. 
We also request you to designate persons whom we may approach with regard to 
obtaining further information or documentation. In future correspondence, we en-
courage you to use electronic communication which also expedites the examination 
process. 
Details concerning the procedures of identification of errors and publication of errors 
are described in chapter X of the “Issuer Guideline” of the Federal Financial Super-
visory Authority (BaFin), which is available at www.bafin.de. The FREP will ad-
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Zimmerstraße 30 - 10969 Berlin 











Exhibit II: Response by Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 - 44137 Dortmund 
 
Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung DPR e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 
10969 Berlin 
2 October 2008 
 
Re: Enforcement examination pursuant to § 342b para. 2 HGB 
Your reference no. S0074711/2105Y 
Dear Sirs, 
As communicated in your letter of 23 September 2008, the Financial Reporting En-
forcement Panel intends to subject the financial statements and the associated man-
agement reports of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA as of and for the year 
ending 30 June 2008 to an examination pursuant to § 342b para. 2 HGB. 
It is our pleasure to confirm our willingness to cooperate with the FREP in this ex-
amination process. Please find attached the consolidated financial statements and the 
individual financial statements as of 30 June 2008 as well as the management reports 
for the reporting period ending 30 June 2008, the corresponding audit reports of our 
auditor and the lists of unadjusted audit differences. 





Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
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Exhibit III: FREP’s List of Questions 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 - 10969 Berlin 
 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 
44137 Dortmund 
26 November 2008 
 
Re: Enforcement examination pursuant to § 342b para. 2 HGB 
Our reference no. S0074711/2105Y 
Dear Sirs, 
Thank you for agreeing to cooperate with us and for forwarding the documents re-
quested.  
We reviewed your annual report and the audit reports for the financial year 
2007/2008. Certain facts need further examination and we are kindly asking for addi-
tional information and documents to better clarify the explanations in the consolidat-
ed financial statements and the associated group management report. After reviewing 
these documents and your answers we may ask you for additional information and 
documents. 
1) Capitalized player values 
Please provide an overview of capitalized player values under the line item “Intangi-
ble Assets” in the amount of kEUR 15,383 and explain how they were accounted for. 
Also, please explain the initial and subsequent measurement of the player values (in-
cluding issues such as injuries, suspensions, etc.). In this context, please explain your 
accounting treatment for Delron Buckley, who was send to FC Basel on loan due to 
not living up to your expectations according to the report published in the football 
magazine Kicker on 4 September 2009. 
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Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 - 10969 Berlin 
 
2) Deferred tax assets on loss carryforwards 
Please explain the criteria for recognition of deferred tax assets on loss carryforwards 
in the amount of kEUR 6,151 as of 30 June 2008. Please present your tax planning 
for the next three years and the actual tax results of the last three years. 
3) Sponsoring contracts 
Please provide an overview of the ten largest sponsoring contracts concluded in the 
past (sponsor, contract period, engagement amount, payment arrangements) and ex-
plain how they were accounted for and how revenue was recognized. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. Please provide the 











Exhibit IV: Response letter by the BVB 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 - 44137 Dortmund 
 
Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung DPR e.V. 
Zimmerstraße 30 
10969 Berlin 
10 December 2008 
 
Re: Enforcement examination pursuant to § 342b para. 2 HGB 
Your reference no. S0074711/2105Y 
Dear Sirs, 
With reference to your letter of 26 November 2008, we are sending you the following 
documents/information. 
1) Capitalized player values 
a) Overview of selected player values of team squad 2007/08 
!  
 
Name First Name Market Value (TEUR) Carrying Amount (TEUR)
Amedick Martin 1,000 … 
Bade Alexander 200 … 
Blaszcykowski Jakub 5,000 … 
Brzenska Markus 1,000 … 
Buckley Delron 1,000 … 
Dede  7,500 … 
Degen Philipp 2,500 … 
Federico Giovanni 2,000 … 
Frei Alexander 11,000 … 
… … … … 










Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 - 44137 Dortmund 
 
b) Summary of additions and disposals during the year 2007/08 
in TEUR 1 July 2007 Additions Disposals 30 June 2008 
Acquisition cost 31,172 11,486 1,463 41,195 
Amortization 20,005 6,762 955 25,812 
Carrying amount 11,167 - - 15,383 
 
c) Initial and subsequent measurement 
According to IAS 38, the player values are shown under the line item “Intangible As-
sets”. They are measured at acquisition cost and amortized on a straight-line basis in 
accordance with the term of the individual contracts for professional players, taking 
into account the FIFA Regulations on the “Status and Transfer of Players” contained 
in circular no. 769 of 24 August 2001. The weighted average remaining contractual 
period of the player values as of the balance sheet date is 3.1 years. The acquisition 
costs of the player values comprise the transfer payments made as well as correspond-
ing fees for players’ advisers. The increase in the capitalized player values is due to 
the newly signed contracts with three players who were acquired in return for transfer 
payments. The three players are Diego Klimowicz (transfer fee of 1.5 m€), Mladen 
Petric (3.5 m€) and Antonio Rukavina (2.3 m€). 
d) Useful life and amortization method 
The intangible assets have a finite useful life. If there are concrete indications for im-
pairment (triggering event), an impairment test is performed in accordance with IAS 
36. The useful life and amortization method are reviewed at least once annually. 





Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 - 44137 Dortmund 
 
2) Deferred tax assets on loss carryforwards 
The deferred tax assets are recognized for the loss carryforwards to the extent that it is 
probable that future taxable profit is available against which the unused tax losses and 
unused tax credits can be utilized (IAS 12.34). In accordance with IAS 12.35, con-
vincing evidence exists that sufficient taxable profit will be available against which 
the unused tax losses or unused tax credits can be utilized. 
Tax results for the last three years were 1.59 m€ for 2005/06, 0.7 m€ for 2006/07 and 
1.42 m€ for 2007/08. We expect the following tax profit for the next three years: 4.74 
m€ for 2008/09, 6.97 m€ for 2009/10 and 7.76 m€ for 2010/11. 
3) Sponsoring contracts 
Borussia Dortmund has a wide range of sponsors (more than 500), with whom we 
agreed on different terms and conditions depending on their status and the contract 
design they wish. Below is an overview of the ten largest sponsoring contracts signed 
in the past: 
No. Sponsor Year of con-
tract 
End of contract Engagement Payments
1 EVONIK 2006 2011 7.5 m € Annual
2 Nike 2003 2009 28.25 m € Non-recurring
3 Signal Iduna 2005 2016 20 m € Non-recurring
4 Radeberger … … … …
5 Warsteiner … … … …
6 Sparda-Bank … … … …
… … … … … …
10 … … … … …
 
The contract with Evonik concerns the players’ jerseys and was signed in July 2006. 





Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
Rheinlanddamm 207-209 - 44137 Dortmund 
 
The equipment contract with Nike was signed in June 2003 and runs through 30 June 
2009. Since July 2004, Nike is the supplier of Borussia Dortmund with exclusive 
rights in terms of clothing, shoes and other equipment products. In the context of their 
engagement, Nike uses different measures in the the stadium (perimeter advertising) 
as well as B2B-possibilities in the restaurant facilities of the stadium. 
One of the main sponsors of BVB is Signal Iduna. The insurance company has se-
cured the rights for the name “Westfalenstadion” until 2016. Since December 2005, 
Borussia Dortmund’s stadium is called “Signal Iduna Park”. 
Generally speaking, Borussia Dortmund recognizes deferred income for payments 
received that relate to periods after 30 June. In subsequent periods, the respective 
amounts are recognized through profit and loss on a pro rata basis (Conceptual 
Framework, OB17, and IAS 1.28). The sponsoring contract with Nike presented an 
exception in that the non-recurring payment was recognized as revenue in 2003. The 
signing of the equipment contract (signing fee) was an essential reason for the reve-
nue recognition in 2003 (IAS 18.5 and IAS 18.29). In addition, the payment corre-
sponded to compensation for our giving up our previous equipment provider. 









3 Educators Material 
3.1 Teaching Notes 
3.1.1 General Remarks 
Enforcement of financial reporting is often a part of the regulatory requirements section of 
advanced accounting classes and, thus, introduced separately to accounting standard issues. 
Hence, most students have only mere knowledge on the effect of enforcement on financial 
reporting outcomes. The case study at hand therefore aligns both areas in a football industry 
setting. This instructional resource covers the case of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. 
KGaA, a German listed football club which in 2009 faced an error announcement subsequent 
to an enforcement investigation by the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel 
(FREP). The setting of this case covers the enforcement investigation procedure of the com-
pany discussing its previously made accounting choices with the FREP’s examiner-in-charge. 
In this context, the case demonstrates to students how important professional judgment deci-
sions are in the areas of intangible assets, deferred taxes and revenue recognition. Further-
more, students learn the difficulties of enforcing accounting standards that require significant 
managerial discretion.  
The main feature of this case is the discussion between the company representatives, assisted 
by its auditors or consultants, and the FREP’s representatives. Therefore, we recommend in-
structors to emphasize the role of the underlying defense or questioning strategy to each party 
in the discussion and to encourage students to additionally take into account the interdepend-
encies between all of the abovementioned accounting areas.  
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: First, we provide general remarks on 
the German enforcement system. Second, we present recommendations on strategic issues, 
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main questions, theoretical background and relevant aspects regarding recognition and meas-
urement issues for each accounting issue separately. Finally, we further provide a short blue-
print to FREP’s final decision in the real-world scenario, BVB’s options when receiving the 
preliminary error finding, and an outlook on potential consequences of adverse disclosure. 
The Teaching Notes are intended for faculty use only and are not meant to be distributed to 
students. The case comprises two main learning objectives. First, the case demonstrates that 
accountants apply professional judgment to solve an accounting problem. Second, students 
will learn that examiners-in-charge also apply professional judgment when reviewing ac-
countants’ decisions. If the notes are distributed to students, this might leave the impression 
that the issues discussed in the case are more clearly resolved than they are. The teaching 
notes are a condensed summary of all issues that can be discussed in class. Instructors who 
wish to have more detailed solutions to the requirements are invited to contact the authors. 
3.1.2 Enforcement in Germany 
The current two-tiered enforcement system in Germany consists of a private financial report-
ing enforcement panel and a federal authority, who have been investigating financial reporting 
of listed firms since 2005. It is but one regulatory reaction to several accounting scandals in 
the early 2000’s. The two-tiered enforcement system was enacted by the Accounting En-
forcement Act (Bilanzkontrollgesetz) in 2004 and, thus, implements EU requirements enacted 
through the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC). The directive complements the require-
ments by the IAS Regulation (EC/1606/2002) that requires firms to prepare consolidated fi-
nancial statements under IFRS and EU member states to implement and maintain effective 
enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure consistent and faithful application of IFRS. It is 
additionally complemented by reforms for auditor oversight and new independence rules for 
auditors (Ernstberger et al. 2012). That is, enforcement investigations constitute an additional 
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but lagged compliance mechanism that complements internal and external audit mechanisms, 
which aim at ensuring accounting standard compliance in the first place (Höltken and Ebner 
2015).  
Recital 28 of the Transparency Directive requires a federal authority to be ultimately respon-
sible for national enforcement. Consequently, most of the EU member states have assigned 
federal authorities to conduct enforcement investigations (ESMA 2015). Germany was the 
first country to combine federal authority with a private institution in order to conduct en-
forcement investigations. Since 2005, FREP conducts primary investigations on a cooperative 
basis, which means that companies are asked to answer FREP’s questions. However, if firms 
do not cooperate or if firms do not comply with FREP’s findings the investigation is handed 
over to the BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; German Financial Super-
visory Authority). BaFin is a federal agency having the necessary legal powers to enforce 
firms’ cooperation and will conduct its own investigation if firms (1) do not cooperate with 
FREP, (2) do not comply with FREP’s findings or (3) BaFin has reasonable doubts with re-
spect to FREP’s findings.  
FREP runs investigations based on random sampling, external indications of accounting non-
compliance or on BaFin’s request. Throughout the investigation process, FREP decides 
whether an accounting treatment has to be labeled as erroneous according to two principles: 
the definition of errors under IAS 8 and the relevance of the financial misstatement to public 
interest. If the firm agrees to the findings by either FREP or BaFin the error has to be publicly 
disseminated. Regularly, firms publish an error announcement in the federal gazette and in at 
least two daily financial newspapers. This process therefore enables the adverse disclosure 
mechanism (also ‘name and shame’ mechanism) which aims at both proactively and reactive-
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ly ensuring faithful and consistent application of relevant accounting standards (Hitz et al. 
2012). 
Please note that the aforementioned explanations are exclusive to the German enforcement 
setting. However, we think that this section can be easily adapted to other enforcement sys-
tems that comprise only federal or private institutions. Instructors therefore might want to 
briefly present two representatives for each enforcement system. First, being the role model 
for authoritative enforcement systems, enforcement by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the U.S. is conducted since 1934 and is the most researched enforcement system so 
far. For a comprehensive perspective on this approach we refer to a commentary by Stephen 
Zeff (1995), who also provides selective comparisons to the German enforcement system be-
fore 2005. Second, being one of the most known private enforcement systems, enforcement by 
the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). Main feature of this approach is the public 
pressure facilitated by adverse disclosure. For a comprehensive picture of U.K.’s enforcement 
we refer to Peasnell et al. (2002) or Brown and Tarca (2007).2 
3.1.3 Accounting for Intangible Assets 
The first accounting issue that is subject to FREP’s investigation gives students the opportuni-
ty to study and discuss the treatment of intangible assets. More specifically speaking, the first 
part of this case deals with accounting for professional football players. In this context, stu-
dents first need to discuss the reasons for capitalizing transfer fees in the first place. In a sec-
ond step, they need to figure out what reasons speak for or against an impairment of the carry-
ing amount of previously recognized player values. Answering these aspects, students will 
review IAS 38’s definition and recognition criteria and IAS 36’s requirements for identifying 
                                               
2  Instructors, who are interested in a more detailed description of the responsible enforcement body, the re-




the necessity for an impairment of non-financial assets. By preparing their discussion, stu-
dents also review the necessity and possible application of managerial discretion in both ac-
counting decisions.  
First, intangible assets are identifiable non-monetary assets without physical substance (IAS 
38.8). Building on this, IAS 38.11-24 provides different criteria for defining and recognizing 
intangible assets. The definition of an intangible asset is met when such an asset is identifiable 
(separability or contractual legal criterion accordingly), can be controlled and provides future 
economic benefit to the entity. An intangible asset can be recognized if, in addition, it is prob-
able that the entity will receive future economic benefit from this asset and costs can be 
measured on a reliable basis. If all of these requirements are fulfilled the entity recognizes an 
intangible asset. 
Second, IAS 38’s requirements for subsequent measurement mandate entities to apply either 
the cost model or the revaluation model. We note that IAS 38.72 allows different methods for 
subsequent valuation, including the cost model and the revaluation model. Instructors might 
discuss both possibilities with students, although, this case is based on the cost model. The 
cost model is quite intuitive due to the transfer fee paid and the missing active market for this 
particular asset with regard to calculating fair values. However, it might be noteworthy that 
fair values of players might be a better indicator of the player’s current value to the club and 
more suitable for fulfilling framework’s idea of confirmatory and predictive information. 
When applying the cost model, an intangible asset is ‘carried at its cost less any accumulated 
amortization and any accumulated impairment’ (IAS 38.74). Hence, there are two potentially 
interesting issues to discuss, including what is the useful life of an intangible asset (IAS 
38.88-96) and the potential need for impairment (IAS 38.111). For the first issue, students 
should identify the consequences of intangible assets with definite useful lives and discuss the 
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amortization period and method (IAS 38.97-99, IAS 38.104-106). For the latter, students 
should think about how entities review carrying amounts (IAS 36.7-17). 
Third, students should apply those requirements to the case. Students should therefore elabo-
rate on the fact that football players are accounted for as intangible assets, though, being hu-
mans. Referring to IAS 38’s introduction and the definition given in the standard’s paragraph 
8, an intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance. Thus, 
students should think about what is really the underlying asset that is recognized in the bal-
ance sheet. Normally, students will come up quickly with the idea that clubs need to account 
for the players’ eligibility, which also fulfills the definition of an intangible asset under IAS 
38. Being an explicit contract, player’s eligibility is an identifiable intangible asset (IAS 
38.12). Whoever owns this contract also is able to control it (IAS 38.13-16) and receives fu-
ture benefit that arises from the player. However, that might be a controversial point worth 
discussing with the students against the background of IAS 38.15 explaining that firms regu-
larly cannot control human capital. In addition, research by Amir and Livne (2005) has shown 
that current capitalization and future benefits of professional football players are not closely 
linked. For recognition purposes, the purchase price indicates the probable future economic 
benefit the club expects from an individual player (IAS 38.25). In line with IAS 38.27, the 
transfer fee might comprise agent fees and signing bonuses and, thus, can be reliably meas-
ured at its costs (IAS 38.24). To sum this up, BVB recognizes an intangible asset when ac-
quiring a football player. 
We note that there are three types of football players which are regularly found at football 
clubs. (1) Acquired players, which join the club in exchange for money, (2) free agents that 
join the club after their contract expired at another club, and (3) youth players which have 
been trained and developed at the club before joining the first squad. Nevertheless, only the 
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first type of players fulfills the capitalization requirements of IAS 38. We recommend the arti-
cles by Oprean and Oprisor (2014) or Lozano and Gallego (2011) for a brief discussion of the 
different treatments of each player type.  
Students regularly assume the contract period to be equivalent to the player’s useful life, 
which is in line with IAS 38.88 and the economic and legal restrictions given in IAS 38.95. In 
consequence, the recognized player value needs to be amortized on a systematic basis (IAS 
38.97). However, instructors might encourage students to think about how players regularly 
perform at different clubs. Most players need some time to unfold their full potential, which 
also decreases at the end of their contract or even career. Thus, a linear allocation might not be 
suitable for disclosing the exact contribution of each player but the most efficient solution 
(Forker 2005).  
In addition, students will find that BVB has to check player values for potential impairments 
in accordance with IAS 36. That is, IAS 36.9 defines that entities need to identify at the end of 
each reporting period if there is an indication for impairment. The recoverable amount only 
has to be determined if such an indication exists. The main task for students in this context is 
to determine which internal or external information might serve as an indicator for impair-
ment (IAS 36.12). The football industry setting provides different indicators that serve as im-
pairment indicators (i.e. career-ending injury) or not (temporary suspension due to red or yel-
low card, slight injury). In the case of Delron Buckley, who was sent to FC Basel on loan, one 
might argue that ‘not living up to the club’s expectations’ has to be considered as internal in-
formation that requires an impairment of the carrying amount. However, taking into account 
that some players need to develop over time, spending some time on loan might enhance his 
ability to contribute to BVB’s sporting success in the future. Also, playing on loan supports 
the assumption that the player has a certain value to another football club. In addition, stu-
 
300 
dents learn that all public available information is relevant to assessing current accounting 
treatments. Please be aware that there is no answer to the case of Delron Buckley in BVB’s 
official replica to the FREP. Students regularly take notice of this circumstance and, therefore, 
allow discussing different answer strategies for Borussia Dortmund, including the strategies 
of providing full or restricted information. In addition, the answer strategy provided in the 
documents for distribution (Exhibit IV) enables students to explicitly discuss the Buckley case 
in the meeting on 12 January 2009.   
3.1.4 Accounting for Deferred Taxes 
The second accounting issue subject to FREP’s investigation gives students the opportunity to 
study and discuss the treatment of deferred tax assets. In particular, the second part of this 
case deals with unused tax losses recognized in deferred tax assets under IAS 12. In this con-
text, students observe the necessity of professional judgment in order to assess the club’s past 
and future performance to recognize and maintain a loss-related deferred tax asset. Students 
will need to review IAS 12’s requirements for recognizing and subsequently measuring de-
ferred tax assets. In addition, they need to assess IAS 36’s requirements for impairment of 
assets for a second time and, thus, also strengthen their conceptual knowledge on the rele-
vance of IAS 36 for other standards.  
‘Deferred tax assets are the amounts of income taxes recoverable in future periods in respect 
of (a) deductible temporary differences, (b) the carryforward of unused tax losses, and (c) the 
carryforward of unused tax credits’ (IAS 12.5). Unused tax losses arise in years where com-
panies recognize negative income according to the rules established by local tax authorities 
and, thus, are recoverable income. In this context, a deferred tax asset shall be recognized in 
the period in which the tax loss arises if it is probable that the respective company generates 
adequate income in future periods against which the unused tax losses can be utilized (IAS 
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12.34). However, the existence of unused tax losses yields the assumption that there will not 
be adequate future income to be utilized and, thus, requiring firms to provide convincing rea-
sons for capitalization (IAS 12.35). IAS 12.36 therefore provides a non-exhaustive list of cri-
teria that might speak in favor of capitalizing unused tax losses as deferred tax assets: (1) suf-
ficient taxable temporary differences relating to the same tax authority, (2) future taxable in-
come is probable, (3) losses are one-time effect results, or (4) existing tax planning opportuni-
ties are available to make unused tax losses utilizable (also cf. IAS 12.30 for tax planning 
opportunities). The deferred tax asset shall be measured at the amount which the entity ex-
pects to recover from the tax authority (IAS 12.46) and shall not be discounted (IAS 12.53). 
Finally, the deferred tax asset’s carrying amount shall be reviewed at the end of each reporting 
period in order to assess the future potential of utilizing currently unused tax profits (IAS 
12.56). It becomes evident that entities need to apply professional judgment at several points 
and, thus, leave a lot room to managerial discretion for executive management. Building on 
this, instructors should encourage students to identify some of these points and discuss poten-
tial risks or benefits of the current accounting treatment within their groups.  
By analyzing FREP’s questionnaire, students should notice that FREP is interested in man-
agement’s judgment of BVB’s previous (years of financial distress) and future economic per-
formance. Both aspects are relevant for determining recognition and subsequent measurement 
of deferred tax assets. Regarding BVB’s answer, students acting as examiners-in-charge will 
probably find this answer to be insufficient. Instructors can use this finding to explain that the 
investigation process in written form allows firms to do so. However, firms need to be aware 
that this strategy bears the risk to upset the examiner-in-charge. In contrast, that might be a 
rewarding strategy to make a personal meeting necessary, which allows to personally explain-




The key figures provided in the company profile section indicate that net income has been 
volatile for the last three years (-20.8, 10.1, and -3.9). But, they also show that net income has 
been highly negative for the two years before (-67.7 and -54.5).  In sum, lack of profitability 
and sporting performance do not give reason to a positive outlook. However, students might 
use the positive trend to argue that BVB’s profitability is already increasing and will continue 
this path. In addition, they might think about the determinants of prior years’ bad perfor-
mance, including almost going bankrupt, amortization of expensive transfer fees, and so on. 
Nevertheless, students should also elaborate on the circumstances of future sporting perfor-
mance, which determines future economic performance. What is the probability? What are 
potential drawbacks? Students will regularly come up with the idea that sporting performance 
cannot be planned. Still, they should come up with a potential development for BVB by ap-
plying their own assumptions. While discussing this issue, instructors may remind students on 
what they have discussed for the other two accounting issues. The following line of argument 
could therefore speak in favor of recognizing loss-related deferred tax assets: Turning the em-
ployment strategy to developing own talent and bring them to the first squad reduces transfer 
fee amortization and, therefore, increases taxable income. To the present day, BVB’s devel-
opment has shown that this strategy actually worked out pretty well.  
3.1.5 Revenue Recognition 
We note that our case primarily deals with IAS 18 as we deal with financial statements from 
2008. However, we think that it might be helpful for students to get an outlook on the upcom-
ing implications of IFRS 15. Hence, we provide an additional solution to recognizing reve-
nues from royalties according to IFRS 15 at the end of section 3.1.6.1.  
The third accounting treatment questioned by FREP is revenue recognition and requires stu-
dents to review IAS 18’s requirements for recognizing revenue from different types of spon-
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soring contracts. In addition, students need to elaborate on the more fundamental require-
ments of the Conceptual Framework. In this setting, students learn how to assess revenue 
from others’ use of assets and evaluate potential motives of each party involved.  The case 
deals with three main sponsoring contracts in detail: (1) EVONIK as the sponsor presented on 
BVB jerseys, (2) SIGNAL IDUNA owning the name rights to the stadium, and (3) NIKE as 
the provider of equipment.  
Before discussing the requirements of IAS 18, instructors may recap on the accrual basis of 
accounting (with reference to IAS 1.27 in conjunction with OB17-OB19) and the correspond-
ing definition and recognition criteria stated in the Conceptual Framework. A relevant issue 
that should be highlighted in this context is the potential temporary gap of claims and pay-
ments (OB17). Concerning revenue, instructors may refer to Chapter 4 of the Conceptual 
Framework and briefly discuss the definition and recognition of income (4.29, 4.47, and 
4.48). Instructors should emphasize that income comprises revenues and gains, whereas the 
former arises in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity. Income is recognized when it 
can be measured reliably and has a sufficient degree of certainty with regard to receiving fu-
ture economic benefit.  
According to IAS 18.1, revenue arises from transactions and events including ‘(a) the sale of 
goods, (b) the rendering of services and (c) the use by others of entity assets yielding interest, 
royalties and dividends.’ Referring to sponsoring contracts, revenue regularly arises from oth-
ers’ use of entity assets as sponsors are granted to advertise with the name of the sponsored 
club. Thus, revenue is recognized as royalties that are charged by the club for the use of assets 
including naming rights, trademarks or copyrights (IAS 18.5).  However, IAS 18 only pro-
vides limited guidance on the assessment of revenues arising from licensing the aforemen-
tioned intellectual property. IAS 18.29 requires revenue recognition when it is probable that 
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the economic benefits flow to the entity and the amount can be measured reliably. The latter 
can be easily determined as it is regularly defined in the underlying contract, whereas the lat-
ter depends on the economic circumstances of the contract. Royalties shall be therefore rec-
ognized on an accrual basis in accordance with the substance of the underlying agreement 
(IAS 18.30(b)). Despite this, IAS 18.33 provides preparers with leeway to this principle by 
stating that ‘royalties accrue in accordance with the terms of the relevant agreement […] un-
less, having regard to the substance of the agreement, it is more appropriate to recognize rev-
enue on some other systematic and rational basis.’ Assessing the agreement’s economic sub-
stance is, however, subject to professional judgement. Concerning the pattern of revenue 
recognition, IAS 18.IE20 describes the straight-line basis as usually most practicable for rec-
ognizing revenue over the contract period.  
The sponsoring contract with EVONIK entitles the sponsor to be present on BVB’s jerseys, 
on perimeter advertising and other marketing opportunities. BVB therefore waives its right 
for the seasons 2006/2007-2010/2011 to present any other company on its jerseys, which is 
one of the most prominent marketing opportunities available. In addition, Evonik pays their 
sponsoring contribution on a yearly basis. In line with IAS 18.29-30 BVB hence recognizes 
7.5 mEUR on a yearly basis.  
The sponsoring contract with SIGNAL IDUNA entitles the sponsor to name the stadium. 
Hence, BVB grants Signal Iduna the long-term use (2005/2006-2015/2016) of its stadium and 
receives royalties in return. BVB therefore waives its right to give any other name to its stadi-
um for the next ten years and recognizes revenue on a pro rata basis as defined in IAS 1.28. 
That is, the straight-line basis according to IAS 18.IE20 seems to illustrate the economic ben-
efit arising from this agreement and, thus, its economic substance.  
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Students regularly find both of the prior discussed solutions intuitive. However, it shows them 
how to assess the economic substance of sponsoring contracts before elaborating on the more 
complex sponsoring contract with Nike. That is, they will understand that it is not the legal 
form (i.e. payment terms) that determine the revenue pattern but the economic substance of 
the underlying agreement.  
The sponsoring contract with NIKE does not follow revenue recognition on an accrual basis 
according to BVB’s answer. BVB representatives argue that Nike’s payment relates to giving 
up their prior equipment partner goool.de. Thus, by giving up its former equipment provider 
goool.de, BVB fulfills all its contractual obligations towards Nike. Assuming that there are no 
further contractual obligations (no repayment obligation or else), BVB would be entitled to 
recognize the full amount as revenue. That is, Nike’s payment would be characterized as a 
one-time-reward and, therefore, justifies direct revenue recognition in accordance with IAS 
18.33. Considering BVB’s economic performance in the early 2000’s and the circumstances 
of almost going bankrupt, the ability to fully recognize revenue at contract inception in 2003 
might be a very motivating factor for BVB’s executive management.  
However, FREP will not agree on relating Nike’s payment solely to giving up the goool.de 
contract. By contrast, FREP argues that Nike receives the right to use BVB’s intellectual 
property in order to equip them for the five years (2004/2005-2008/2009). That is, the eco-
nomic substance of the contract requires BVB to recognize revenue from these royalties on an 




3.1.6 FREP’s Final Decision, BVB’s Options, and Potential Consequences 
3.1.6.1 Blue-Print to FREP’s Final Decision 
At the end of the investigation, FREP needs to decide whether the accounting treatments un-
der investigation are compliant with the relevant accounting standards or not. For the latter, 
FREP establishes an error finding according, which has to be treated by the company in ac-
cordance with IAS 8. IAS 8.5 defines prior period errors as ‘omissions from, and misstate-
ments in, the entity’s financial statements for one or more prior periods arising from failure to 
use, or misuse of, reliable information.’ In addition, the erroneous financial misreporting 
needs to be material according to IAS 8. IAS 8.5 defines materiality by stating that ‘omissions 
or misstatements of items are material if they could, individually or collectively, influence the 
economic decisions that users make on the basis of the financial statements. Materiality de-
pends on the size and nature of the omission or misstatement judged in the surrounding cir-
cumstances. The size or nature of the item, or a combination of both, could be the determining 
factor.’ Hence, this definition builds on the descriptions of materiality given in IAS 1 and in 
the Conceptual Framework.  
The first issue tackled by FREP is recognizing and subsequently measuring football players as 
intangible assets. Although it is common knowledge that football players are recognized as 
intangible assets according to IAS 38, FREP uses such questions to investigate the general 
level of companies’ IFRS application knowledge. Students will therefore regularly consider 
this as a compulsory exercise. However, preparers of financial statements can show their en-
deavor to contribute to a cooperative enforcement investigation by providing a perfect answer 
in consideration of the exact requirements of IAS 38. This said, students should highlight 
BVB’s ability to control player’s eligibility and put emphasis on the difference between ‘nor-
mal’ workforce and football players (IAS 38.15). When discussing this issue, students should 
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remember that BVB accounts for the players’ eligibility rather than the player as a human 
being. With regard to subsequent measurement, students should first identify the linkage be-
tween IAS 38 and IAS 36 and secondly think about internal and external indicators enabling 
impairment according to IAS 36.9. This might include a more general elaboration on tempo-
rary suspensions, yellow or red cards and so on. The case of Delron Buckley allows a more 
explicit discussion on internal indicators as company representatives do not see him ‘living up 
to their expectations’, which might fulfill the case of IAS 36.12(g). But, in line with BVB’s 
letter from December 10, 2008, we do not think that this causes impairment. Reasons for that 
are two-fold: First, having him playing at another club on loan means that his performance is 
valuable to a third party; second, the statement might also be an attempt to motivate him to 
increase his effort in being a valuable member of BVB’s first squad. 
The second issue addressed by FREP is deferred tax assets resulting from unused tax losses. 
Recognizing deferred tax assets is all about estimating future taxable income against which 
currently unused tax losses can be utilized (IAS 12.34). Students therefore need to consider 
the sources of future taxable income, which is provided through marketing rights, sponsoring, 
and transfer fees. Successfully competing in different contests, being the determinant to in-
come from marketing rights and sponsors is thus a pivotal prerequisite for generating ade-
quate taxable income. In addition, selling valuable players can generate necessary income but 
diminish sporting performance in the next years. Thus, students might come up with other 
‘soft’ concepts like increasing the amount of youth players or free agents on the first squad, 
which might increase sporting performance in short-term and revenues from transfer fees in 
mid-term. Another ‘soft’ argument might be that prior years’ negative income is a result from 
investing in expensive players that yield higher amortization at first, although current sporting 
performance does not support this argument. Despite knowing the actual reason, we think that 
FREP accepted BVB’s positive for the future because given the successful history and the 
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current success of BVB’s youth teams a ‘soft’ argumentation seems reasonable for arguing for 
sufficient future taxable income. Instructors can opt to add that BVB’s sporting performance 
during the ongoing investigation was quite promising, ranking 6th in the Bundesliga at the 
time of the meeting with FREP in Berlin.  
The third issue investigated by FREP is revenue recognition, which concentrates on account-
ing for sponsoring contract. That is, sponsoring contracts typically comprise large amounts of 
money and several years of contract period. Hence, FREP would generally presume that reve-
nue from sponsoring contracts is recognized over time. This becomes interesting for multi-
period contracts that are based on a non-recurring payment, which is the Nike contract in our 
example. BVB argues that full recognition in 2003 is justified by giving up its prior equip-
ment provider goool.de, thus classifying Nike’s payment as installment payment (IAS 18.33). 
By contrast, Nike receives the right to equip BVB for the period of 2004 – 2009. Thus, the 
payment shows the characteristics of a royalty in line with IAS 18.30, which shall be recog-
nized on an accrual basis. That is, the economic benefit arising from this contract has to be 
allocated to each year of the contract period. To sum this up, FREP also infers that BVB re-
ceives the economic benefit arising from this agreement on a yearly basis and, thus, BVB vio-
lates the requirements of IAS 18.29. 
We emphasize that IAS 18 will be superseded by IFRS 15 in reporting periods beginning on 1 
January 2018 or later and that entities might even opt for early application. Therefore, in-
structors might want to discuss potential differences of IAS 18 and IFRS 15 the next session 
after applying this case. IAS 18 only provides rudimentary information on revenue recogni-
tion for licenses (IAS 18.29 and 18.33). By contrast, IFRS 15 provides detailed guidance on 
revenue from licensing (IFRS 15.B57-B62) and, in addition, introduces a new approach to 
differentiating licenses that grant use to an asset and licenses that grad access to an asset 
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(IFRS 15.BC404). In consequence, timing of revenue recognition follows the type of license 
granted. First, licenses that grant use to an asset are satisfied at a point in time. Second, li-
censes that grant access to an asset are satisfied over a period of time. In the following we 
present brief guidance on how to assess the Nike contract under IFRS 15. First question at 
hand is to identify if the Nike contract also fulfills the requirements of a licensing agreement 
under IFRS 15. IFRS 15.B52 defines a license to establish ‘a customer’s rights to the intellec-
tual property of an entity’, which will be the case as the economic substance of the agreement 
would be still the same. At contract inception, BVB will identify the equipment license granted 
to Nike as a separate performance obligation (IFRS 15.22). That is, granting such a license 
provides Nike with access to BVB’s intellectual property throughout the contracted period 
(IFRS 15.B52, IFRS 15.B56(a), IFRS 15.BC403). In consequence, BVB accounts for this as a 
performance obligation satisfied over time (IFRS 15.B60). By contrast, a license that would 
grant use of intellectual property is accounted for as performance obligations satisfied at a 
point in time. To sum this up, the assessment of the license under the Nike contract depends on 
the classification if the license grants access or use to intellectual property. In our opinion, 
the Nike contract would be classified as a license that grants access to an asset and, thus, 
revenue would have to be again recognized over time. However, this decision repeatedly de-
pends on professional judgment and, therefore, will probably raise FREP’s interest in the fu-
ture as well.  
3.1.6.2 The Preliminary Error Statement: BVB’s Options 
Based on the aforementioned blue-print to the different accounting treatments and the assess-
ment of the materiality of BVB’s misinterpretation, we expand on the fact that FREP con-
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cludes BVB’s 2007/2008 financial statements to be erroneous.3 The actual error was estab-
lished due to the misapplication of IAS 18.29 regarding the contract with Nike. Revenues 
arising from the use by others yielding royalties must be recognized on an accrual basis in-
stead of being fully recognized at the beginning (IAS 18.30). After deciding this, FREP sends 
Borussia Dortmund a preliminary error statement, requiring their acceptance. Borussia Dort-
mund can decide whether it accepts the preliminary error finding or not. If they do not agree 
with FREP’s finding the case is handed over to BaFin, which will conduct an additional inves-
tigation. When thinking about this option, students should reflect potential political aspects 
with regard to the relationship between FREP and BaFin – is there a real chance for Borussia 
Dortmund that BaFin will overrule FREP’s finding and, thus, scrutinize their investigation? 
Additionally, which internal and external resources are needed to prevail? Students therefore 
need to assess Borussia’s success rate. While discussing this question, instructors may also 
address the highest authority with regard to the German enforcement process, the Higher Re-
gional Court Tribunal in Frankfurt/Main. Companies can demand legal proceedings at the 
court in the event that they also do not agree with BaFin’s findings. 
By accepting the established error, Borussia Dortmund needs to restate their financial state-
ments in accordance with IAS 8. We regularly give students a short summary on the relevant 
sections of IAS 8 in order to enable them to reflect their own decision on certain accounting 
treatments in this case. In addition, we explain the option available to restate financial state-
ments properly. We assume that students in advanced accounting classes are aware of the 
different issued dealt with in IAS 8, including application of accounting policies, change in 
accounting estimates and prior period errors. Hence, we would already expect students to use 
                                               
3  The error announcement, which Borussia Dortmund published on July 14, 2009, can be accessed via 




arguments provided by IAS 8 in the previous discussions. However, instructors might want to 
remind students of the concept of enforcement that the examiner-in-charge need to evaluate 
potential errors against the background of IAS 8 before they decide if a certain treatment is 
erroneous. 
Prior period errors are defined by IAS 8.5 as ‘omissions from, and misstatements in, the enti-
ty’s financial statements for one or more periods arising from failure to use, or misuse of, reli-
able information that was available when financial statements were authorized for issue and 
could reasonably expected to have been obtained and taken into account in the preparation 
and presentation of those financial statements. Such errors can include the effects of mathe-
matical mistakes, mistakes in applying accounting policies, oversights or misinterpretations of 
facts, and fraud.’ Consequently, errors can arise from recognizing and measuring of items or 
disclosing related information. These errors need to be restated retrospectively in the period of 
their discovery in order to regain IFRS compliance (IAS 8.42). Errors are therefore corrected 
by restating all prior periods presented that were affected by the error. If restating prior peri-
ods becomes impracticable the entity shall restate the opening balances of assets, liabilities 









Current Assets -15.3 -10.4 -4.7 -4.7 
Equity -15.3 -10.7 -6.6 -6.6 
Current Liabilities 0 0.3 1.9 1.9 
Revenue 5.4 5.4 5.4 
IAS 8.46 Other adjustments -20.7 -0.9 -1.2 
Income -15.3 4.5 4.2 
Table 2: Restatements according to IAS 8 
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When applying IAS 8 to Borussia Dortmund’s financial statements, students should note that 
retrospective correction needs to be conducted in the 2008/2009 financial statements.  In this 
context, students should consider that Borussia Dortmund prepared IFRS financial statements 
for the first time in 2005/2006. However, the equipment contract was already entered in 
2002/2003. Thus, necessary information for prior periods cannot be obtained and, therefore, 
the 2005/2006 opening balance needs to be restated. Table 2 summarizes all restatements rec-
ognized by Borussia Dortmund in the 2005/2006-2008/2009 financial statements. 
In addition, the false recognition of revenue also affects BVB’s legal accounts. We note that 
this is a special occasion for the German setting, where IFRS financial statements primarily 
serve the information function of accounting and legal accounts are primarily used for deter-
mining stakeholders’ payment claims. However, the actual error affects both types of financial 
statements and, hence, students might be interested in the full dimension of the misapplica-
tion’s impact. In addition, errors affecting legal accounts yield more negative investors reac-
tions according to current research as outlined in the following section. 
3.2.6.3 Consequences of Adverse Disclosure 
After having determined that the instant recognition of revenue from the Nike contract was 
not compliant to IAS 18 and having identified that BVB needs to restate its financial state-
ments, students should think about how to communicate such an issue to shareholders. That 
is, students should make up their minds on the detail of explanations and possible conse-
quences of publicly disseminating such information.   
Adverse disclosure, also called ‘name and shame’ mechanism sets the tone from the top with 
regard to investor communication. That is, error announcements must be published in the fed-
eral gazette and, at least, in two daily financial newspapers. Public dissemination of financial 
misreporting is regulated in terms of stating the financial statements being revised, which 
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standard and which accounts are affected and the extent of the restatement. However, the error 
announcement must not trivialize the established error of the respective company. To sum this 
up, there are certain minimum requirements that must be disclosed. Still, this leaves room for 
executive management to decide how much additional information they want to disclose. 
Considering prior years’ sporting and financial development, it becomes probable that Borus-
sia Dortmund misinterpreted IAS 18 in its favor. In consequence, executive management 
probably chooses a restrictive communication strategy instead of explaining their motives in 
full detail. 
There is extensive literature on personal and economic consequences to adverse disclosure 
(cf. Höltken and Ebner 2015 for an overview). Preceding research on the German enforce-
ment system shows that investors do react negatively to error announcements (Hitz et al. 
2012). Investor reactions are driven by errors yielding a revision of profitability or leverage 
and also affect legal accounts (Hitz et al. 2012, Ebner et al. 2015). Borussia needs to restate 
revenues and corresponding assets that contain the deferred revenue. In addition, those re-
statements also affect Borussia’s legal accounts. Hence, Borussia might face negative stock 
market returns in reaction to publishing this error announcement.  
Being ultimately responsible for financial reporting, executive management faces personal 
penalties due to financial misreporting, including remuneration cutbacks or termination of 
employment. Financial misreporting is not only an indicator of misuse of executive powers 
but also indicates failure in governance mechanisms, including non-executive directors or 
auditors. For the latter, the case of Borussia Dortmund provides an interesting example for 
auditor turnover as they switched from a second-tier auditor (BDO) to KPMG, being one of 
the Big 4 auditors, the first year after restating their financial statements. While addressing 
this issue, instructors may discuss if this is about finding a ‘scapegoat’ or increasing govern-
ance levels in order to restore organizational legitimacy (Farber 2005). Students may elabo-
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rate on whether the second-tier auditor has addressed the revenue issue while auditing the 
2002/2003 financial statements. Considering the amount of the sponsoring contract, it seems 
very likely that they have done so. In this context, instructors may add that FREP is obliged to 
report such findings of audit malpractice to the Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC). AOC 
records a note in the responsible auditors’ files at the Chamber of Public Accountants indicat-
ing a reprimand. As a last resort, AOC can withdraw the responsible auditors’ professional 
title. Also, audit firms react to such events by either financially penalizing the responsible 




3.2 Case Learning Objectives and Implementation Guidance 
3.2.1 Learning Objectives 
1) Review the accounting for intangible assets (IAS 38), deferred taxes (IAS 12) and rev-
enue recognition (IAS 18) in an integrative case study. 
2) Apply and analyze accounting requirements using professional judgment. 
3) Become familiar with the process of enforcing financial reporting standards. 
4) Realize the consequences of decisions taken in earlier periods. 
5) Develop a reasoning and defense strategy for interaction with an enforcement institu-
tion. 
3.2.2. Implementation Guidance 
We developed this integrative case study for our class ‘Advanced International Financial Re-
porting’, which is part of the accounting elective of the Master’s program at HHL Leipzig 
Graduate School of Management. While we used the case on the master’s level, we believe 
that intermediate classes on the undergraduate level are suited for case usage as well. The case 
aims at introducing students to the real-world application of accounting standards and the 
consequences of management decisions taken in earlier periods by employing an enforcement 
situation at a publicly traded German soccer club that reports according to IFRS. Due to its 
integrative approach, the case enables students to appreciate not only the professional judg-
ment involved in daily accounting decisions, but also the real-world applicability of account-
ing standards and enforcement actions. By doing so, we contribute to the necessity of devel-
oping students’ application knowledge, which trains accounting-related conceptual knowledge 
and complementary knowledge (Robinson-Backmon et al. 1999). Depicting these issues by 
taking the case of a soccer club likely sparks the interest of most students in our case. 
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We employed the case as one final requirement in our class. That is, students were taught the 
requirements of IFRS accounting throughout the term and were to be given a final ‘wrap-up’ 
of accounting issues based on the case. Thus, they were made familiar with accounting rules 
and institutions prior to working on the case. When we used the case, we dedicated an entire 
afternoon to the case (approximately 4 to 4.5 hours excluding breaks). In a first session, we 
introduced students to the concept of enforcement and explained the general procedure of an 
enforcement examination. In addition, we gave instructions on the case. In the following two 
hours, students prepared the case (see time instructions next to requirements) and we provided 
assistance where necessary. In a final session of about 75 minutes, students simulated the 
meeting of the company and its consultants with the FREP. In the end, the students taking the 
role of the FREP took a decision on the company’s accounting. Finally, we provided students 
with the solutions to the case and gave feedback regarding their performance, argumentation 
strategy and findings. 
As an alternative to our approach, the case can also be employed by using one and a half sub-
sequent class sessions. In the first (half-)session, students can be introduced to the enforce-
ment mechanism, if not part of the class anyway, and the case instructions can be given. In the 
second session, the role play would take place and the solutions be provided. Table 3 depicts 
the alternative ways of using the case, displayed as Alternative A (entire afternoon) and Alter-
native B (subsequent class sessions). The time allotted to each content area is only meant as 






Alternative A Alternative B Content 
45-60 minutes Half a session Introduction to enforcement &  
case instructions 
 
Up to 120 minutes Between class ses-
sions, i.e. as home-
work 
 
Case preparation & assistance 
75-90 minutes: 
! 30-45 minutes for 
the meeting 
! 15 minutes for the 
FREP consulta-
tion 
! 30 minutes for the 
solution & feed-
back 
Second class session: 
Time requirements as 
for Alternative A 
Role play: 
! Meeting of company, consult-
ants & FREP 
! FREP consultation and decision 
Solution & feedback 
4-4.5 hours in total 1.5 classes in total  
Table 3: Alternatives for using the case 
By considering a German company and the German enforcement institution, the case natural-
ly takes a German focus. However, note that neither the case nor the requirements discuss 
issues that solely apply to a German setting. That is, both accounting requirements and the 
enforcement situation underlying the case could (hypothetically) be set in any country that 
applies IFRS and employs an enforcement institution. In particular, the conversations and the 
meeting with the enforcement agency give insights into how such investigations take place – 
regardless of country-specific factors. We thus believe that students at schools outside of 
Germany will have the same learning experience as students at our school. 
3.2.3 Student Feedback 
After every application of this case study, we ask students for their opinion on the case instead 
of handing out a questionnaire. We regularly ask them for case setting, workload, degree of 
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difficulty, and educational value. First, feedback from students with regard to the case setting 
indicates that they can easily relate to the football club setting and find it quite interesting to 
discuss everyday accounting issues in this particular setting. 
Furthermore, after first using the case in 2011, we made a number of adjustments to it. In par-
ticular, we reduced the complexity of the case. In the first version, we included an additional 
issue in the case – leasing of the club’s stadium according to IAS 17. Student feedback indi-
cated, however, that four accounting issues cannot be discussed in a sufficient way in the time 
available. As a result, we eliminated the leasing issue from the case. In addition, feedback 
points to the fact that students appreciate to develop strategies in order to either defend or 
question different accounting treatments. Discussing their opinions within and amongst the 
groups also encouraged students to get involved with the case. Overall, students find the ad-
justed case’s workload and degree of difficulty to be appropriate for the time given.  
In addition, students pointed to the value of the feedback session at the end of the case. At 
first, we dedicated only 15 minutes to showing and explaining the solutions. Subsequently, we 
extended the time allocated to the feedback session and do encourage instructors to allow a 
sufficient amount of time for the final session as students explicitly value a good ‘wrap-up’, 
including BVB’s option when receiving the preliminary error statements and potential conse-
quences of adverse disclosure. To sum this up, students uniformly assure that the case im-
proves their understanding of enforcement investigations conducted by FREP.  
We believe that the educational value of our case descends from the combination of reviewing 
conceptual knowledge and transferring this into application knowledge in a discussion situa-
tion. Students often state that arguing with IFRS requirements significantly improves their 
understanding of the requirements’ implications and interdependencies with other standards.  
We note that students became aware of the role of professional judgement for accounting is-
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sues. They also understood why it became necessary to enforce those decisions in order to 
ensure faithful and consistent financial reporting. Overall, we felt that the case did improve 
students’ ability to understand the necessity and the risk of professional judgment in decisions 
on recognizing or subsequently measuring assets. 
By now, we have employed the case six times at our school and intend to continue using the 
case in subsequent years because students have indicated the value of an integrative enforce-
ment case at the end of the semester. In addition, other instructors have employed the case at a 
number of other schools in Germany and have also received positive feedback on the learning 
experience that the case provides. In particular, students appreciated the real-world scenario 
employed in the case. They enjoyed both the application of what was discussed in class as 
well as the experience of discussing accounting issues, realizing what professional judgment 
entails and what consequences managerial decisions can have. Overall, student feedback has 
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